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Abstract 
When performing a skilled action—whether something impressive like a double 
somersault or something mundane like reaching for a glass of water—you exercise 
control over your bodily movements. Specifically, you guide their course. In what does 
that control consist? In this dissertation, I argue that it consists in attending to what you 
are doing.  
More specifically, in attending, agents harness their perceptual and perceptuomotor 
states directly and practically in service of their goals and, in doing so, settle the fine-
grained manner in which their bodies will move—details an intention alone leaves 
unsettled. This requires, among other things, that we reject views on which agents’ 
control is identical with their practical rationality. 
When all goes well, agents attentionally prioritize what is motivationally relevant to them 
to the exclusion of what would otherwise distract them from achieving their goals. 




attention is to avoid distraction, this entails the possibility of defective attention. Defective 
attention, in turn, casts light on scenarios in which agents lose control over what they are 
doing, as when a skilled practitioner ‘chokes under pressure’. 
A complaint sometimes levelled against accounts, like mine, that claim to reduce agents’ 
control of their behaviour to that of causally efficacious mental states or events is that 
these accounts invariably deprive agents themselves of their rightful role in the generation 
of behaviour. This is the “Disappearing Agent Problem” for “reductive” or “event-
causal” theories of action. I argue that, correctly understood, extant reductive theories do 
face a genuine Disappearing Agent Problem. However, it is a problem we solve by 
recognizing the role that conscious attention plays in making an action the agent’s own. 
Accordingly, I develop and defend an attentional account of action ownership. On this 
view, allocating conscious attention in service of your goals is sufficient for a kind of 
conscious perspective (“motivational perspective”), which, when active in controlling 
your behaviour, constitutes the behaviour as your own doing. As I explain, such 
perspective also contributes to explaining the subjective structure of an agent’s 
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What are the features of behaviour that qualify it as manifesting the agent’s control? A tra-
ditional “intellectualist” answer identifies agential control with practical rationality and
exercises of agential control with processes like practical reasoning culminating in deci-
sion. However, intellectualists face a challenge in explaining the control agents exercise
when moving their bodies. To illustrate, when an expert squash player performs a win-
ning drop shot, the control she manifests does not terminate with her decision, e.g., to
perform a drop rather than a boast. Intuitively, she also manifests control in the precise
manner in which she executes her decision—e.g., in such fine details as with what grip
to hold the racquet, how high to lift her arm, and how far and with what force to follow
through. Assuming that agents do not explicitly deliberate and decide on these fine de-
tails of their movements, intellectualism leaves us without an adequate understanding
of how agents settle such properties of their actions. This is the motor control challenge to
intellectualism.
The motor control challenge really is fatal for intellectualism. We must extend our
attributions of agential control beyond deployments of the agent’s rationality to include
certain of the psychological states and processes used in fine-grained intention execu-
tion. In rejecting intellectualism as an adequate theory of agential control, however, we
confront a new explanatory demand. We must say what an agent’s control of her fine-
grained movements consists in psychologically if not rational deployments of the sort
intellectualists have traditionally appealed to in their accounts of agency. Moreover, an
adequate account of these psychological states and processes must simultaneously reveal
why such states and processes qualify as deployments of the agent’s control.
To see why the latter may be an issue, consider the plausible suggestion that, in ac-
counting for how an agent’s fine-grained bodily movements are controlled, we must
1
appeal to finer grained states than beliefs, desires, and intentions, such as the agent’s
perceptual states. Unless agents somehow base their actions on perception, an obvious
feature of both ordinary and highly skilled actions would remain mysterious—namely,
how agents tailor their actions flexibly and precisely to particular features of a situation,
while respecting strict temporal constraints on intention execution. A role for percep-
tion in accounting for fine-grained human motor control thus seems unavoidable. On the
other hand, unless we explain how these action-informing perceptual states become an-
chored to the agent’s goals in acting, we will not have explained why perceptually based
behaviours qualify as manifesting the agent’s control. It thus seems that understanding
perception’s central role in enabling skilled, intentional action requires an account of mo-
tivational harnessing: the process whereby perceptual states become coordinated with the
agent’s goals in acting and, as a result, structured according to the standards of success
that the latter set for behaviour.
I’ll argue that attending just is this process. In attending, an agent’s perceptual states
become suitable to generate intention-congruent motor representations and thereby to
inform fine-grained bodily movement. The process of attending is the process whereby
agents allocate control toward a motivational state’s fine-grained motor implementation.
The plan for the chapter is this. In §1.2, I sketch the motor control challenge to intel-
lectualism and lay some initial groundwork for a non-intellectualist account of agential
motor control. In §1.3, I present my own proposal in terms of attending. In §1.4, I re-
turn to the intellectualist and argue that their main lines of response are unsuccessful.
In §1.5, I consolidate my proposal by explaining the role attention plays in dealing with
distractions. Finally, in §1.6, I compare my account with others that emphasize a role for
attention in action. Appreciation of the difficulties facing these proposals will strengthen
the case for by own conception of attention and its role in action.
1.2 The motor control challenge
According to what I’ll call an “intellectualist” conception, the control agents manifest in
acting can be characterized exhaustively in terms of two factors. The first is the causal
relation between behaviour and the agent’s propositional attitudes. The second is psy-
chological processes operating on these attitudes (e.g., practical reasoning). Davidson’s
(1963) theory of action offers an example. According to Davidson, an action is an event
that is intentional, and an event is intentional if and only if (henceforth, “iff”) it is caused
by reasons that motivate and rationalize it—on Davidson’s original view, a desire to Φ
and a belief that Ψ-ing is a way to Φ. To illustrate, suppose Athena visits a foreign city
and wishes to see City Hall, believes that taking the B-32 bus is a way to get there and
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that taking the B-32 is superior way of going there than her available alternatives (e.g.,
taking a taxi, walking, etc.). Other things being equal, she will take the B-32, and her
doing so will have been intentional iff caused (non-deviantly) by her motivating complex
of beliefs and desires—i.e., her reasons.1 On this view, behaviour is attributable to the
agent rather than to an external event or to one of the agent’s subsystems iff it manifests
the agent’s rationality. It is this alignment of agential control with rational control that
qualifies Davidson’s account as “intellectualist” in my sense.
Some philosophers have objected that Davidson’s account fails to do adequate justice
to the role of the agent in action because his account does not do adequate justice to the
role of the agent’s rationality in action. This is then taken to motivate the introduction
of yet other intellectual requirements on action. For example, it has been suggested that
that a full-fledged action must not only be motivated by reasons, but by reasons that the
agent “endorses” and “reflectively identifies with” (e.g., Velleman 1992; 2000; Bratman
1996). The objection with which I am concerned in this chapter goes in the opposite direc-
tion. According to this objection, Davidson’s view fails to adequately accommodate the
agent’s role in action because it does not do adequate justice to a different kind of con-
trol agents exercise in acting. Specifically, the account does not accommodate the control
agents exercise in skillfully moving their bodies.
To see the problem, consider the act of taking a sip of water. On Davidson’s view,
we can understand this as follows. If you are thirsty and believe that taking a sip from
the glass of water in front of you is a way to relieve your thirst, then, all else equal,
you will take a sip from the glass before you, and your sip will have been intentional iff
non-deviantly caused by your reason for action. However, as Israel, Perry, and Tutiya
(1993) note, Davidson’s account leaves open a “gap” between the propositional contents
of the agent’s motivating belief-desire complex—which in our example concerns a distal
object upon which the agent intends to act (the glass of water)—and the local bodily
movements required to act on the object in the intended way. To bring out the difficulty,
Israel et al. discuss the “wrong movement problem”. This is the problem that some
action failures seem not to be due to any error in one’s orienting beliefs—e.g., beliefs
about one’s circumstances or about which actions are ways of accomplishing which ends
in the circumstances—but to failures of execution. For example, one might fail to take
a sip from the glass in front of oneself not because one falsely believes there is a glass of
water located there or that sipping from it is a way to quench one’s thirst, but because one
executes the wrong movements when reaching for the glass. In such a case, action failure
doesn’t seem to arise from any falsity in the agent’s beliefs, at least as these are standardly
1Davidson later came to hold that intentions do not reduce to belief-desire pairs and instead are a sui
generis attitude (Davidson 1978). He “despairs” about deviant causal chains in Davidson (1973).
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conceived. For example, one’s beliefs that there is a glass there and that reaching for it is
a way to satisfy one’s thirst are true and, let’s suppose, justified. Rather, the action failure
seems to arise from lack of practical intelligence or “know how”. To highlight the central
role that the capacity for motor control plays in this challenge to Davidson, I’ll call it the
“motor control challenge”.
Israel et al.’s own response to the motor control challenge is not to reject Davidson’s
intellectualism. They instead respond by enriching our account of the propositional at-
titudes on the basis of which agents act to include beliefs about how to execute different
kinds of intentional actions (“belief how”) (Israel et al. 1993, 534). With these beliefs, Israel
et al. aim to bridge the gap that they claim to have found in Davidson’s account between
distal objects and local bodily movements. However, as Pacherie (2011, 69) notes, while
Israel et al.’s proposal might explain some action failures, it cannot explain all. What it
seems able to explain are execution failures resulting from false beliefs about which bod-
ily movements are ways to execute a given sort of action. But it seems not to explain what
goes wrong when the agent correctly believes that executing a certain type of movement
in the circumstances is a way to grasp the glass (and as a result intends to execute that
type of movement) but fails to execute her intention because her body does not move as
she intended. By hypothesis, failures of the latter sort don’t result from any fault in the
agent’s beliefs or other attitudes, but from a failure to implement them. Assuming the lat-
ter execution failures can reflect a lack of agential control, then it seems agential control
cannot be the same as rational control.
The motor control challenge forces the intellectualist either to explain why the above
action failures, contrary to initial appearances, are rational failures or why these action
failures, contrary to initial appearances, are not failures of agential control. In §1.4, I’ll
assess these potential ways of meeting the challenge. For the moment, I want to point
out that the motor control challenge also raises an explanatory demand on those raising
the objection to the intellectualist. In particular, they must say what an agent’s motor
control might consist in psychologically, if not deployments of rational processes of the
sort intellectualists have traditionally invoked in their accounts of agency. This is the
explanatory demand I want to take up now. Because Pacherie (2006; 2008; 2011) herself
offers the first step toward an alternative account with the notion of a “nonconceptual
motor representation”, and because my account will build on this notion, I’ll start with it.
The notion “motor representation” is taken from motor control theory (see e.g., Jean-
nerod 1997; 2006). It refers to the type of representation that is the proximate cause of
intentional movement. These representations are also responsible for ensuring the sat-
isfaction of strict biomechanical, kinematic, and temporal constraints on the successful
implementation of an intention. In order to perform these roles, they must specify the
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precise movement parameters for an action (e.g., with what force to move one’s arm) and
they must specify an action’s precise outcome (e.g., the specific grasp that will obtain
when the action is complete).
Unlike intentions, motor representations are nonconceptual (Pacherie 2011). A repre-
sentational state is “nonconceptual” if its instantiation doesn’t require its subject to pos-
sess the concepts needed to characterize its content (e.g., to express its correctness con-
ditions), where a “concept” is a representation deployable in thought (Peacocke 1992).
One reason for regarding motor representations as nonconceptual rather than conceptual
concerns the fineness of grain or determinacy of their content compared with that of inten-
tions.2 For example, in order to successfully reach for a glass of water and take a sip, ex-
act numerical magnitudes of various movement parameters must be represented at some
level. To claim that intentions are responsible for this is to claim that we have intentions
that represent, at the conceptual level, the exact numerical magnitudes for such proper-
ties as the speed, trajectory, force, and final location of one’s reach or the aperture and
force of one’s grip. This claim is implausible. Given the capacity limitations of concep-
tual states and processes—e.g., the coarseness of their content and the slowness of explicit
reasoning—it’s unlikely the agent represents the required information conceptually in the
form of beliefs and intentions. It seems much more likely that the representational states
responsible for specifying these movement parameters and outcomes are nonconceptual
motor representations.
As noted earlier, nonconceptual motor representations provide the beginning of an
account of the psychological basis of agential motor control. A complete account, how-
ever, would explain why we should think of these psychological states as contributing a
distinctively agential form of control. My own answer builds on a feature of Davidson’s
view that, I will suggest, survives the motor control challenge to his intellectualism:
MOTIVATIONAL CONTROL: An agent exercises control over some property of her behaviour
iff that property of her behaviour is the result of control by a motivational state
of hers—e.g., by the intention with which she acts.
What the motor control challenge ultimately shows, in my view, is that intellectualists
like Davidson have operated with an overly restrictive view of the mental states and
processes constitutive of exercises of motivational control (cf. Dickie 2015, 95 ff). On their
view, the way one settles the answers to questions about how one will act (e.g., whether
or not one will Ψ) is by engaging in explicit inference. This process culminates in the
rational selection of a specific course of action—e.g., a conceptual intention to Ψ given
2Evans (1982, 229) defends the claim that perception possesses nonconceptual content on similar
grounds.
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one’s goal of Φ-ing. In deploying such rational processes, a distinctively rational form of
control is thereby exercised. More specifically, a distinctively practical form of rationality
is exercised. This is a form of inference in which one adopts a conclusion on the basis
of certain premises, not because the conclusion is “shewn to be true by the premises”
(Anscombe 1957/2000, 58), but rather because its premises show it to be good in light
of one’s goals or to count in favour of the conclusion. Supposing agents exercise not
only rational control but motor control, we can ask about the process or processes that
agents use to settle finer grained questions about how they will implement their goals—
e.g., whether or not they will Φ in determinate way w. Given MOTIVATIONAL CONTROL, this
would be a psychological process that is anchored to the agent’s intention. But rather
than resulting in a further implementational intention (e.g., toΨ as a means of Φ-ing), this
process instead results in a nonconceptual motor representation. The challenge facing
the opponent of intellectualism is to describe such an intention-directed psychological
process without relapsing into intellectualism.
In the next section, I sketch an account of the psychological process whereby an agent’s
intention to act generates a nonconceptual motor representation and, in doing so, set-
tles the answers to finer grained questions of intention implementation than an intention
alone can settle.
1.3 A solution to the motor control challenge
In this section, I propose that it is through attention that agents settle the fine details of
their actions and thereby exercise motor control. In particular, attending is the process of
harnessing perceptual information to coherently resolve implementational questions that
remain unresolved by the agent’s conceptual intention to act. I’ll start by explaining how
I conceive of attention as a psychological phenomenon. I’ll then explain how the features
of this causal process help us to answer the motor control challenge.
As I shall understand it, attending is a biasing process that makes a subject differen-
tially prone to use some available information at the expense of other information. To
illustrate, suppose you begin to look for your favourite red pen with the aim of writing
something down. Your intention to find your red pen introduces a bias into visual pro-
cessing, so that you become preferentially sensitive to red, pen-shaped stimuli to the ex-
clusion of other stimuli. Once it is detected, motor programming for reaching commences.
You reach for your pen with a grip appropriate for writing, and you consequently do as
you intend.
I’ll now say more about how I propose to understand this biasing process.
We can understand the process of attending as comprising two constituent mental
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states: what I’ll call an “attentional source state” and an “attentional resultant state”. An
“attentional source state” is the mental state that drives the bias, whereas an “attentional
resultant state” is the effect of this bias on states of sensorimotor processing. One virtue
of this conception of attention is that it helps to resolve an ambiguity that one sometimes
finds in the empirical literature regarding where in this biasing process attentional selec-
tion itself exists or occurs. I’ll illustrate this with the case of visual attention. According
to more traditional views of visual attention, the realizer of attention itself is identified
with the causal source of attentional bias in a dedicated “supramodal”, nonsensory area
of the brain that acts on lower level visual systems (e.g., Posner and Peterson 1990). In
my terms, this approach identifies attention with the attentional source state. By con-
trast, more contemporary models often identify visual attention with the resultant (or
“emergent”) effect of some biasing process on states of visual processing (e.g., Desimone
and Duncan 1995; Duncan 1998). These generate opposing conceptions of attention as
either essentially cognitive and high level or else sensory and low level (see Stinson 2009;
Allport 2011; Mole 2015; Wu 2017 for discussion). My conception has elements of each
picture. On my conception, a process of visual attention is realized in the biasing of lower
level visual systems by higher level source states, and a state of visual attention is realized
in the modulated state of visual processing that results from this biasing process. Con-
sistent with contemporary models, a state of visual attention is, on this conception, a sort
of visual state. However, there is also a constitutive role for participating source states
in making that visual state one of attention. That is, a state of visual attention is a visual
state whose status as attention constitutively depends on the biasing influence of certain
source states. I return to this framework often throughout the dissertation.
When the source state for an attentional episode is the subject’s goal or intention, the
attention is said to be “goal-directed” or “top-down” as opposed to “stimulus-driven”
or “bottom-up” attention. In the next chapter, I argue that this traditional dichotomy
between two types of attentional control—one intuitively active; the other intuitively
passive—are less clear-cut than sometimes assumed. I will argue there that an agent’s
attention is always partly driven by a motivational source, and so in an important sense
is always motivated or “goal-directed”. In this chapter, however, my concern is specif-
ically with attention as it is deployed in service of an agent’s intention to achieve some
goal. Consequently, I am concerned with an unambiguously goal-directed form of atten-
tion. I will postpone consideration of the different varieties of attentional control—i.e.,
the different potential source states of attentional bias—till the next chapter. For the re-
mainder of this chapter, unless otherwise stated all references to “attention” should be
read as referring to goal-directed attention—in particular, to attention that is directed by
the agent’s intention to accomplish some goal.
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The attentional source state for goal-directed attention can be thought of a motiva-
tional state, such as an intention. With reference to the tasks given to subjects in laboratory
conditions, psychologists refer to a subject’s “intentional set”, “task set”, or “attentional
set” as playing this source role. We can think of a task set as the intention that sets the
goal for psychological processes and directs them toward that goal’s achievement. Thus,
in adopting a certain task set, the subject’s intention to complete that task comes to serve
as an attentional source state. In our earlier example, your intention to write with your
favourite red pen serves as your intentional set, which introduces a top-down bias into
the network favouring task-relevant stimuli and responses and suppressing or inhibiting
task-irrelevant stimuli (“distractors”) and responses. Intuitively, in adopting this task set,
you are giving (“setting”) yourself the task and, in so doing, becoming mentally prepared
(“set”) for the task ahead. This means anchoring your attention to that intention.
If the process of top-down biasing by intention disposes a subject to respond to a tar-
get in a task-congruent manner, does this show that attending operates not only on the
subject’s perceptual states but also on her motor states? The answer depends on how
we draw the boundary between perceptual and motor states, and the framework I’m
proposing is neutral about how we draw this line. One option is to distinguish states of
perceptual attention and motor attention or perceptual and motor aspects of a state of at-
tention. This would accord with the distinction sometimes drawn between “selection-for-
perception” and “selection-for-spatial-motor action”. According to this framework, two
forms of attention, subserved by partially functionally and anatomically separate pro-
cessing streams, become coordinated under a single “visual attention system” (Schneider
and Deubel 2002; cf. Cisek 2007; Memelink and Hommel 2013; Herwig 2015 for com-
plementary approaches). If by “perception”, however, one includes not only the ventral
visual states used in categorizing and identifying objects for uptake in reasoning and
planning, but also the visual states immediately used in fine-grained movement-control
within the dorsal visual processing stream (Milner and Goodale 1995/2006), then it is
possible that parameter-setting for a motor representation can be fully specified once
perceptual (or “perceptuomotor”) states have been attentionally modulated. The latter
visuomotor states are sometimes said to represent objects in terms of the fine-grained
movements required to, for example, reach and grasp an object. If we include the latter as
perceptual, then perceptual attention may be sufficient to resolve determinate movement
details because, among the perceptual states that receive attentional biasing, some repre-
sent the agent’s environment in terms of the determinate movements required to perform
various object-directed actions, and this may be sufficient to generate a motor represen-
tation. In either case, the subject’s intention biases psychological processing within lower
level, nonconceptual systems in ways that eventually culminate in formation of a motor
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representation.
At the end of the last section, I formulated the motor control challenge for the oppo-
nent of intellectualism as follows: to accommodate the claim that in acting, an agent’s
bodily movements are motivationally controlled, while resisting the claim that motiva-
tional control reduces to conceptual decision-making. I suggested that this demand could
be met by identifying a process whereby agents select a means to an intended end that
does not require that the selected means figure in the conceptual content of a decision.
I now want to suggest that such a nonconceptual form of selection occurs when agents
attend in acting. By attending, the agent selects solutions to implementation problems in
a way that is simultaneously: (i) directed by the agent’s intention, and (ii) distinct from
decision-making.
That attending is an intention-directed process follows from an intention serving as
its source state. The primary difference between attending and practical reasoning is
that, in attending, the mental states that one’s intention harnesses in in order to settle
its own implementation are not conceptual states, such as orienting beliefs about one’s
circumstances and which ways of acting are conducive to achieving one’s goals in those
circumstances. Instead, in attending, one’s intention harnesses non-conceptual states.
Nevertheless, important parallels exist between attending and practical reasoning. Just as
practical reasoning is a process of harnessing beliefs in order to settle high level questions
about how one will act (e.g., whether one will Ψ given one’s goal of Φ-ing), attending is a
process of harnessing nonconceptual information in order to settle finer grained questions
about how one will act (e.g., the specific manner in which one will Ψ given one’s goal of
Φ-ing). Just as agents put their beliefs to use as premises in deliberating about how to act,
they put their nonconceptual perceptual states to use in attending in order to settle how
they will move their bodies. The former process leads ultimately to a conceptual action-
guiding state (an intention); the latter to a non-conceptual action-guiding state (a motor
representation). When acting with skill, agents exploit, in a practical form, their status as
both reasoners and as perceivers.
Related to the non-conceptual status of perceptual attention, we can identify two
senses in which the selection the agent makes by attending will typically be “automatic”
rather than deliberate or intended. First, I’ve said that the final product of an agent’s
attentional selection is a nonconceptual motor representation responsible for executing
the fine-grained movement parameters of an intentional action. The content of this rep-
resentation will include, among other things, precise magnitudes like velocity and grip
aperture. Since intention, by contrast, is a conceptual state, the fine-grained properties
the motor representation specifies need not, and typically will not, figure in the content of
the agent’s explicit intention. As a result, when a motor representation successfully pro-
9
duces the movement that its content specifies, the properties of the movement for which
the motor representation is responsible need not be intended by the agent. For exam-
ple, when you finally reached for your red pen in order to write something down, you
likely did not deliberate about the precise grip size and aperture that you used to grasp
it. Instead, such fine-grained properties of your action were performed “automatically”
or “sub-intentionally”. Relatedly, while subjects can usually offer some verbal explana-
tion for what they have done intentionally, they may not be in a position to do the same
for properties of an action that are the product of nonconceptual motor representations.
For example, if asked why you just grabbed your red pen, you might respond “Because
I needed to write something down with it”. But if asked to justify some highly specific
property of your reach, you may not be able to offer the same kind of justification because
you did not realize your grip had the described property (cf. Luthra 2016, 2273). The
relevant property was an automatic rather than deliberate feature of your action.
A second dimension of automaticity comes from the fact that attending itself will often
be automatic in that agents typically will not intend to attend as a means to achieving their
goals. For example, having formed the intention to write something down with your pen,
you do not typically then strategically decide to focus your attention on the desk in order
to find your pen (though you can do this). Rather, once an intention is formed, it normally
comes to structure attention automatically. Because attention is deployed automatically,
subjects can very well be surprised to learn how they were directing their visual attention
to a scene while performing a task (cf. Wu 2014b, 35). Rather than being initiated on
the basis of practical reasoning, attending typically occurs in tandem with one’s practical
reasoning. Attending is a motivated, yet typically automatic mode of agential control.
In this section, I’ve sketched my proposed solution to the motor control challenge.
Attending is the process whereby agents settle finer grained properties of intention im-
plementation than are normally settled by decision. This process is realized in the biasing
by an agent’s intention of nonconceptual perceptual and perceptuomotor states. In so
doing, we exercise automatic, yet motivationally directed control over our bodily move-
ments. Having sketched my proposal, I want now to return to the intellectualist and
explain why we should prefer my account over theirs.
1.4 The extent of agential control: Rebutting the intellectu-
alist
As I noted in §1.2, intellectualists about agential control face two options in responding to
the motor control challenge. First, they could accept that the motor control manifested in
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fine-grained behaviour is a genuine exercise of agential control but argue that this form
of control can be accommodated by suitably enriching our conception of the proposi-
tional attitudes on the basis of which agents act. Second, they could grant that motor
control cannot be fully explained as a form of rational control, but then deny that they
are under any burden to explain motor control because motor control doesn’t instantiate
a genuinely agential form of control. The former response claims to bring motor control
within the scope of agency, while the second claims to exclude it. I’ll consider each of
these responses in turn, and argue that neither provides a convincing response for the
intellectualist. Consequently, we should reject intellectualism.
1.4.1 Motor control as rational
According to the first reply I’ll consider, the fine-grained properties of action reflect the
agent’s rational control. In particular, on this proposal, an agent who lacks the ability to
successfully execute a certain type of intentional movement does not possess the same
beliefs as a person who possesses that ability.
One question for someone pursuing this response is whether or not they regard the
proposition believed by the skilled agent as being sufficiently fine-grained to explain the
precise movements the agent makes in a particular situation, at a time, in response to spe-
cific cues, etc. There are two worries facing an affirmative answer to this question. The
first is that it will place unrealistic demands on decision-making. When one intentionally
reaches for a glass of water or executes some skilled performance, it is true that precise
magnitudes governing various movement parameters of the reach must be represented
at some level. But it is implausible that such information is represented in the agent’s de-
cision, presumably on the basis of deliberation, about how to execute the action. Second,
even supposing that an agent possessed beliefs that were fine-grained enough to rational-
ize the precise execution details of her action (and that all of these beliefs were true and
justified), this still wouldn’t help to explain the case where the execution error arises in
the application of those beliefs to a particular situation.
To circumvent these difficulties, the intellectualist might appeal to Stanley and
Williamson’s (2001), Stanley’s (2011), and Stanley and Krakauer’s (2013) account of
“know how” as a species of propositional knowledge and of skilled action as an action
governed by such knowledge. Stanley and Williamson illustrate their proposal with Han-
nah’s knowledge of how to ride a bicycle:
Hannah knows [PRO how to ride a bicycle] is true relative to a context c if and
only if there is some contextually relevant way w such that Hannah stands
in the knowledge-that relation to the Russellian proposition that w is a way
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for Hannah to ride a bicycle, and Hannah entertains this proposition under a
practical mode of presentation. (Stanley and Williamson 2001, 430)
Importantly, the key element in this proposal is not the proposition Hannah knows—i.e.,
that w is a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle. In general, nonexperts can know many of
the same propositions experts know about which actions are required to execute a certain
skill—e.g., that fitting an arrow to one’s bow is a way to initiate an act of archery. Indeed, a
large part of being a novice in a domain consists in acquiring knowledge of propositions
about which actions are required to execute the skill and in actively considering such
propositions when practicing. While Stanley and colleagues believe that experts are apt
to know many more such propositions than nonexperts about the domain in which they
possess expertise, they also accept that merely to increase the propositions an agent knows
is insufficient to explain skill. What seems fundamentally to distinguish experts from
nonexperts, on their account, is rather the practical mode of presentation under which
the expert knows propositions about ways of executing the skill. It is a certain way of
knowing propositions about which actions are required to execute a skill which experts
acquire through years of disciplined practice and training. And it is presumably this
way of knowing that is meant to explain why experts, but not novices, exemplify precise
motor control when applying what they know in a given circumstance. On this view, to
act skillfully consists in deploying one’s knowledge that w is a way to φ in a particular
circumstance under a distinctively practical mode of presentation.
With the notion of a practical mode of presentation, Stanley et al. give the appearance
of accommodating agential motor control within an intellectualist framework. However,
when we examine the details of how such knowledge is meant to account for motor
control, the appearance is found misleading. On examination, they do not grant that
motor control is a genuinely agential (because rational) form of control, but rather deny
its agential status. To show this, I’ll focus my remarks on Stanley and Krakauer (2013),
which is Stanley’s most detailed discussion of how he envisions the relationship between
the agent’s propositional knowledge of ways to φ and the fine-grained motor control the
agent displays in φ-ing.
According to Stanley and Krakauer, skill or know how is a composite state that pos-
sesses a knowledge component and a nonknowledge component. The former is knowl-
edge of a large number of facts about which actions are ways of executing the skill—
paradigmatically, what to do to initiate the activity in a certain circumstance. They regard
this component as explaining both the intelligence and control agents manifest in act-
ing skillfully—paradigmatically, in strategic decision-making.3 The second component
of skill is what they call “motor acuity”, which, following Shmuelof et al. (2012), they
3They write:
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describe as “practice-related reductions in movement variability and increases in move-
ment smoothness” (quoted in Stanley and Krakauer 2013, 8). Unlike the knowledge com-
ponent, Stanley and Krakauer characterize the states and processes responsible for the
motor acuity of a performance as nonintelligent and not under the subject’s direct con-
trol. They compare its agential status to digestive processes and to perceptual acuity:
things, they suggest, the agent has no direct control over (Stanley and Krakauer 2013, 6).
Their main aim is to show that being skilled at something requires factual knowledge
about such things as, for example, the way to initiate the activity. They defend this claim
by appealing to studies of amnesic subjects who show steady improvements in motor
acuity using a foreign tool through daily practice with the tool. However, given their
amnesia, these patients must rely on explicit instruction each day about the way the tool
is used. Because the patients lack this knowledge at the start of each day, Stanley and
Krakauer argue that these patients aren’t skilled in the activity, even though their motor
acuity increases with daily practice. In their view, contemporary philosophical and em-
pirical discussions of motor skill miss this obvious fact by mistakenly equating motor skill
with its non-epistemic, non-intelligent, and non-agentive component—i.e., motor acuity.
Let’s grant Stanley and Krakauer that the factual knowledge they discuss is required
for skilled actions, and let’s instead focus on the implications of their position for the
motor control challenge. Of the two components of skill that Stanley and Krakauer put
forward, only motor acuity seems to be directly relevant to the fine-grained control agents
display when executing their intentions (Fridland 2014, 2739; Levy 2017). It is motor acu-
ity that is claimed to explain improvements in motor variables that occur through practice
and training, and Stanley and Krakauer acknowledge that merely adding to an agent’s
factual knowledge—e.g., about which actions are required to initiate the activity—is in-
sufficient to explain the performance improvements that come with skill development.
But since, on their view, the motor acuity of a performance is the product of states and
processes that do not directly manifest the agent’s control, this response to the motor
control challenge seems to resolve into a version of the second intellectualist strategy out-
lined at the start. That is, it resolves into the claim that motor control does not instantiate
rational control but also does not instantiate agential control. What explains the improve-
ments in fine-grained motor control (as opposed to improvements at the level of conscious
The claim that skill involves knowing what to do and how to do it explains Aristotle’s com-
ment about the distinctive nature of skill, which is that skills are under our voluntary control
. . . If one can, in the relevant sense, start shooting arrows by fitting them into one’s bow, and
one knows that one can do this, then shooting arrows by fitting them into one’s bow is under
one’s voluntary control. Thus, skill possession requires a kind of knowledge, possession of
which entails voluntary control over one’s actions. It is this feature of skill that explains its
distinctive nature (Stanley and Krakauer 2013, 5).
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strategy), on Stanley and Krakauer’s view, is something that, by their own admission, is
passive, nonintelligent, and brute mechanism. Stanley and Krakauer’s strategy collapses
into the denial that motor control processes manifest knowledge and rationality at all.
Further, if the subject’s acquisition of a practical mode of presentation is meant sim-
ply to consist in improved motor acuity, then it is not easy to see how it could reflect
any change or advancement in the subject’s understanding of what is required to execute
an activity. Motor acuity merely characterizes the efficiency of a passive, nonintelligent
system. Consequently, one might wonder if Stanley and colleagues have genuinely de-
scribed a mode of presentation. Perhaps the difficulties Stanley and colleagues face reflect
a specific empirical conception of motor control that they would do better to avoid. For
example, perhaps they could claim that the improvements occurring through practice
and training are improvements in the agent’s ability to attentionally settle fine details of
movement in accordance with her intention, along the lines I’ve suggested. This could
help them to avoid the result that the expert’s practical mode of presentation on a way
to φ is a brute causal matter, and rather a reflection of the agent’s point of view in action.
Might my attentional account of motor control provide a superior implementation for the
notion of a practical mode of presentation?
I find this suggestion congenial. Attention could provide the practical mode of pre-
sentation under which an agent knows the way to φ when applying her knowledge in
a particular circumstance. However, if this means acknowledging that motor control is
attentionally based (in the manner that I proposed in §1.3), then Stanley and colleagues
would be walking back on the claim that the agent’s control is exhausted by the com-
ponent of skill they link with factual knowledge and strategic decision. This is because,
on my proposal, attention is distinct from the latter components of the agent’s control.
So, while my account might provide a way to salvage the notion of a practical mode of
presentation from the difficulties Stanley et al.’s elaboration of it faces, it also seems to
suggest that in applying one’s knowledge in a concrete circumstance, one must actively
draw on a nonconceptual form of control. That is, by allowing that attending provides
the practical mode of presentation under which one knows the way to φ, Stanley and
colleagues would seem to acknowledge that one’s implementation of rational control de-
pends on exercising of another form of control—attentional control. And this would be
to abandon intellectualism about agential control.
I’ve discussed two versions of the claim that motor control is a species of rational
control. Neither, I’ve suggested, presents a viable strategy for the intellectualist. With
that, I propose to leave the first line of response and turn to consider the prospects of
the second. This is to argue that the psychological states and processes underlying the
fine-grained motor control agents display in acting falls outside the domain of agential
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control.
1.4.2 Motor control as “subpersonal”
To justify the claim that motor control is nonagential, the intellectualist could argue that
motor states and processes are merely a subpersonal enabling condition for the exercise
of agential control rather than constitutive of agential control. According to this pro-
posal, it is the agent’s decision to take a sip from a glass of water, for example, that marks
the end of personal or agent level states and processes and the commencement of sub-
personal processes responsible for overseeing fine-grained implementation details—e.g.
with what velocity, force, grip size and aperture to reach for the glass. With the distinction
between personal and subpersonal levels, the intellectualist can distinguish between two
types of execution failure. The first type is explainable by reference to the agent’s rational
perspective—e.g., to a false belief or an error in reasoning—and so genuinely attributable
to the agent. The second type is a brute failure in the operation of subsystems that medi-
ate an agent’s rational perspective and her overt behaviour. On this proposal, execution
errors arising from failures of motor control as opposed to errors of belief belong to the
second category. Any “gaps” that separate the agent’s decision and its motor execution
can be closed at the subpersonal level without amending the intellectualist’s view of the
mental states and processes that are constitutive of agential control.
The question for this proposal is: what does it mean to say that motor states and
processes are subpersonal? I’ll consider two interpretations of this claim: first, that motor
states and processes are unconscious; second, that motor states and processes are mere
“reflex”. I’ll take each of these suggestions in turn.
1.4.2.1 Motor control as unconscious
Let’s begin with the claim that motor control is subpersonal because it is unconscious.
Some think there is empirical support for this claim. To illustrate, in experiments requir-
ing subjects to point at a target, subjects make rapid and accurate finger adjustments in
response to sudden changes of target position, even when subjects report having been
unaware of any change of target position or of having moved their fingers.4
This objection raises several important and difficult issues. I limit myself to the fol-
lowing observations.
4For an early study, see Bridgeman (1981). Milner & Goodale (1995/2006) appeal to these and other
findings in support of their “two visual systems hypothesis” that dorsal stream visual processing is un-
conscious whereas ventral stream processing is conscious. For philosophical commentary, see Clark (2001),
Campbell (2002), Kelly (2002), Matthen (2005), Briscoe (2009), Mole (2009), Brogaard (2011), Wu (2014a);
Briscoe and Schwenkler (2015); and Shepherd (2016a).
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First, the states underlying fine-grained motor guidance exhibit some of the central
features of conscious states, even if they do not exhibit all of them. For example, these
subjects adjust their fingers spontaneously in response to visually detected shifts of tar-
get position. This distinguishes the visual states underlying their finger movements from
the visual states found in blindsight. In blindsight, subjects suffering from damage to
primary visual cortex report no awareness of stimuli occurring within a certain region of
their visual field (the “scotoma” or “blind field”), though there is behavioural evidence
that information from stimuli within that region is nevertheless still being encoded in
their visual system (likely bypassing the damaged striate cortex via subcortical pathways
to extrastriate areas) (Kentridge et al. 1997). Although they do not spontaneously act on
stimuli presented in their blind field, they can answer certain questions about the stimuli
with above chance accuracy when asked to perform forced-choice tasks requiring sim-
ple discriminations. In contrast, the visual states underlying the finger adjustments of
neurotypical subjects in the pointing paradigm are fluidly integrated within motor con-
trol. They thus satisfy some criteria for “access-consciousness”, including being poised
for spontaneous use in service of action (in this case, in keeping one’s finger pointed at
a target), though not other criteria, such as availability for introspective report and use
in conscious reasoning.5 If one takes functional access to a state’s content as evidence for
phenomenality—i.e., consciousness “there is something is to like for the subject” to enjoy
(Nagel 1974)—then we have more reason to regard the visual states underlying the sub-
ject’s fine-grained finger movements as phenomenally conscious than we do in the case
of, for example, blindsight.
Second, and more importantly, the above objection appears to assume that if subjects
were unaware of performing the finger movement and so did not consciously intend to
perform it, then that movement was not intentionally controlled by the agent. But I re-
ject that assumption. In §1.2, I explained that one can consistently reject intellectualism
about agential control and still accept MOTIVATIONAL CONTROL: that one qualifies as having
exercised control over some property of one’s behaviour iff one’s behaviour having that
5For the terminology and seminal discussion of “access consciousness”, see Block (1995). See also
Smithies (2011, 261) from whom I take the point that dorsal stream visual representations meet some of
Block’s criteria on functional access-consciousness. However, Smithies’ takes the point in a more intellec-
tualist direction than I wish to. Specifically, Smithies appeals to the fact that subjects are unable to offer a
rationalizing explanation for why their fingers moved as evidence that while the visual states encoding tar-
get movement are functionally access-conscious, they are phenomenally unconscious (Smithies 2011, 263).
An alternative would be to preserve the link between functional access-consciousness and phenomenal con-
sciousness but reject the specific normative requirements Smithies places on phenomenal consciousness—
namely, that it provide the subject with propositional justification. It could well be that the visual states
devoted to guiding fine-grained movement, while phenomenally conscious, are ill-suited to provide the
subject with the sort of justification Smithies emphasizes (given that their contents are, by hypothesis, un-
available for report and propositional reasoning).
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property is the product of one’s motivational (e.g., intentional) control. Against the in-
tellectualist, I proposed that to qualify as having exercised intentional control over some
feature of one’s own behaviour, it isn’t necessary that one have intended that one’s be-
haviour possess the property. For example, it may be that although one did not intend
to adjust one’s finger, nevertheless the finger adjustment made in response to a perceived
target shift was still controlled by one’s intention to keep one’s finger on the target. In
that case, it qualifies as an automatic property of one’s intentional performance. On my
account, this makes it a property of the subject’s performance that is likely the product of
perceptual attention rather than of explicit decision.
My suggestion that intentional control over some property of one’s behaviour does
not require one to explicitly intend that one’s behaviour possess that property plausibly
coheres with ordinary thought about skilled intentional agency. To illustrate, consider
an Olympic gymnast who skillfully executes a winning performance. Intuitively, she
acted intentionally, which is why the judges were justified in awarding her the gold. She
deserved the gold because it was her doing.6 Nevertheless, we also accept that many
of the fine-grained behavioural adjustments that were critical to her success were done
automatically—i.e., not as a result of deliberate strategy. There need be no inconsistency
between these two claims. In particular, we can uphold both claims consistently if we dis-
tinguish the property of being intentionally guided from the property of being explicitly
intended. And we can say the same about the automatic finger adjustments discussed ear-
lier. One automatically adjusts one’s finger in response to a moving target only because
one has the conscious goal of keeping one’s finger pointed at it.
In sum, the conscious status of the visual states and processes recruited in noncon-
ceptual intention implementation is unclear. They exhibit some of the characteristics of
paradigmatically conscious states (e.g., spontaneous uptake in service of conscious goals)
but not others (e.g., availability for report). Further, we should reject the assumption that
to qualify as intentionally controlled, an aspect of behaviour must have been consciously
intended. Importantly, none of this helps to show that consciousness (either phenomenal
or access) is irrelevant to an agent’s possession and exercise of control. Indeed, in Chapter
3, I will argue that agents’ ownership over their actions requires that they be in a certain
sense conscious of what they’re doing—a sense that I unpack in terms of conscious atten-
tion being deployed practically in service of goal execution. What the above discussion
shows is merely that the content of the agent’s guiding intention need not (and often will
not) be completely determinate with respect to execution details. There are nonconcep-
tual properties of one’s behaviour that are settled nonconceptually by attending rather
6See also Fridland (2015) and Luthra (2016) on the relevance of practices of praising athletes for skilled
performances, whose discussions are largely congenial to my own.
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than conceptually through decision-making. This, I suggest, accords with everyday as-
sumptions about skilled agency
1.4.2.2 Motor control as motivationally unguided
Let’s turn to the claim that motor control is subpersonal in the sense of “mere reflex”.
While there is something to this suggestion, we must refine it to take account of an ob-
vious difference between reflexes, as these are traditionally conceived, and the bodily
movements that occur when we act. Specifically, whereas a classical reflex is mediated
by a mandatory connection between sensory input and motor output, motor control pro-
cesses deployed in action are initiated by an agent’s decision to act. Despite this difference
in how they are initiated, one might nevertheless insist that motor control processes are
importantly reflex-like because of how they unfold. Once initiated by decision, one might
suggest that skilled behaviours unfold without any further input from intention, unless
perhaps halted by the agent’s decision to adopt a new strategy. Instead, they follow a
stereotyped routine that has been developed through practice: a tightly bundled series of
responses, each step of which is triggered by a different sensory input. This would allow
one to acknowledge that motor representations are responsible for making rapid online
adjustments and modifications in response to incoming sensory feedback. But it would
imply that these adjustments and modifications are not made in light of the relevance of
the input to the agent’s current goals. Instead, they are pre-set moves in a routine. In
particular, on this proposal, motor control systems do not satisfy the following condition
on motivational guidance:
MOTIVATIONAL GUIDANCE: A guidance mechanism—i.e., one responsible for effecting com-
pensatory behavioural adjustments in response to changing sensory input—
instantiates motivational control only if the behavioural adjustments that it
makes are sensitive to the content of a motivational state of the agent.
So, while motor control systems are certainly triggered motivationally, according to this
proposal, they are not guided motivationally.7
With this suggestion in place, the intellectualist might now draw on Frankfurt’s (1978)
observation that an agent’s control over her own behaviour does not merely consist in the
triggering of behaviour by her decision—as if, once an agent decides to perform an action,
7Papineau expresses a view in this vicinity when he writes:
[T]op-level batting is more like an automatic reflex than any consciously controlled sequence of
movements. The basic facts of timing, plus the evidence rehearsed in the last three sections, all
argue that the execution of a specific shot in response to the bowler’s delivery is an automatic




in which one out of vastly many movement trajectories is selected (and redundancy elim-
inated) and a late execution phase in which the selected trajectory is programmed and
executed using relatively simple “trajectory tracking” algorithms. On these serial models,
the bulk of the computational burden falls to the early decision stage, with the implemen-
tation stage being the mere playing out of inflexible routines developed over time through
practice-related improvements in motor acuity. These models suggest a relatively smart,
early, and flexible stage and a relatively dumb, late, and inflexible stage. Against the se-
rial model, “optimal control theory” rejects the assumption of an early decision stage and
a late implementation stage. It instead regards the agent’s task as informing fine-grained
motor control directly and continuously throughout task performance.
The principal evidence in support of optimal control theory over serial models con-
cerns the preponderance of movement variability in skilled performances like walking,
grasping, etc. Serial models predict a global reduction in movement variability with
the development of motor acuity through practice and training (leading to increasingly
stereotyped movement patterns). By contrast, optimal control theory does not make this
prediction. Instead, the optimal control strategy, according to the latter theory, is to reduce
variability only where doing so is relevant to task success, leading to “task-constrained
variability” in performance. As Todorov and Jordan (2002) explain, the latter prediction
is empirically better supported. Even in motor tasks at which the subject is highly skilled,
one finds significant variation along task-irrelevant dimensions from one performance
to the next, rather than the overall suppression of variation that one would predict if a
serial model were correct. Quick fine-grained adjustments are observed principally in
response to environmental perturbations that affect task-relevant dimensions (e.g., obsta-
cles to task-success). Otherwise, they remain uncompensated for, leading to variability
from performance to performance. This pattern of task-constrained variability counts
against the assumption that an agent’s intention figures in an early preparatory stage of
trajectory selection, after which routines blindly implement the pre-selected trajectory.
It instead suggests a picture on which the agent’s intention actively modulates its own
fine-grained execution throughout movement execution.11
My framework interprets such fine-grained, yet task-sensitive behavioural adjust-
ments as reflecting attentional guidance. In particular, they reflect the ongoing modu-
latory effects of the agent’s task-set on sensorimotor systems—including, in this case,
proprioceptive states that register passively caused changes in the state of the agent’s
own body. On this view, movement variability between performances reflects a capacity
to ignore sensory feedback not directly pertinent to current behavioural goals. Because
11For complementary considerations against “serial” models of motor control primarily based in neuro-
physiological considerations, see Cisek (2007).
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it is not worth bothering to enforce uniformity between performances with respect to ex-
ecution details that aren’t relevant to goal attainment, detected bodily disturbances that
contribute to variation along these dimensions are attentionally de-prioritized (ignored).
By contrast, if a detected disturbance in movement threatens to introduce variance with
respect to a feature of one’s performance where uniformity is critical for goal-success,
this disturbance will be met with quick compensatory adjustments to ensure no varia-
tion in the relevant behavioural feature is in fact introduced. There is a natural role here
for attending, conceived of as the direct modulation of sensorimotor systems by task-set,
in realizing the kind of flexible, goal-directed motor control observed in human motor
performance.
Importantly, my proposal entails that agents use attention to control their performance
throughout intention implementation, rather than using attention only an early, prepro-
gramming stage of motor control. If attending contributed in the latter manner, it would
not be a source of motivational guidance, but of mere motivational triggering. This as-
sumption about the ongoing contribution of attention in the guidance of motor execution
receives support from eye-tracking experiments investigating the precise point at which
expert golfers lose control over their swing when they “choke under pressure”—i.e., per-
form far below their skill level because of high levels of anxiety. Using gaze fixation
duration (“quiet eye duration”) as a measure of the dwell time of visual attention on the
ball (known to be longer in experts than in novices), Vine et al. (2013) compared fixa-
tion duration for successful putts and unsuccessful putts at three phases of the action:
pre-backswing, during swing, and after swing. They found that the amount of time ex-
perts visually fixated the ball during the pre-backswing phase of action preparation was
comparable in the condition in which they performed a successful putt and the condition
in which they choked and failed. However, fixation durations in the “during” and “af-
ter” swing phases were significantly shorter when subjects choked and missed than when
they putted successfully. On this basis, the authors argue that “performance failure under
pressure appears to be due to disruptions in attentional control once movement has been
initiated” (Vine et al. 2013, 1988). As they note, this provides empirical support to models
of expertise—in particular, “attentional control theory” (Eysenck et al. 2007; Eysenck and
Derakshan 2011)—according to which attention plays “an online control function, provid-
ing visual sensory information as the movement unfolds” (Vine et al. 2013, 1988). As one
might have intuitively expected, expert golfers keep their eye on the ball for longer than
novices do, and when they choke under pressure they are quicker to take their attention
off it. This accords with my view that attention contributes a basis for agential guidance
in fine-grained intention implementation.12
12In Chapter 2 (§2.5.2), I return to the example of choking under pressure and the account that attentional
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I’ve argued that at least some states and processes underlying skilled motor control
satisfy the requirements of MOTIVATIONAL GUIDANCE. Even if the states and processes gov-
erning fine-grained motor control are not always sensitive to all of the contents of all the
agent’s intentions in acting, they are nevertheless directly sensitive to some of these con-
tents and are so throughout action. Consequently, the intellectualist’s attempt to dismiss
motor control as merely “subpersonal” on the grounds that this control is goal-insensitive
is unsuccessful. I’ve further proposed, consistently with the claims of attentional control
theory, that attention is the psychological basis for the guidance agents exercise in fine-
grained motor control. I want now to elaborate on what I take this guidance to consist
in.
1.5 Coping with distraction
To claim that agents “guide” their behaviour is to say that they oversee its progress. In
doing so, they are poised to effect compensatory adjustments in response to detected dis-
turbances that could otherwise cause their behaviour to deviate from its intended course.
I’ve proposed in this chapter that, in the domain of skilled bodily action at least, the
agent’s guidance of her behaviour is realized by attention. Intuitively, agents guide their
conduct by attending to what they are doing. But why exactly is attention so important
for motor control? The answer I’ll offer in this section is simple: because otherwise agents
would likely become distracted. Having explained how I understand this claim, we’ll be
in a position to contrast my proposal with other recent accounts that have emphasized a
central connection between attention and action.
To illustrate the problem of distraction, consider a classic paradigm from Eriksen and
Eriksen (1974). In their “selective set” paradigm, subjects have the task of responding
rapidly to the identity of a target character placed in the middle of a row of five char-
acters. For example, if the character is an H or a K, subjects must respond by quickly
moving a lever in one direction, but if it is a S, they are to respond by moving it the
other direction. Eriksen and Eriksen found that if the subject’s target is crowded by task-
incongruent distractors (i.e., characters that have been paired by task instruction with
control theory gives of it. In my view, a correct understanding of the loss of attentional control that occurs
when experts choke is a bit more subtle than proponents of attentional control theory typically depict it
as being (though I agree with the theory’s central thesis that choking under pressure constitutes a form of
distraction). In the present context, however, the point to emphasize is not the exact character of the control
loss that occurs when experts choke under pressure, but the theory’s claim about the control that experts
do exercise when they are not choking under pressure. This control is what Vine et al. (2013) (following
Eysenck et al. 2007) call “goal-directed” attention. By this, they mean the kind of intention- or task-directed
attention that I have been discussing in this chapter. To this extent, I agree with the conclusions Vine et
al. draw from their study and, with them, take attentional control theory to provide an empirically well-
supported account of expert motor control.
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the opposite response to that of the target) rather than by task-congruent distractors (i.e.,
characters paired by task instruction with the same response as that of the target), then re-
sponse times are impaired. For example, subjects are slower to respond if shown SSHSS
(task-incongruent) than KKHKK (task-congruent). This is the “flanker incompatibility
effect”.
The flanker incompatibility effect illustrates that distractor stimuli can present a bar-
rier to fully successful motor control. In particular, distractors can cause “response con-
flicts” or “response competition”, which reduces processing efficiency and ultimately
impairs performance. Another finding of Eriksen and Eriksen’s provides a clue to
this problem’s solution. While task-incongruent distractors negatively impacted perfor-
mance when placed within one visual angle of the agent’s target, reaction times for task-
congruent and incongruent distractors were comparable when distractors were placed
beyond this distance from the target. It is as if environmental stimuli falling beyond the
zone of attentional enhancement are effectively suppressed and blocked from figuring in
motor control processes. Intuitively, they are ignored.
Eriksen and Eriksen’s finding helped give rise to the popular notion of a “spotlight” of
visual attention. In particular, Eriksen and Eriksen suggested that visual attention is or-
ganized around a retina-centric spatial frame of reference with an approximately 1 visual
degree radius. Subsequent work suggests that this particular claim of theirs is probably
too simplistic, and I do not want to be committed to that aspect of their proposal here. To
illustrate just one difficulty, the particular spatial organization that visual attention takes
in a given instance may depend contextually on the agent’s task. In the terms of my pro-
posal here, it appears to depend on the specific kinds of perceptual and perceptuomotor
states that the agent is motivationally harnessing in order to execute her goals. For ex-
ample, in studies investigating distractor interference in a manual reaching task, visual
attention was found not to use a retina-centric reference frame, as Eriksen and Eriksen
had found, but rather a hand-based reference frame organized according to proximity to
the agent’s moving hand (Tipper et al. 1992, 1998; see also Linnell et al. 2005). If visual
attention is rightly understood as having a spatial frame of reference, then it is one that
might vary with context depending on the specific kinds of visual states that are being
attentionally enhanced. In turn, there is dispute over whether the interference caused by
the nearby flankers in Eriksen and Eriksen’s paradigm reflects a spatially defined spot-
light or rather “gestalt” principles of perceptual organization. For example, it may instead
be that subjects perceive the crowding flankers as belonging to a single group or object as
the target, leading them to be co-selected (see, e.g., Driver and Baylis 1989).
Fortunately, these questions about the organization of attention are not essential to my
main point. My main point is about the broader functional role that attention appears to
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be playing in response control, regardless of the specific organization attention happens
to take in a given context of action. Even if one is skeptical of the suggestion that the
structure of visual attention is like a spotlight, we can affirm the following points: that
the perception of distractors poses a source of interference to successful action (i.e., “dis-
tractor interference”); that agents compensate for this source of interference (to the extent
they are able to) by attending to what is goal-relevant and ignoring what is not; and that
where agents fail to compensate for this source of interference, their control is impaired
(e.g., processing efficiency declines) and they tend to perform worse as a result (e.g., are
slower to respond or make more errors). Consequently, my claim that attention realizes
a form of “guidance” does not merely rest with the claim that attention sustains a skilled
action as opposed to merely triggering its occurrence (as discussed in the previous sec-
tion). In addition, it rests on the claim that attention is a process whereby the deleterious
effects of distractor interference on action are managed. And in particular I want to sug-
gest that we can grasp these claims about the functional role of attention in the managing
of distractions as reflecting a coordinative role in motor control.
To bring out the coordinative role of attention in motor control, consider the action
of reaching to grasp an apple from a tree full of apples (Neumann 1987). To succeed, the
same apple that informs the parameter specifications for your reach (e.g., its speed, trajec-
tory, force, and final location) must also inform the specifications for your grasp (e.g., its
aperture and force), and the same apple informing specifications at earlier phases in the
reach must also do so at later phases. From an information-processing perspective, such
coordination isn’t trivial. It is known, for example, that the reaching and grasping com-
ponents of prehension recruit functionally distinct visuomotor processing streams.13 For
coherent behaviour to arise, the activities of each of these component subsystems must
be coordinated. Each must converge on a common environmental source when setting
their respective motor parameters, rather than draw information incompatibly from dis-
tinct sources. As Neumann observes, without a way to ensure the selective “coupling”
and “decoupling” of information flow among functionally separate subsystems in mo-
tor programming, action would disintegrate into “behavioural chaos”. It would become
disorganized, uncoordinated, and incoherent.
Attention, Neumann proposed, is the mechanism that plays this coordinative role (see
also Allport 1987). We can incorporate Neumann’s proposal into my framework as fol-
13As Jeannerod (1997, 21-22) explains, the reaching channel specializes in “extrinsic” properties of an
object (e.g., location in space with respect to the body), functions to transport the hand to a desired location,
and uses a body-centered coordinate system. By contrast, the grasping channel specializes in “intrinsic”
properties like shape or size, functions to shape the hand appropriately to the object for a given purpose,
and uses a hand-centered coordinate system. Further, these systems likely become engaged at distinct
stages in an action (see Matthen 2005, 303 for discussion).
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lows. The process of attending is realized in a biasing process that modulates lower level
visual and visuomotor subsystems. The resultant state of attention is realized in the con-
vergence of these diverse subsystems upon a common source to work together in pro-
gramming an intention’s execution. The suppressive or inhibitory aspect of attention
serves to exclude other information arriving through the senses from contributing to mo-
tor specifications and thereby producing response conflicts. In the ideal case, the agent’s
intention biases her perceptual and perceptuomotor states so that only information di-
rectly relevant to a specific implementation is allowed to contribute to generating a motor
representation. Here, we might think of the attention of the skilled practitioner perform-
ing her craft at her peak—e.g., the expert golfer successfully executing a putt. Because
potential distractions are effectively suppressed, the golfer’s movements are smooth and
her adjustments to task-relevant changes in the environment (e.g., changing wind condi-
tions) are quick and efficient.
To consolidate, let’s return to the solution that I proposed to the motor control chal-
lenge in §1.3. According to that proposal, whereas agents draw on reasoning and plan-
ning in order to settle higher level questions of strategy (e.g., whether to Φ, given one’s in-
tention to Ψ), they draw on perceptual attention in settling lower level implementational
questions about the precise manner in which they will move their bodies (e.g., whether to
Φ in determinate manner w, given one’s intention toΦ). I’ve argued that agents settle fine-
grained, nonconceptually represented properties of their actions through the intentional
harnessing of available nonconceptual information toward that end. Our discussion in
this and the preceding section adds a new dimension to this picture of agential motor
control. It adds that in settling how one will move, part of the control that one exercises
consists in compensating for the potential interference effects caused by distracting non-
conceptual information. Consequently, agents must genuinely guide their performances.
This requires settling, on an ongoing basis, which way one will move in order to ful-
fill one’s intention. And, in organizing one’s response, one must adjust for the persis-
tent threat to behavioural coordination that distractor interference poses. Finally, what
our discussion in this section brings out is that there are clear limits to an agent’s ability
to block distracting information from interfering with response. It may be that when a
distractor (e.g., a task-incongruent flanker in a selective set paradigm) is not fully sup-
pressed, the distractor and one’s target will compete and performance will decline as a
consequence. In Eriksen and Eriksen’s selective set paradigm, this manifests in longer re-
sponse times. In other contexts, it will manifest in more execution errors. In Neumann’s
hypothetical attention-free scenario, it would be completely crippling. In such a scenario,
we would not be able even to reach out and grasp a thing. The motor control challenge
would be insurmountable (§1.2).
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1.6 Comparison with extant accounts
The proposal I’ve outlined in this chapter about attention’s role in action bears some im-
portant points of contact with other recent treatments of the topic. To further elucidate
and defend my proposal, I’ll conclude by contrasting my view with these extant accounts.
1.6.1 Cognitive unison theory
Mole (2011) calls attention “cognitive unison”. Part of what makes unison an apt
metaphor for attention is the suggestion of an absence of interference or cacophony: a co-
herently integrated state into which a network settles, poised to support flexible, efficient
action. This accords well with my view of attending as serving a coordinative role and
as the alignment of component subsystems around a common purpose. Further, we each
understand the role of attention in relation to the elimination of distraction. This much I
find congenial to my proposal and in step with contemporary thinking about attention.
One place where our views differ is in how they conceive of distraction. Mole devel-
ops his account of attention primarily with an eye to accommodating empirical evidence
about dual-task interference. This is the processing interference that results when subjects
attempt simultaneously to perform two tasks that draw on overlapping sets of processing
resources, resulting in performance decrements to one or both of the tasks. His view is,
approximately, that if none of the psychological resources that an agent can deploy in ser-
vice of a task, given her understanding of that task, are being used to serve any other task,
then her performance of the task will be characterized by an absence of task-irrelevant
processing. Consequently, it will exemplify cognitive unison or attention.
By contrast, my account understands attention’s role in relation to a more fundamen-
tal form of processing interference than dual-task interference. To illustrate, even when
a subject is attentively engaged in Eriksen and Eriksen’s selective set paradigm, visual
processing of the task-incongruent flanking distractors (when located very close to the
target) contributes to slower reaction times. In a case like this, it is possible that that all
the psychological resources that the subject can bring to bear on her task (given her un-
derstanding of it) either are being deployed to that task or are poised for deployment.
The subject might be performing her task as attentively as anyone can. Yet, if the flanking
items crowd the target, distractor interference will occur, and the subject’s performance
will be worse relative to the condition in which the flankers are placed further from the
target and successfully ignored. I take this interference effect to reflect a genuine form
of distraction. Furthermore, I take this to be a form of distraction that attention has the
function of overcoming (though here attention fails fully to do so). And yet it seems to
have nothing to do with distraction by another task.
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To amplify the difference between Mole’s and my accounts, consider the following
question for Mole’s account. If all of the processing resources that a subject can, with un-
derstanding, potentially apply to her current task are poised for deployment in its service,
then what is to prevent all of those resources becoming active simultaneously in order to
implement different possible, but mutually inconsistent ways of executing the task? I
read Neumann as raising a version of this question when he asks:
The problem is how to avoid the behavioral chaos that would result from an
attempt to simultaneously perform all possible actions for which sufficient
causes exist, i.e., that are in agreement with current motives, for which the
required skills are available and that conform to the actual stimulus situation
(Neumann 1987, 347).
Since none of the processing resources that the agent brings to bear, as she plunges into
behavioural chaos, are occupied with any task other than her current one (e.g., of grab-
bing an apple from the tree), the chaotic state Neumann describes might seem to meet
Mole’s criterion for cognitive unison. And yet it is a dramatic case of processing inter-
ference: only a subset of those processing resources can be deployed coherently at a given
time. Mole acknowledges that agents typically possess multiple strategies for task im-
plementation and that agents must select one strategy as the way they will execute the
task (see Mole 2011 63 ff.). However, he attributes no privileged role to attention in the
agent’s coming to settle on a particular implementation strategy. My account, by contrast,
proceeds on the assumption that attention does play a privileged role here—namely, in
settling the specific way an agent’s intention will be executed.
Possibly because Mole does not regard attending as having any necessary role to play
in dealing with this more basic variety of distractor interference—a form of processing in-
terference we might regard as emanating “bottom-up” with the sensory signal as opposed
to “top-down” from the agent’s goals—he is led to a relatively modest conception of atten-
tion’s role in action. On his view, attention is useful but often unnecessary unless the task
at hand is particularly “cognitively fragile” or “difficult” (and so “attention-demanding”)
(Mole 2011, 114). Many of our skilled actions, on Mole’s account, occur in the absence of
any attention (Mole 2011, 62-3). On my view, by contrast, attention is deployed even in
the case of relatively simple, effortless, and automatic actions like reaching out to prehend
an apple.
Though I rest my account on a conception of distractor interference seemingly more
basic than dual-task interference, this is not to suggest that it is a straightforward matter
to determine which type of interference explains a given instance of impaired control.
As we’ll see in the next chapter, much of what is traditionally classified as exclusively
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“bottom-up” or “stimulus-driven” processing interference—e.g., an especially “salient”
distractor in a visual search task or an expert’s anxiety-induced shift of attention to the
face of a threatening-looking audience member—turns out, on my view, to be directed
by the agent’s motivational priorities, broadly conceived. If this is right, then a suitably
generalized notion of dual-task interference (“motivational interference”) may explain
more interference effects than sometimes supposed. Nevertheless, on my view, the latter
type of interference is not the problem that attention exists, in the first instance, in order
to solve. On the contrary, motivational interference threatens to undo that solution by
introducing conflicts within the source states of attention.
1.6.2 The “could have done otherwise” model
Within the extant literature on attention, the account of attention nearest to my own is
from Wu (2011a; 2011b; 2014b). Nevertheless, beyond genuine points of contact lie oppo-
nent conceptions of the kind of control agents exercise in acting. Because these differences
between us are in my view quite fundamental, and because they help to motivate aspects
of my investigation in later chapters, I will devote some time to assessing Wu’s account.
I’ll begin by highlighting some points on which Wu and I agree.
Wu and I each hold that agents need attention, at least most fundamentally, because
they can carry more information about their surroundings than they are able to put to use
when acting. In this sense, we agree that attention arises originally from limitations in the
capacity to act in the face of surplus information-processing capacity (rather than any in-
trinsic bottleneck on that capacity).14 Further, we agree in attributing to attention a role in
specifying finer-grained movement parameters than are represented by the content of the
agent’s intention, but that are nonetheless necessary for successful intention execution. In
this sense, we both take attention to be the central source of skilled motor control.
However, Wu and I situate these points within opposing conceptions of agency. In
particular, Wu understands agency fundamentally in relation to what he calls the “many-
many problem”. In his terms, agents face many perceptual “inputs” and many poten-
tial behavioural “outputs”. This yields a many-many mapping between available inputs
and potential outputs which Wu calls the agent’s “behavioural space”. For action to oc-
cur, Wu claims, the agent must select one of these many input-output mappings—i.e.,
a “path” through behavioural space. Attention, Wu suggests, is the agent’s selection of
a behavioural path. Because every action requires a solution to the many-many prob-
lem and only attention can solve this problem, Wu concludes that every action requires
14Cf. also Allport (1987) and Neumann (1987). Note that none of these authors deny that agents possess
information-processing limitations. They instead deny that attention’s most basic role is to manage such
limitations.
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attention. Attention is “selection for action”.
What justification does Wu provide for the claim that every action poses a many-many
problem? The answer is to be found in the background conception of agency on which
Wu builds his account:
. . . [F]or agency to be possible, there must be behavioral options, even if it
is just the option of not acting. A behavior space must open up with more
than one path, and now there is a Many-Many Problem . . . All actions then
emerge from an appropriate behavior space where actions entail . . . choosing
one among other behavioral paths. This “choice” is not available in pure reflex.
(2014b, 90)
In other work, Wu motivates this view by inviting us to consider a possible world in
which creatures do not confront many-many problems. We will be forced to conclude,
he suggests, that agency is absent from that world. Regardless how overtly complex and
coordinated the movements of creatures in that world might be, these creatures are not
agents because “the presentation of possibilities is denied them” (2011b, 54). For Wu, it is
a creature’s selection of a path through a space of alternate behavioural possibilities that
constitutes “the critical moment in agency” (2014b, 81). And it is that selection of one
from many alternate possibilities (even if just the possibility of refraining from action)
that, on Wu’s account, essentially distinguishes the actions we do from the “pure reflexes”
that we passively undergo. When the doctor taps your knee and your leg jolts, you may
say “I didn’t do that!” What makes your assertion correct (if it is), Wu claims, is that you
could not have done otherwise than to move your leg. So, moving it wasn’t up to you.
This all suggests that Wu endorses the following:
REGULATIVE CONTROL: Agency consists in the exercise of the power to select one out of
many alternative behavioural possibilities (minimally, the power to Φ or not to
Φ).
In more detail, an agent exercises “regulative control” over an action iff the agent selects
it from a set of alternative possible responses remaining open until the time at which she
acts. The agent thereby “regulates” between opposing behavioural alternatives.15 If this
explains the basis of the agent’s control in action, then without the freedom to select and
act otherwise than one does, the agent’s conduct wouldn’t be up to the agent. The funda-
mental problem of agency, on this conception, is to select which alternative behavioural
15I borrow the terminology of “regulative control” from Fischer (1994). Fischer opposes regulative con-
trol with “guidance control”, the latter of which does not require alternative behavioural possibilities, but
concerns the actual causal mechanism responsible for behaviour. Fischer is, in turn, elaborating distinctions
in Frankfurt (1971).
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possibilities to actualize given all the information the agent has available and her full
repertoire of behavioural capacities. If attention is the way agents select between alter-
nate possibilities, attention is revealed as the psychological basis of agents’ exercises of
regulative control. Whereas the agent selects which action to perform and on which ob-
ject, the agent doesn’t select a reflex because no many-many problem exists for reflexes. If
reflexes are “selected” at all, they are selected subpersonally and so are outside the agent’s
control. Given that the distinction between action and reflex provides a mutually exclu-
sive and jointly exhaustive classification of behaviour, attention is revealed as necessary
for action of any sort.
We should resist Wu’s view of attention as the exercise of regulative control in action.
To begin with, the account seems to face a dilemma concerning the agential status of
selection for action. In particular, either selection for action is an action or it is a reflex. If
it is an action, then we face a vicious regress. This is because if selection for action is itself
an action and every action requires selection for action, then selection for action will itself
require selection for action. If selection for selection for action is itself an action, then it
too requires selection for action, and so on ad infinitum. Selection for action cannot be both
an action and a precondition for action of any sort.
If, on the other hand, selection for action is a reflex, then there is no role for the agent
in generating behaviour. In general, if φ-ing is a reflex, then, Wu supposes (plausibly), it
isn’t the agent who φ-s. For example, if an arm rising is a reflex, then it is not the agent
raising her arm. Similarly, if selection is a reflex, then it is not the agent selecting the
response. But action requires that it be the agent selecting response. So, if selection is a
reflex, then the selected response isn’t an action.
So, whether selection for action is an action or a reflex, action is revealed to be impos-
sible.
There are ways to avoid the above dilemma. Arguably, the most promising way to do
so (and Wu’s own preferred response) is to claim that the agent’s selection of a specific
behavioural path is not any event in addition to the agent’s action—whether an additional
action or a passive reflex. Rather, on this view, to select just is to act.16 On this elabora-
tion, we do not understand the agent’s selection as an event that causes one path through
16Wu expresses sympathy for this conception of the agent’s selection in Wu (2014b, 97-99) and comes out
more forcefully in support of it in Wu (2016):
‘Selection’ might suggest to some readers that the agent must do something else (selecting)
in order to act. In fact, the idea is simpler. We have appropriate selection when a subject’s
perception of the environment is coupled to and thereby informs the production of a response.
That is, selection is just a necessary product of taking a specific path in behavior space. Where
we have a specific aspect of the subject’s experience operating in this way, we have selection
of what is experienced for action. This just is, I claim, a form of attention (2016, 108).
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behavioural space to occur; rather, we understand the agent’s selection as the agent’s tak-
ing a specific path through behavioural space where alternative behavioural possibilities
existed. In skilled bodily action, for example, we can think of the agent’s “selection” as
consisting in a certain perceptual state being used to inform a certain motor response,
where alternate perceptual-motor couplings were possible. The agent’s selection is not a
further event leading up to this state of affairs, but the resultant state of affairs.
This does seem to provide a coherent response to the dilemma that I have posed.
However, it is worth pausing to reflect on its implications. The most natural way to inter-
pret the above response is to construe the agent’s “selection” as entailing the exercise of
a causal power by an agent—specifically, the power to cause one behavioural option (i.e.,
input-output mapping) to be actualized rather than another one. On this reading, what
distinguishes the input-output coupling that occurs in action from the input-output cou-
pling that occurs in pure reflex is that, in action but not reflex, the input-output coupling
is the agent’s doing. It is caused by the agent. Were an input and output to become coupled
without it being the agent who causes them to couple—i.e., who selects the coupling—
then this would just be pure reflex.
If this is right, then the proposed solution to the dilemma requires regarding the
agent as one of the relata in an action-constituting causal relation. Non-reductive agent-
causalists will be happy with such a picture.17 However, Wu is not such a theorist. In
keeping with the aspirations of “reductive”, “event-causal” theories of action, Wu in-
stead means to reduce the agent’s causal role in action to that of certain mental states,
events, or processes. Specifically, his proposal is to identify the agent’s role in action with
the selection of a behavioural path. And this reductive aim sits uncomfortably with the
dilemma-averting implementation of the selection for action account. Confronted with
the question of what distinguishes the input-output coupling that occurs in action from
the one occurring in pure reflex, Wu cannot appeal to the causal role of the agent. Nor
does he wish to appeal to the agent’s intentions or other motives as constituting the agent.
This is because he maintains that it is possible for agents to attend and act in the absence of
17Steward’s (2012) account of action provides an instructive point of comparison here. Much like Wu,
Steward holds that, with time’s passage, the agent continuously resolves the fine details of her bodily move-
ment in a way that is highly constrained, but never fully determined, by her motivational states (e.g., her
intentions). It is in the settling of such fine details that Steward finds a critical indeterministic role for the
agent in action—a role the agent would be deprived of if her behaviour were determined (motivationally
or otherwise) down to its fine details. Without the power to settle the answers to open questions about
how one’s body will move, Steward believes that agency would be abolished (much like in Wu’s hypothet-
ical world of creatures who do not confront many-many problems). Steward couches these ideas within a
framework of primitivist agent-causalism. As I read her proposal, it not only requires that we reject causal
determinism (which Steward is candid about), but arguably also physicalism, given its reliance on strong
metaphysical emergence about the agent and the agent’s causal powers in relation to her body. Assessment
of Steward’s rival implementation lies beyond the scope of my investigation. I highlight it mainly to note
that the stakes are high here.
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any motivation to do so, which he takes the case of purely “bottom-up” attention capture
to demonstrate (Wu 2011a, 101; 2014b, 91-93). His view is that our motivational states
may (usually) constrain how we act, but they are not necessary for action (cf. Steward
2012, 34, 66). In order to uphold his proposed solution to the dilemma, then, it seems Wu
must retreat to the bare counterfactual claim that whatever input-output mapping in fact
occurs when an agent acts could have been otherwise, whereas the input-output mapping
that occurs in pure reflex is (in some unspecified sense) necessary or mandatory.
However, this is an unattractive way to distinguish action and reflex. For one, the
proposal faces the difficult question of distinguishing the kind of indeterminism that
characterizes the actions of agents from other potentially indeterministic events that are
presumably not the actions of any agent, such as the specific path that water happens
to take while streaming down a hill or the precise moment at which a radioactive atom
emits a particle. Without invoking the agent or some event of decision as the cause of the
indeterministic event, there appears to be little to distinguish the two scenarios. Conse-
quently, Wu seems to face a particularly acute version of the “Disappearing Agent Prob-
lem” (Velleman 1992; Pereboom 2014).18
I’ll now try to pinpoint where, in my view, Wu goes astray. We each agree in empha-
sizing perceptual attention as the psychological capacity underlying an important form
of flexibility manifest in skilled action. In particular, we agree in regarding perceptual
attention as the non-deliberative means whereby agents resolve fine-grained properties
of behaviour. However, by situating these ideas within the framework of REGULATIVE CON-
TROL, Wu provides a broadly libertarian gloss on the flexible control manifest in such ac-
tions. What most fundamentally distinguishes skilled action from pure reflex, Wu thinks,
is a kind of response-freedom: the fact that sensory inputs do not “coerce” behaviour. To
accommodate this, he postulates some event, process, or state of personal level selection
to regulate between alternate options, and he regards occurrences of such selection as
constituting a behavioural episode as an action. It is this interpretation on the flexibility
exemplified in skilled action that lands him in the above difficulties. If it is the agent who
18Admittedly, Wu has in some work emphasized a type of agential control linked with intention, ac-
knowledging that a purely automatic or unintended action would occur without agential control and so
would be “passive” (e.g., 2013; 2017). However, even in these contexts Wu maintains (a) that the many-
many problem provides the criteria for distinguishing action from reflex, and (b) that the many-many prob-
lem can be posed and solved (through attention) outside any context of intention. These claims entail the
possibility of passive actions. In response, Wu is here backtracking on the intuitions upon which he drew
to distinguish action and reflex in the first place: only the former, recall, are “up to me” or “my doing”.
If he attempts to capture “up-to-me-ness” with attention and the many-many problem, then it is unclear
in what sense the action is passive or beyond the agent’s control when unintended. Second, my argument
in the text remains as a challenge to the claim that a genuine form of action has been identified with the
many-many problem. And third, there are no passive actions in my view. While there can be impulsive,
emotional, and habitual actions, every action is the agent’s doing.
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selects, as Wu claims, then either this selection must be an action the agent performs or it
must somehow constitute the agent as acting. The former leads to a regress, while the lat-
ter lacks an informative account of what makes the selection (e.g., a certain input-output
mapping) agential. Wu’s view consequently cannot provide an adequate account of the
role of the agent in action.
By contrast, I endorse MOTIVATIONAL CONTROL as an account of the control agents exer-
cise in acting (§1.2), which I’ve further specified as MOTIVATIONAL GUIDANCE. As the point
is often put in the free will literature: whereas regulative control concerns the agent’s
alternate behavioural possibilities at the time of action, guidance control concerns the ac-
tual causal mechanism underlying the agent’s behaviour (Frankfurt 1971; Fischer 1994).
Actions are motivationally guided processes. Rather than response freedom, therefore, I
attribute a necessary role to the agent’s goals (or as I will call them in Chapter 2, the agent’s
“priorities”) in distinguishing action from reflex. Given that attending is itself a process
that unfolds under the direction of the agent’s goals, attending qualifies as an action as
well. It is the goal-directed process of selecting and structuring one’s perceptual and per-
ceptuomotor states to be usable in goal execution. This process need not (and arguably
often will not) be itself attention-guided. Commonly, we do not attend to our attend-
ing, though the capacity to deliberately guide (and so decide) how we will attend could
become important under conditions of motivational conflict. But that would be a more
sophisticated form of cognitive control than we have been examining in this chapter. It is
probably more common that our attention is immediately and automatically guided by
our goal-setting motivational states, rather than mediated by separate acts of attention.
Since I deny that acts of attention must themselves be attention-guided, no regress arises
on my view. The precondition for action is not guidance by attention, but guidance by a
motivational state. One important form such guidance can take is attentional, but it is not
necessary that guidance take this form.
On my view, the informational challenge confronting agents is not to select a path
through behavioural space and to solve many-many problems. Rather, the informational
challenge confronting skilled agents is to implement coordinated and coherent behaviour
in pursuit of their goals given the threat of distraction. These are different problems. In
principle, an agent’s motivational states could fail to constrain which sources of informa-
tion the agent draws on in response selection, with the result that her behaviour becomes
chaotic, disorganized, and incoherent. So long as the agent’s responses are formed on
the basis of a subset of the information available to her, she would qualify as traversing
behavioural space, and so, on Wu’s view, as exercising agential control. However, her
behaviour will have been motivationally unguided. Specifically, her behaviour will have
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been distracted, and so, on my view, would not exemplify the agent’s control.19
For these reasons, the move to a guidance framework of agential control seems to me
an improvement over the rival framework Wu chooses to work with. However, a ver-
sion of the same challenge that Wu faces might be thought to arise also for accounts that
purport to explain action in terms of guidance of behaviour by a motivational state of the
agent. In particular, one might ask what could justify reductively identifying the agent’s
guidance of behaviour with guidance by a motivational state? The suspicion that nothing
could justify doing so seems to generate a new version of the Disappearing Agent Prob-
lem, this time for my account. I address this challenge in Chapter 3. There, I suggest
that attention (specifically, conscious attention) plays an essential role in answering this
challenge on behalf of reductive-causal theories of action. Rather than attempting to re-
duce the agent’s role in action to attention, as Wu proposes to do, I argue that to solve the
Disappearing Agent Problem we must identify the agent with the psychological state or
states serving to direct conscious attention.
Before we see how I propose to answer the Disappearing Agent Problem, however,
we must first address a different challenge to my account. I have proposed that attending
is closely tied to acting: attention just is the modulation of information processing by mo-
tivational states. But, the objection runs, surely there are cases where we attend without
acting—cases where attention is “captured” from without rather than driven from within.
The next chapter develops my proposal in a way that addresses this concern.
19This point suggests that regulative control is not sufficient for agential control. “Frankfurt cases” can be
adapted to show that it is not necessary (even over very fine-grained features of one’s behaviour). See Stew-
ard (2012, Ch.7) for discussion of many permutations on Frankfurt cases (though I depart from Steward’s
negative verdict about the efficacy of these cases).
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Chapter 2
Actionism and Attention Capture
2.1 Introduction
Chapter 1 identified one way exercises of agency depend on attention. The suggestion
was that finer-grained properties of action are the nonconceptually represented outputs
of perceptual attention. This is in contrast to higher level properties of an action that
are represented by an intention, usually as a result of practical reasoning. Given agents
exercise motor control in skilled bodily action and attention is the process whereby agents
exercise this control, attention is required for skilled bodily action.
In this chapter I turn to ask whether attending is always active. According to what I’ll
call “actionism” about attention, to attend is necessarily to exercise an agential capacity.
This may be because attention is itself essentially an action or activity (Watzl 2011; 2017;
Jennings 2012; Carruthers 2015), because attention is essentially a manner of performing
an action (Mole 2011; Koralus 2014), or because attention is essentially an aspect of acting
(Wu 2014b). Actionists do not merely claim that every subject of attention is also an agent
capable of action. They commit to the stronger claim that whenever one is attending one is
also acting.
Now, if attention ever occurs without action, the relationship between attention and
action is contingent rather than necessary, and actionism is false. So, to refute actionism,
it’s sufficient to identify a single instance of attention occurring without any action being
performed. Common sense suggests that there are such instances. For example, while
working quietly at your desk, you hear a fly buzzing around your head. The buzzing
sound draws or grabs your attention, distracting you from your work. On the face of it,
automatically reorienting attention to the fly is neither an action nor serves any action
that you’re attempting to perform. Instead it seems like a reflex—analogous to the way
your knee jerks when tapped. If so, then there is are counterexamples to actionism. This
is the objection from attention capture to actionism.
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Actionists are aware of this challenge (Mole 2011, 53; Jennings 2012, 541; Wu 2014b,
90-92; Carruthers 2015, 145 ff). However, extant responses have proceeded as if there is
only one constraint on an adequate solution when really there are two. The first, more
widely recognized constraint is to show how, even in cases we would intuitively describe
as “captured” attention, the agent nonetheless still qualifies as active. The second, hith-
erto unrecognized constraint is to explain why, in some cases of capture, attention fails to
fulfill its proper functional role and consequently is defective as attention. In this chap-
ter, I defend an actionist reply to the objection from attention capture that satisfies both
constraints. I will now say more about the motivations behind each of them.
The reason for the first constraint is clear enough. If one holds that one acts whenever
one attends, then one must show that, even in intuitively passive cases like attention cap-
ture, the agent is active. Actionists have made various suggestions here. For example, it
has been suggested that in these cases the agent is still selecting one out of many alternate
behavioural possibilities (Wu 2011a, 101; 2014b, 91-3); maintaining veto power (Jennings
2012, 541); using her understanding to accomplish a task (Mole 2011, 52-3); responding
to an unconscious decision (Carruthers 2015, 145 ff) or a primitive urge (Watzl 2017, Ch.
6) to attend to the attention-grabbing stimulus. In different ways, each proposal hopes to
show that attention, even at its most intuitively passive and involuntary, retains an active
element.
The reason for the second constraint may seem less obvious. Whether one is an action-
ist or not, one might suggest that what succeeds at capturing our attention often merits our
attention. Attention capture is functionally beneficial because significant events are reg-
istered and attended to regardless of what we happen to be focusing on at the moment of
capture. For example, while working at your laptop, suppose you notice a rodent-shaped
entity scurrying by the floor board in the visual periphery. You halt what you’re doing to
investigate what you saw. The attention you were paying to your laptop has been inter-
rupted and automatically reallocated to where you detected motion. One might plausi-
bly argue that here attention operates as it should: sometimes attending properly requires
dropping one activity to focus on something of higher behavioural priority or importance
to the agent.
This is true. But not all cases of capture are like this and so the constraint remains.
Recall the example of the buzzing fly. Suppose that you have no interest in the fly and are
quite certain that it poses no danger to you. It is irrelevant to you, yet it grabs your atten-
tion. In this case, your perception of the attention-capturing stimulus need not prompt
you to switch from one task or project to another, more important one. Rather, the fly
plainly interferes with your goals. It distracts you. Let’s call this a case of “distracted
capture” to distinguish it from a case in which attention capture coincides with the agent
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switching to a higher priority task. If, finally, the proper functional role of attention is
to prevent interference from distraction (see Chapter 1, §1.5), cases of distracted capture
seem to be cases of defective attention.
We can summarize the argument for my second constraint as follows:
1. The proper functional role of attention is to prevent the agent from becoming dis-
tracted by goal-irrelevant information.
2. In cases of distracted capture, the agent becomes distracted by goal-irrelevant infor-
mation.
Therefore,
3. In cases of distracted capture, attention’s proper functional role is not satisfied.
If this argument is successful, then there is an analogy between distracted attention and
false belief. Supposing a belief’s role or aim is to track the truth (see e.g., Williams 1973;
Velleman 2000a), then a false belief is unsuccessful insofar as it doesn’t achieve that aim.
Analogously, according to the above argument, insofar as cases of distracted capture fail
to achieve the aim of attention, they are unsuccessful cases of attention. And supposing,
with the actionist, that attention is the exercise of an agential capacity, distracted capture
is a defective exercise of that capacity. Extant actionist responses to the objection from
attention capture fail to recognize this point when they depict all cases of attention as
if they were equally good according to the standard of success set by attention’s proper
functional role. This is an error. It distorts our understanding not only of attention but
also of a central range of cases in which agents lose control over their conduct. As we’ll
see, defective attention begets defective action.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In §2.2, I introduce the distinction between automatic
and volitional deployments of attention, as this is operationalized within the empirical lit-
erature on visual attention. In §2.3, I discuss a traditional view of automatic attention as
governed by perception of environmental salience—the “environmental salience view”—and
I explain why the view is inconsistent with actionism. In §2.4, I argue against the envi-
ronmental salience view. In §2.5, I motivate the rival priority view of automatic attention
and explain how the priority view allows us to satisfy both constraints on an adequate re-
sponse to the objection from attention capture. I conclude by contrasting my account with
two extant actionist views of attention, each of which fails to acknowledge the possibility
of defective attention.
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2.2 The distinction between voluntary and automatic at-
tention
Common sense has it that sometimes we voluntarily control how we attend. Thomas Reid
writes:
Every man knows that he can turn his attention to this subject or to that, for a
longer or shorter time, and with more or less intenseness, as he pleases. It is a
voluntary act, and depends upon his will. (Reid 1872/2000, 127)
It is equally part of common sense, however, that attention is not always a voluntary act.
As Reid explains:
It is well known, that things new and uncommon, things grand, and things
that are beautiful, draw our attention, not in proportion to the interest we have,
or think we have in them, but in a much greater proportion. Whatever moves
our passions or affections draws our attention, very often, more than we wish.
(Reid 1872/2000, 128, italics added)
Similarly, William James distinguishes a variety of attention requiring effort to initiate and
sustain and implicating the agent’s will from a form of attention that operates passively.
As he describes the latter:
In passive immediate sensorial attention the stimulus is a sense-impression, either
very intense, voluminous, or sudden . . . or it is an instinctive stimulus, a
perception which, by reason of its nature rather than its mere force, appeals to
some one of our normal congenital impulses and has a directly exciting quality
... [T]hese stimuli differ from one animal to another, and what most of them
are in man: strange things, moving things, wild animals, bright things, pretty
things, metallic things, blows, blood, etc. (James 1890/1950, 416-7, italics orig-
inal)
Reid’s and James’ remarks about active and passive attention are intuitive. However,
there are places where they do not say quite as much as we might like them to. For ex-
ample, when Reid writes that things draw our attention “not in proportion to the interest
we have, or think we have in them, but in a much greater proportion”, Reid remains non-
committal about whether it is actually the agent’s interests that determine what draws
attention. And when Reid claims that “whatever moves our passions or affections draws
our attention”, he leaves open whether it is our passions or affections that cause atten-
tion to shift or whether our passions and our attention are moved together by a common
cause. I take these to be questions about the role the agent’s motivational states, broadly
construed—including the agent’s interests, impulses, passions, and affections—play in
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intuitively involuntary and automatic shifts of attention. Similar remarks apply to James,
who does not clarify the role of the animal’s congenital impulses in determining the focus
of attention. Reid’s and James’ hesitancy to pronounce on these issues may be evidence
that common sense and introspection alone do not resolve them. Further, because Reid’s
and James’ distinction between two types of attention is ultimately an empirical matter,
we might ask how well they stand up to empirical investigation. To verify if their claims
are correct, we must consult the relevant empirical evidence.
Fortunately, there is a large body of empirical work bearing directly on Reid’s and
James’ claims. I will show that this work ultimately vindicates Reid’s and James’ distinc-
tion between two kinds of attention and (more controversially) enriches that pre-theoretic
distinction in ways that help to resolve whether attending is the exercise of an agential
capacity. Because the vindication claim is less controversial than the enrichment claim,
it makes sense to begin by examining the case for the former. Once we have seen how,
in broad outline, empirical psychology supports Reid’s and James’ intuitive picture, we
will be in a better position to consider more nuanced questions about the possible moti-
vational dimension of automatic attention. For the remainder of this section, I’ll explain
some of the main paradigms psychologists have used to empirically investigate the con-
trol of attention and how these have been used to establish a distinction between two
modes of attentional control. This will provide the background against which more con-
troversial questions can be posed.
An influential experimental paradigm in the study of attentional control is the “spatial
cuing paradigm” (Posner 1980). In this paradigm, the subject visually fixates at a central
location on a visual display (e.g., a cross). The subject’s task is, without moving her eyes
from the center, to respond as quickly as possible to the appearance of a target on the left
or right hand side of the screen. Before the target appears, the subject sees a cue for 100
milliseconds. Depending on the trial, the cue will either accurately predict target location
(i.e., will be “valid”), inaccurately predict target location (i.e., will be “invalid”), or will
not carry any information about target location (i.e., will be “neutral”). Shortly after the
cue disappears, the target will appear and the subject must quickly report that she saw it
or report some feature of the target. Posner (1980) found that valid cues facilitate, while
invalid cues impair, target detection. Subjects are faster to detect the target when they
receive a valid cue than if they receive a neutral cue, and they are slower when they
receive an invalid cue than if they receive a neutral cue. This is taken as evidence that
visual attention shifts (covertly) to the cued location.
Posner’s spatial cuing paradigm provides a way to investigate the dynamics of visual
spatial attention. It has been adapted to investigate the dynamics of auditory attention
(e.g., Spence and Driver 1994) and cross-modal attention (e.g., Spence and Santangelo
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2009). For example, an auditory cue at a certain location has been shown to facilitate
response to a visual target at the same location and vice versa. I will focus on the visuo-
spatial case.
Significantly, researchers have found that attention behaves differently depending on
the type of cue the subject is shown (Jonides 1981; Posner and Cohen 1984). An “indi-
rect” (or “central” or “symbolic”) cue is an arrow (or some other meaningful symbol) that
appears at the center of the display where the subject’s gaze is fixed and symbolically
indicates which side of the display the upcoming target is likely to appear. Upon seeing
a central cue, subjects strategically shift their attention to the symbolically indicated lo-
cation to prepare for the target’s arrival. By contrast, a “direct” (or “peripheral”) cue is a
stimulus, such as a brief flash or other abrupt onset stimulus, that appears on either the
right or left side of the display while the subject’s gaze is fixed at the center. In valid con-
ditions, the subject’s target later appears where the cue had previously appeared, while in
invalid conditions the target appears on the opposite side of the display to where the cue
had appeared. Even when subjects know that the direct cue is a task-irrelevant distractor
and explicitly form the intention to ignore it, valid peripheral cues improve performance
and invalid cues impair it. This has been taken to show that a peripheral cue, unlike a
central one, directs the subject’s attention “involuntarily” and “automatically”—i.e., with-
out the subject intending to redirect her attention to the cued location. In these circum-
stances, researchers typically speak of the subject’s attention as having been “captured”
by the cue. They also speak of subject as “distracted” by the cue (also sometimes called
a “distractor”). Because one form of attention is controlled voluntarily and strategically,
while the other form occurs involuntarily and automatically, the distinction is sometimes
drawn between “controlled” or “voluntary” attention and “automatic” or “involuntary”
attention.
These two types of attention are known to differ in their temporal characteristics. First,
they differ in how much time they require to reach a cued location. Whereas a valid in-
direct cue maximally facilitates task performance with a cue-target onset asynchrony of
300 milliseconds, a valid direct cue does so with a cue-target onset asynchrony of about
100-120 milliseconds (Carrasco 2011). Involuntary attention thus reaches a cued location
faster than voluntary attention, possibly reflecting the greater amount of time required for
central cognition to become active compared with automatic processes. Second, whereas
subjects can voluntarily sustain their attention to an indirectly cued location for as long
as they choose, attention to a directly cued location decays rapidly (Posner and Cohen
1984). This can be demonstrated by varying cue-target onset asynchrony for direct cues.
If the target appears approximately 100 milliseconds after the direct cue disappears, the
cued location receives maximal facilitation relative to uncued locations. If, however, the
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target appears 200 milliseconds or more after the direct cue disappears, the reverse is
found to occur: subjects are now slower to detect the target at cued than at uncued loca-
tions. After an initial period of attentional facilitation, attention is immediately inhibited
or suppressed at a directly cued location. This is called “inhibition of return”. No such
attentional inhibition is found using an indirect cue: subjects can voluntarily maintain
attention to the cued location long after the cue has disappeared. Because of these differ-
ences in temporal profile, psychologists sometimes refer to the type of attention engaged
by a direct cue as “transient” attention, and the type of attention engaged by an indirect
cue “sustained” attention.
In sum, common sense is right to distinguish two types of attentional deployment.
Attention can be voluntarily deployed in light of one’s current task or deployed invol-
untarily and automatically. Though this helps to vindicate part of our intuitive thought
about attention, it bears emphasis that nothing that we’ve seen so far directly resolves
whether automatic attention is a counterexample to the thesis of actionism. We’ve said
no more than Reid and James already had about what role, if any, the agent’s motives
might play in explaining why attention behaves as it does when automatically deployed.
Even if automatic attention can observably conflict with the agent’s explicit intention,
it remains to be seen that it is controlled independently of the agent’s motives. To make
progress with this latter issue, we must go beyond the bare distinction between voluntary
and involuntary attention and examine specific proposals about the mechanisms govern-
ing how attention is allocated. Since it is the automatic or involuntary control of atten-
tion that bears most directly on the objection from attention capture, I’ll henceforth be
concerned with the mechanisms of automatic (i.e., involuntary, transient) attention. The
first proposal that I’ll consider explains deployments of automatic attention in terms of a
stimulus property called “salience”. Properly understood, I’ll suggest, the salience view
of automatic attention is inconsistent with actionism in any form.
2.3 The environmental salience view
Why do subjects attend automatically to the location of a direct cue upon seeing one in
Posner’s spatial cuing paradigm? A traditional answer to this question appeals to the
cue’s visual salience. However, if “salience” is to do the required explanatory work, it
cannot simply mean the property of being such as to cause attention to shift automatically
to the cued location when the cue is perceived. Understood in that way, an answer in
terms of cue salience does not tell us anything we did not already know. It would not tell
us what it is about the cue, or about ourselves, that causes attention to shift. However,
there is another sense of “salience” that promises to provide a more informative answer
42
to our question. And this brings us to the account of automatic attention that I will be
considering in this section and the next one: the environmental salience view.
According to the “environmental salience view”, automatic attention is controlled by
the perception of environmental salience. The view has two central assumptions:
(i) Salience is a property of the subject’s environment to which subjects are per-
ceptually (e.g., visually) sensitive.
(ii) In normal perceivers, the perception of salience at a location is able to cause
attention to shift automatically to the location where salience was (and perhaps
still is) perceived.
Assumptions (i)–(ii) are at the very least implicit in the terminology psychologists fre-
quently use in discussing automatic attention. For example, paradigmatically attention-
driving stimuli—e.g., abrupt onsets in a spatial cuing paradigm and feature singletons in
a visual search paradigm—are commonly called “physically”, “objectively”, and “intrin-
sically” salient, and the ensuing attention-shift is called “exogenous”, “stimulus-driven”,
and “bottom-up”. This suggests that salience is understood as an objective, physical fea-
ture of stimuli, perception of which is sometimes sufficient to drive attention to the salient
location.
Assumptions (i)–(ii) are also explicit in traditional “salience-based” accounts of au-
tomatic attention. According to one influential model—first introduced by Koch and
Ullman (1985) as a hypothetical mechanism to explain the dynamics of attention when
searching for a target in a crowded visual display and later modelled computationally by
Itti and Koch (2000; 2001)—there is a “salience map” in the human brain governing how
attention automatically evolves over time. This is hypothesized to be a topographically
organized map that integrates multiple “feature maps” into a single representation of the
relative conspicuousness (or salience) of each location in a scene. Salience is computed
using image-based algorithms that measure how dissimilar each location is from neigh-
bouring locations, synchronically and diachronically, along multiple dimensions of vari-
ation (e.g., colour, orientation, motion), then aggregate these individual measurements
into a single value representing overall salience. The location with the highest salience
value then drives attention in a “winner-takes-all” fashion and becomes a likely target for
eye movement. Once attended, the salient location is then promptly suppressed (inhibi-
tion of return). This is hypothesized to endow attention with an “internal dynamics” so
that it can scan a scene for novel information without getting stuck cycling between only
the most physically salient locations.
Consistent with assumption (i), salience-based models regard salience as a measurable
property of stimuli to which the subject is visually sensitive in virtue of a salience map.
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Consistent with assumption (ii), perceiving environmental salience can cause an auto-
matic attention shift. For example, a red square in a visual display full of green squares
would be considered especially salient because its location differs from its surroundings
more than any other location in the display—here, with respect to the dimension of hue.
Consequently, the red item will visually “pop out” and automatically summon attention
to its location, resulting in very fast response times in a visual search task (Treisman and
Gelade 1980). This is an example of “static” discontinuity. Similarly, Yantis and Jonides
(1984) and Jonides and Yantis (1988) proposed to explain the tendency of attention to
shift automatically to the location of a direct or peripheral cue in Posner’s spatial cuing
paradigm by the fact that the cue in these experiments has abrupt visual onset (e.g., a
sudden flash). This is an example of “dynamic” discontinuity because the dissimilarity is
between a location at one moment (just before the cue arrives) and the same location at a
subsequent moment (when the cue arrives). Because abrupt onset involves dissimilarity
along multiple featural dimensions, it was suggested to be especially salient and able to
redirect attention independently of behavioural context. According to the environmental
salience view, visual attention unfolds automatically by continually being captured by
perceptions of environmental salience.
Returning to the thesis of actionism about attention, I want to suggest that the environ-
mental salience view of automatic attention should make actionists uneasy. Actionism,
recall, is the view that every episode of attention manifests an agential capacity, either
because attention is, by its nature, an action, a manner of action performance, or a com-
ponent of action. By contrast, the environmental salience view seems to make automatic
attention more similar to a passive reflex in which your body moves but it isn’t you who
moves it. When environmental salience captures your attention, it seems it isn’t you who
moves your attention to a new location, but the salience of the location. Like a knee-jerk
reflex, salience-driven attentional reorienting seems to be fundamentally passive.
To consolidate this diagnosis of conflict between actionism and the environmental
salience view, consider a sample of recent actionist proposals for how to accommodate
the intuitive notion of captured attention:
• When something salient captures attention, the agent selects the salient stimulus for
some action (e.g., orienting). The agent is active in selecting because it was psycho-
logically possible for her to select a different stimulus for response or no stimulus at
all (Wu 2014b, 90, 92).
• When something salient captures attention, the agent begins to attentively perform
a different task from the one she was performing when she first perceived the salient
stimulus. The agent is active because her task-performance is guided by her under-
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standing of the task (Mole 2011, 52-6).
• When something salient captures attention, the agent’s act of attention is governed
by a motivational state, such as a decision (Carruthers 2015) or a more primitive
urge-like state (Watzl 2017, Ch. 6) to turn her attention to the salient stimulus. The
agent is active in shifting attention because the attention-shift is controlled by a per-
sonal level motivational state.
Common to each of these proposals is the suggestion that attention, even when captured
automatically, is controlled by something internal to the agent: a selection among alter-
natives, an understanding of how to achieve a certain task, or a motivational state like a
decision or an urge to attend to the salient item. By contrast, the environmental salience
view leaves no room for such internal variables because it regards automatic attention as
governed purely by the perceived qualities of the stimulus. Put differently, each actionist
proposal takes attention, including capture, to be controlled at least partly endogenously
whereas the environmental salience view takes attention capture to be purely exogenous
or stimulus-driven. It is no coincidence that each of the actionist proposals sketched here
disagrees with the latter claim. The latter implies that attention, when captured, is con-
trolled by something external to the agent, which is plausibly the antithesis of agential
control. While I’ve considered only a sample of actionist proposals, others are apt to be
inconsistent with this feature of the environmental salience view too.
It is worth noting that all parties will agree that attention capture is “automatic” in
that it occurs without being intended. On its own, this is consistent with actionism be-
cause, as argued in Chapter 1, many automatic processes manifest agential control. For
example, a skilled typist may intentionally perform a complex series of finger movements
without having to separately intend each step in the sequence (i.e., each individual key
press). That the individual key strokes aren’t separately intended—i.e., that they happen
automatically—doesn’t disqualify them from being active. According to the account that
I gave in Chapter 1, the individual key strokes are active despite being automatic because
each key-stroke occurs under the control of the agent’s intention—e.g., the intention to
type a certain word or sentence. In just the same way, it is possible that attention unfolds
in a simultaneously automatic, yet endogenously goal-directed manner.
The challenge the environmental salience view poses to actionism is therefore not that
attention is sometimes automatic. Rather it is that attention is sometimes automatic in the
way a knee-jerk reflex is—i.e., exogenous and stimulus-driven. That is why the first con-
straint on an adequate actionist response to the objection from attention capture—namely,
that attention capture be shown to manifest an agential capacity—is not satisfied if the en-
vironmental salience view is true. At the same time, on the environmental salience view,
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there is nothing inherently defective or unsuccessful about attention shifts that are purely
salience-driven or exogenous. In being stimulus driven, automatic attention behaves ex-
actly as it has the function of behaving. Consequently, if the environmental salience view
is true, then the actionist’s second constraint—namely, that cases of distracted capture be
an unsuccessful or defective operation of attention—is also arguably not satisfied.
Having outlined the environmental salience view and the challenge it presents to ac-
tionist accounts, I’ll now explain why I think we should reject the view. Grasping the
reasons for rejecting the environmental salience view will, in turn, pave the way for my
positive alternative.
2.4 Against the environmental salience view
Though the environmental salience view continues to exert an implicit influence on the-
orizing about attention, there are both empirical and conceptual grounds to reject it. The
main empirical challenge concerns the contribution of factors other than objective salience
that contribute to determining how attention automatically changes across time, includ-
ing endogenous factors like task-relevance, affective significance, and reward history. As
we’ll see, appreciation of these other determinants of automatic attention ultimately un-
dermines the explanatory informativeness of environmental salience in a theory of atten-
tion and points toward an alternative picture of automatic attentional control as anchored
in the agent’s motivational priorities.
The first line of evidence against the environmental salience view comes from research
on gaze allocation in situations of natural vision—i.e., everyday tasks like making a sand-
wich or crossing a street. While it is important not to confuse visual attention with visual
foveation (Posner 1980), in real-world scenarios visual attention and foveation are typi-
cally closely correlated. This is partly because attention to a location is probably necessary
to program an eye movement to that location (e.g. Deubel 2008; 2014). And since (out-
side special laboratory contexts) eye movements tend not to be explicitly intended by the
subject, eye-tracking in the context of natural vision tasks provides a rough window into
the dynamics of automatic attention.1
However, eye-tracking data in natural vision tasks (as opposed to in laboratory set-
tings that present subjects with 2-D images on a computer monitor) offers little evidence
1It might also be noted that the temporal profile of goal-directed eye movements corresponds more
closely to that of automatic than to voluntary attention. Recall that it takes about 100-120 ms for automatic
attention to reach a cued location and 300 ms for volitional attention to do so. The average latency of a
goal-directed saccade—the time between the appearance of a cue and saccade initiation—is around 200-250
ms (see Carrasco 2011, 1490). Supposing that attention must already be at the target location in order to
program the saccade, this suggests that these eye movements are programmed on the basis of automatic
attention.
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for the environmental salience view. For example, when reporting an experiment by
Rothkopf et al. (2007) in which subjects had to navigate obstacles in an ordinary 3-D
environment, Tatler et al. (2011, 4) note that subjects tended to look primarily at objects
and to make only 15% of visual fixations to the visual background, whereas salience-
based models predicted that humans should have made more than 70% of fixations to the
background. Further, salience-based models have trouble explaining a common feature
of human eye movements observed during performance of well-practiced tasks: the ten-
dency to make anticipatory eye movements (saccades) to where a target object will be in
the very near future. While playing a ball game, for example:
Saccades are launched to regions where the ball will arrive in the near future
(Ballard & Hayhoe 2009; Land & McLeod, 2000). Crucially, at the time that the
target is fixated, there is nothing that visually distinguishes this location from the
surrounding background of the scene. Even without quantitative evaluation, it is
clear that no image-based model could predict this behavior. Similar targeting
of currently empty locations is seen in every-day tasks such as tea making
(Land, Mennie, & Rusted, 1999) and sandwich making (Hayhoe, Shrivastava,
Mruczek, & Pelz, 2003). When placing an object on the counter, people will
look to the empty space where the object will be placed. (Tatler et al. 2011, 4,
italics added)
In other words, when subjects automatically shift their gaze in anticipation of a fly ball or
of a change that the subject will bring about by acting, there need be (and often will be)
nothing physically salient about the location to which the eye moves. Yet, the attention
deployed here is automatic. Tatler et al. don’t deny salience plays a role in gaze allocation
but do deny that it is anywhere as central to automatic attentional control as the envi-
ronmental salience view suggests (Tatler et al. 2011, 10-11). In a similar vein, Henderson
et al. (2007) and Henderson et al. (2009) offer evidence for what they call the “cognitive
relevance framework” of overt visual attention (a.k.a. the “cognitive control hypothesis”)
against the “visual saliency hypothesis”. They offer evidence that visual searches in the
context of real-world scenes rather than 2-D computer displays are “fast and efficient”
despite being very poorly predicted by environmental salience: “In the majority of trials,
salient regions were not fixated” (850).
One might reply that while evidence from natural vision experiments may undermine
the environmental salience view as a completely general account of automatic attention,
the environmental salience view might still provide an explanation of attention capture.
In particular, one might point out that it seems wrong to describe an expert’s trained
attention as being “captured” when she skillfully anticipates the upcoming location of
the ball and moves her attention and eye to that location. Whatever troubles it might
encounter when trying to explain the skilled attention experts manifest in natural vision
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tasks, the environmental salience view could still provide a correct explanation of what
happens when our attention operates incongruently with our goals.
In response, when we examine the empirical work that speaks most directly to invol-
untary attention capture (rather than automatic attention in general), the environmen-
tal salience view fares little better. For example, consider the orthodox suggestion that
stimuli with abrupt visual onsets are especially potent at driving attention in a purely
stimulus-driven, bottom-up manner. According to the environmental salience view, it is
the intrinsic salience of abrupt onsets that explains why a direct/peripheral cue in a spa-
tial cuing paradigm consistently captures subjects’ attention (even when they intend to
ignore it).
Against this, Folk et al. (1992) demonstrated that the apparently stimulus-driven char-
acter of subjects’ attention to abrupt onset cues is probably an artifact of the experimental
paradigm that researchers had been using to study attention. Using a variant of Posner’s
spatial cuing paradigm, Folk et al. sought to show that whether or not an abrupt onset
cue succeeds at capturing a subject’s attention critically depends on whether the target
of the subject’s current task also has an abrupt onset. For example, when subjects have
the task of responding to an abrupt onset singleton, Folk et al. found that abrupt onset
colourless cues captured attention, whereas non-abrupt onset coloured cues failed to do
so. But when subjects were told instead to detect a red, non-abrupt onset singleton among
a set of uncoloured distractors, they found the opposite pattern of results. In that case,
an abrupt onset colourless cue failed to capture attention, whereas a non-abrupt onset red
cue succeeded in doing so.
Folk et al. concluded that a stimulus captures attention only when it instantiates “a
feature property that is critical to the performance of the task at hand” (Folk et al. 1992,
1032). In particular, stimuli capture attention only if they are represented in the agent’s
current task set or “control settings”. To be clear, Folk et al. don’t claim that such auto-
matic shifts of attention are volitional or explicitly intended. Subjects may be fully aware
that the cue that grabs their attention is a distraction and consequently they may intend to
ignore it (e.g., in conditions where the cue is 100% invalid with respect to upcoming tar-
get location). Their hypothesis is, rather, that when a distractor captures attention, it does
so only because it shares a perceptible feature with one’s target. In a task like the spatial
cuing paradigm, a peripheral cue captures attention only because it instantiates the visual
feature that one is using as one’s basis for target selection. If so, then attentional capture
is “contingent” on task set:
The range of external events that can cause interrupts is determined by the in-
ternal settings of the software, which, unlike “hard-wired” interrupt systems,
can be varied by changing the code. Once the code is compiled and the pro-
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gram initiated, however, events that have these properties will be processed
independently of the central processor (i.e., involuntarily). Similarly, in ex-
ogenous attention allocation, the control settings determining what properties
will elicit shifts of attention can vary in accordance with task demands. Once
the system is set and the processing sequence begun, however, the attentional
response to properties compatible with current control settings is strongly in-
voluntary. (Folk et al. 1992, 1041)
This is called the “Contingent Capture” or “Contingent Orienting Hypothesis”.2 If it is
right, then in adopting a certain task set, we bind ourselves in advance, like Odysseus to
the mast of his ship, to having our attention automatically captured by a certain range of
stimuli (cf. Elster 2000).
The Contingent Capture Hypothesis is controversial. However, even its critics (e.g.,
Belopolsky et al. 2010) do not attempt to explain Folk et al.’s key findings in terms of
physical salience. Instead, what one finds is the notion of “salience” broadened to en-
compass other sources of attentional bias than that emphasized by, for example, Ulman
and Koch (1985). One alternative to Folk et al.’s interpretation of the contingent capture
effect highlights a confound with the subject’s recent history of attending to the target-
congruent feature (through an entire block of trials). Given this recent history of attention
to that feature, subjects might be primed to attend to the feature when it next appears (Be-
lopolsky et al. 2010). If this is right, then the contingent capture effect might not directly
depend on task set, but selection history. Does the latter reflect a purely “bottom-up” form
of attention? One ground against an affirmative answer concerns the close relationship
that may exist between selection and reward history. Awh et al. (2012)—two of whose
authors overlap with Belopolsky et al. (2010)—propose:
The selection bias towards previously attended features or positions [as, e.g.,
defended by Belopolsky et al. (2010)] may be grounded in the reward that
observers experience when they achieve their task goals (4).
Similarly, in their review of the effects of reward on inter-trial priming, Chelazzi et al.
(2013) have suggested that:
[I]n standard experiments of this kind, where reward is not typically involved
[i.e. explicitly administered by experimenters], the occurrence of negative
priming may be dependent on some form of internal reward, acting in a simi-
lar way to external reward feedback. (63)
The suggestion Chelazzi et al. and Awh et al. each make is that the effect of recent
(and not so recent) selection history on automatic capture may be the product of value
2A related view is the “Displaywide Contingent Orienting Hypothesis” (Gibson and Kelsey 1998). Burn-
ham (2007) reviews the recent attention capture literature (including paradigms I have not discussed here)
and concludes that, to date, there is no evidence for purely stimulus-driven attention in this literature.
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learning mechanisms. The suggestion here is that subjects experience an implicit reward
upon completing each trial, disposing attention to return to reward-associated stimuli
when they next appear. This would make selection-history-based capture an instance of
“value-driven attentional capture” (Anderson et al. 2011; Peck et al. 2009) likely rooted
in “incentive salience” (Berridge 2004; Anderson and Yantis 2013). Concurrent to the
discovery of value-driven automatic attention rooted in incentive salience has been the
discovery of “affective” or “emotional” salience resulting in “emotional capture” (e.g.,
Fox et al. 2001; Vuilleumier 2005; Todd et al. 2012; Pessoa 2013), which likely interacts
with reward history (Todd and Manigold 2018). Together with the possibility of task-
contingent capture, this has led prominent figures in the field of attentional control to re-
nounce the “top-down/bottom-up distinction of attention control” as a “failed theoretical
dichotomy” (Awh et al. 2012). Given their dependence on the subject’s internal goal state
and history, these non-intrinsic varieties of salience—not only task-contingent, but also
emotional and incentive-related—are not well-understood as “bottom-up” or “stimulus-
driven”.
Confronted with these difficulties for the original environmental salience view, one
might propose amending the environmental salience view to accommodate other vari-
eties of salience. One might suggest that all cases of attention capture are driven by
the perception of environmental salience, but “environmental salience” should be con-
ceived broadly to encompass not only physical or intrinsic salience, but salience in a sense
that encompasses emotional, incentive, and task-contingent sources of attentional bias.
Let’s call this the “liberal” environmental salience view of attention capture, as distinct
from “conservative” environmental salience view that theoretically privileges physical
salience.
However, it is hard to see how environmental salience could continue to play an infor-
mative role in a causal explanation of attention capture if understood liberally. On the lib-
eral interpretation, stimulus salience will be extremely context- and response-dependent.
It will depend on, among other things, the perceiver’s reward history with the stimulus-
type, current level of arousal and motivational drive (e.g., hunger, thirst, etc.), task set,
and possibly other factors too. There need be nothing in common among such stimuli
other than being such that exposure to them will tend to trigger an automatic shift of spa-
tial attention in some perceiver under some circumstances. Consequently, an explanation
of attention capture framed in terms of its perceived salience will return us to the difficul-
ties that the environmental salience view was originally introduced in order to overcome.
In particular, to claim that stimuli are salient on the liberal construal amounts to a mere
re-description that it is attention capturing (for a specific subject at a specific time), which
is what we invoked salience in the first place to explain. So, whereas the original envi-
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ronmental salience view was substantive but empirically false, the liberal salience view is
potentially true, but uninformative.
The considerations discussed in this section suggest that we should reject the environ-
mental salience view. We need a different account of the mental state underlying auto-
matic shifts of attention. We could continue to call this mental state “salience”, and it may
be that some empirical researchers intend to use the term in this broad manner. However,
given the close associations of the term “salience” with the specific commitments of the
environmental salience view, I will mostly avoid using the term henceforth. I will speak
instead of the mental state responsible for the control of automatic attention. In the next
section, I offer an account of this mental state that grounds it in the agent’s priorities, and
I show how this helps answer the objection from attention capture against actionism.
2.5 The priority view of automatic attention
This section develops the positive view of automatic attention that I want to propose. I
call this view “the priority view”. The priority view has the following main constituents.
It understands automatic attention, including various cases of captured attention, in re-
lation to attention’s aim of preventing distraction (Chapter 1 see §1.5). The priority view
retains this claim but it casts it in a more positive light. It claims that the aim of automatic
attention is to prioritize. “Prioritization” is the activity of aligning information-processing
with the agent’s goals (or “agential priorities”). When all goes well, this process results in
states of processing in which information that would otherwise interfere with successful
action is suppressed and goal-relevant information is selectively enhanced. Distraction is
averted and relevant information is prioritized. Importantly for answering the objection
from attention capture, it is possible, on the priority view, for an agent to attend but to fail
at prioritizing. The priority view therefore does not claim that attention just is prioritiza-
tion, but rather that prioritization is the proper functional role or aim of attention. When
we are attending well, we are prioritizing.
Before proceeding, I want to clarify how the priority view relates to relevant empir-
ical work. Recall the empirical evidence raised against the environmental salience view
in the previous section. That evidence suggests that environmental salience is not the
only, or even a primary, causal factor in determining how one automatically attends. In
addition to environmental salience, multiple endogenous factors appear to contribute as
well, including task set, reward history, and affective significance. In recognition of these
findings, psychologists of attention have increasingly begun to adopt the expression “at-
tentional” or “integrated priority map” (or simply “priority map”) in place of the more
traditional “salience map” when referring to the representational structure thought to be
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responsible for directing automatic visuospatial attention (e.g., Fecteau & Munoz 2006;
Serences & Yantis 2006; Bisley & Goldberg 2010; Baluch & Itti 2011; Awh et al. 2012;
Todd and Manaligod 2018). We are told that the priority map integrates both bottom-up
information arising from the sensory receptors (including about environmental salience)
with top-down information in order to construct a topographical ranking of each location
in the scene according to the overall “priority” (Fecteau and Munoz 2006; Baluch and
Itti 2011) or “value” (Gottlieb 2012) of the information at that location given current be-
havioural context. Beyond this minimal characterization, researchers rarely explain what
theoretical significance we should attach to this terminological shift, except to remark that
it reflects an increased emphasis on endogenous factors like “relevance” in determining
the content of this map. The priority view is my own attempt to identify the broader
significance of this shift for understanding the nature and agential status of automatic
attention. So, while the priority view is anchored in recent empirical work on attention, I
am going beyond what psychologists themselves say about the matter.
This is a long section, so here’s my plan for it. I begin in §2.5.1 by elaborating on the
priority view and its main differences from the environmental salience view with respect
to the agential status of automatic attention. In §2.5.2, I explain how the priority view
claims to accommodate cases in which the aim of prioritization is intuitively unsatisfied,
including cases of distracted attention capture. I close in §2.5.3 by drawing a comparison
between my account and two other extant proposals in the philosophical literature.
2.5.1 Agential priorities, acts of prioritization, and the integrated prior-
ity map
Let’s begin with an example to illustrate the main idea behind the priority view. Consider
the visual attention of a well-motivated, expert squash player who is visually tracking the
squash ball as it leaves her opponent’s racquet. The squash player is motivated by the goal
of successfully returning the shot and ultimately of winning the match. Because she is
thus motivated, she ignores what would otherwise distract her—e.g., the bright sheen of
her opponent’s watch or the loud conversation occurring outside the court—and instead
focuses on the parts of the environment that are relevant to attaining her goals—e.g., she
might predictively saccade to the upcoming location of the ball (see §2.4). Suppose that
she succeeds: her visual processing of the ball’s upcoming location is selectively enhanced
and visual processing of the location of various distractors is suppressed. By reorienting
her attention automatically to where the ball is soon to be (and away from, for example,
the watch or the loud events beyond the court), she attends to what’s currently most
relevant to her. By aligning her perceptuomotor processing with her goals in this way, the
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squash player qualifies as engaged in a kind of prioritization. According to the priority
view, such prioritization is the constitutive aim of automatic attention.
Importantly, the notion of “priority” enters the priority view at multiple junctures.
Most fundamentally, we must distinguish the agent’s priorities (or “priority system”) from
the agent’s acts of prioritization. I’ll begin by explaining the former and how it relates to
the psychological structure of attention, as this was explained in Chapter 1 (§1.3).
By “agential priorities”, I mean the agent’s total or overall motivational state at a time.
This includes the integrated goal hierarchy provided by an agent’s intentions and plans.
In the above example, these consist in the player’s intention to return the ball and ul-
timately to win the match. However, as I will understand the notion of an “agential
priority”, an agent’s intentions are only one component of her priorities. This is because
intentions do not exhaust the agent’s total motivation. To illustrate the importance of total
motivation, consider the difference between someone who is strongly motivated to win a
squash match and someone who is less motivated to win. For the first person, winning
is clearly a priority. About the second individual, though, we might say that while she
also had goal of winning, her “heart wasn’t in it”. For the latter individual, winning isn’t,
at least in the moment, as much of a priority. There is a difference in the overall motiva-
tional strength with which the agents hold the goal of winning—a difference that seems
to directly impact this goal’s status as a priority.
What exactly this difference in overall motivational strength in the above example
amounts to isn’t totally clear. However, it likely goes beyond the contribution of any sin-
gle attitude. As Shepherd (2017b) observes in a recent discussion of motivational strength,
The dispositional basis of one’s overall motivation to A will consist of the dis-
positional properties of a range of accessible motivational mental states and
processes relevant to one’s A-ing. These may include emotions (Scarantino &
Neilsen 2015), desires (Mele 2003), intentions (Mele 1992), as well as modifica-
tional work done by relevant beliefs, perceptual states, states of imagination,
and more. (Shepherd 2017b, 262; cf. Mele 2003, 173).
Building on this point, I propose to understand the agent’s current priorities as deter-
mined by the integration of a range of motivational systems. This includes not only con-
scious intentions but also implicit and automatic affective and reward-related biases, lev-
els of arousal, and potentially more. To emphasize the wide range of contributing factors,
I’ll also speak in this context of the agent’s “priority system”.
With the notion of the agent’s priority system in hand, we must revisit the account of
attention that I sketched in Chapter 1 (§1.3). There, I explained that attending is a biasing
process composed of two mental states: an attentional source state and an attentional
resultant state. The former is the source of attentional bias, and the latter is the result
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of the process on lower level states of sensory and sensorimotor processing. In Chapter
1, I operated with the simplifying assumption that the attentional source state during
action is the agent’s intention in acting, which I related to a task set or intentional set.
However, we must amend this to accommodate the broader notion of agential priorities.
In particular, I want to suggest that where an agent’s intention contributes a source of
automatic attention, it does so in virtue of the place that it occupies within the agent’s
larger priority system. At least in the case of automatic attention, it is the agent’s overall
priority system or total motivational state that serves as the source of attentional bias.
I will continue to refer in the singular to the attentional source state for an episode of
automatic attention. But we should bear in mind that this source state is an aggregate of
motivational factors.3
According to the priority view, when agents automatically guide their conduct, they
do so according to the standards of success set by their agential priorities. Attentional
prioritization provides the means whereby agents exercise such automatic guidance. It is
critical to grasp that, on the priority view, what makes information-processing an instance
of attentional prioritization is the role of the agent’s priorities in directing it. For example,
when our well-motivated squash player reorients her attention to the ball’s upcoming
location, she counts as having prioritized that location only if it was her priority system
that guided the reorienting. Otherwise, as I’ll discuss more fully in §2.5.2, she would not
qualify as having prioritized at all.
To consolidate the view, it is instructive to contrast the priority view’s conception of
“attentional prioritization” with how the same expression is apt to be interpreted on the
environmental salience view. If by “attentional prioritization”, one merely meant the se-
lectively enhanced processing of some information to the exclusion of other information,
then the claim that the proper functional role of attention is to psychologically prioritize
information is fully consistent with the environmental salience view. After all, the envi-
ronmental salience view fully accepts that perception of environmental salience triggers
selective processing of the salient location. However, by understanding “prioritization”
in this way, one would be severing any essential connection between prioritization and
the agent’s motivational priorities. Consequently, the priority view does not understand
the function of attention in that way. In formulating the role of attention, the priority view
instead draws on an understanding of “prioritization” according to which prioritizing is
a process whose standards of success are constitutively determined by the agent’s prior-
3Further, the neural correlates of these diverse states may be more physically distributed than some-
times suggested. Attentional source regions include not only the frontal “dorsal” and “ventral attentional
networks” Corbetta and Shulman 2002; Shulman and Corbetta 2012, but also portions of the amygdala for
affective biases (Allport 2011, 40; Pessoa 2013, Ch. 2) and possibly also sources of motivational bias in the
basal ganglia (Cisek 2007).
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ity system. Specifically, the priority view means by “prioritization” the act of bringing
one’s states of information-processing into alignment with one’s agential priorities. Un-
derstood in this way, while it may be possible for selectively enhanced processing to be
triggered purely “bottom-up” on the basis of perceived salience, it is not possible for an
act of attentional prioritization to occur that way. The latter act must, instead, issue from
the agent’s priorities.
With this, we are in a position to grasp why the priority view qualifies as form of
actionism about attention. The priority view regards all episodes of automatic attention
as motivated occurrences and, in this sense, as emanating from the agent. Whereas the
environmental salience view depicted an automatic attentional shift as a brute, reflexive
response triggered by the perception of salience, the priority view understands an auto-
matic shift of attention as a motivated response to the detection of goal-relevant or “high
priority” information—i.e., information that merits prioritization. This includes instances
of what we would intuitively characterize as “captured” attention. After all, sometimes
attending to what is of highest priority to you requires automatically interrupting what
you’re doing in order to attend to a more urgent concern. For example, while our squash
player is preparing, preemptively, to move to the front of the court in anticipation of a
boast from her opponent, suddenly her attention becomes captured by an unexpected
feature of her opponent’s follow-through which has the potential to drive the ball in a di-
rection opposite to the anticipated one. The attention that she was paying in expectation
of a boast has suddenly been interrupted by an unexpected, but highly relevant visual
cue. In these cases, an agent’s attention and behaviour may be fully coherent and may
even manifest significant skill. Thus, even when captured, on the priority view, attention
is directed from within by the agent’s priorities rather than from without by environmental
salience. Because it regards all episodes of automatic attention as possessing a motiva-
tional source in the agent’s priorities, the priority view meets the first of our constraints
on an adequate response to the objection from attention capture. I will examine more
complex cases of capture in §2.5.2.
I’ve been relating the priority view of automatic attention to my thesis in Chapter
1 that attending is a process anchored to the agent’s goals and aimed at coping with
distractions. According to the priority view, this is the theoretical context within which
we must understand the “integrated priority map” that psychologists working on the
control of visual attention posit. For the remainder of this subsection, I comment on what
significance we should attribute to this map on the priority view.
Among psychologists, the assumption that there is a literal topographical map in the
primate brain that drives subsequent states of visuospatial attention in virtue of its con-
tent remains fairly entrenched. Much research is devoted to investigating the proper-
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ties of this map—e.g., determining which factors (both exogenous and endogenous) con-
tribute at which time scales to its rankings. However, while I do not wish to downplay the
importance of the priority map, it is possible that these assumptions are partly a holdover
from the environmental salience view. Once we have rejected the assumption that au-
tomatic attention is driven exogenously by the perception of salience, we may wish to
reconsider the assumption that automatic attention is controlled by a map. Rejecting this
assumption is consistent with retaining the empirically well-established construct of the
priority map, though we may wish to reinterpret its exact place in attention.
In particular, once we reject the environmental salience view and embrace the prior-
ity view, the natural conclusion to draw is that the actual source state for attention is not
strictly the priority map itself. Rather, the source state is the agent’s own priorities: the set
of systems that are contributing inputs to the priority map. Once these disparate inputs
have been integrated into a unified visuospatial representation of the scene in the form of
a priority ranking, one might plausibly suggest that a form of attention is thereby instanti-
ated in the state of the map. The agent’s motivational priorities have been brought to bear
on available visual information and resulted in the ranking of visual information accord-
ing to its relevance to priority attainment. And that just is, on the priority view, a form of
attention. Importantly, the agent’s act of attention may be incomplete or in progress, and the
priority map certainly has an important coordinative role to play in how that attentional
activity develops. This makes the priority map an early, though functionally critical stage
in a temporally extended process of attention. But this is consistent with maintaining that
the state of the priority map already instantiates a form of visual selective attention.
Moreover, although it has been the focus of a large amount of work on the control of
visual attention, the contribution of the priority map might turn out to be relatively nar-
row from the perspective of guiding bodily action as a whole. In particular, the brain areas
researchers have identified as the basis of the priority map in primates—the well-studied
regions of posterior parietal cortex, including the monkey homologue lateral intraparietal
cortex (LIP)—are significantly overlapping with (if not just the same as) areas that pro-
gram rapid eye movements. Furthermore, it is known that this map has a spatial frame
of reference and functional interconnections (e.g., to the frontal eye fields) tailored to this
specific role. There are many ongoing controversies about the different functions carried
out in LIP and functionally connected areas like the frontal eye fields (Armstrong 2011).
But if one is interested in how visual attention is used to guide other aspects of bodily ac-
tion, like reaching out one’s arm, then other areas with very different spatial format and
functional connections could turn out to be more relevant (e.g., medial intraparietal cortex
or MIP). While this does not preclude the priority map in LIP and connected areas from
playing a privileged role in orchestrating these other resources, it raises the possibility
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that the priority map is one specialized resource among many others that is motivation-
ally harnessed in attending. To this, we can add that there are forms of attention other
than spatial attention, including object-based and feature-based, which the priority map
won’t be able to account for given that it is location-based. This is further reason to doubt
that it will play an essential role to all cases of visual attention.
None of this is meant to deny or downplay the importance of the priority map in me-
diating at least one very central form of visual attention: attention of a kind that guides
overt eye movement. And although I’ve proposed that the state of the map already mani-
fests a form of selective visual attention, I do not deny that the priority map, in turn, plays
an important role in biasing processing within, e.g., the ventral visual stream (e.g., feature
maps in V1 and V4) and in motor areas like FEF toward the highest ranked locations in
the map. In doing so, it serves to direct selectively enhanced perceptual and motor pro-
cessing in order to bring that processing into alignment with its own priority rankings.
Consequently, researchers are right to claim that the priority map genuinely directs visual
attention. The points I’ve been emphasizing are simply that: (i) the priority map’s role
in directing visual attention is plausibly an intermediate stage within a larger attentional
process that has its ultimate source in the agent’s priority system; (ii) that there could be
other structures in the brain that perform a similar mediating role in the flow of visual
attention. The priority view has additional consequences for how we should conceive
the role and content of the priority map. As these are not immediately relevant to the
points I wish to make for the remainder of the chapter, however, I reserve discussion of
these further implications for an appendix to this chapter. I turn now to explain how the
priority view hopes to accommodate cases in which the aim of prioritization is intuitively
unsatisfied.
2.5.2 Failures of prioritization
According to the priority view, all cases of automatic attention issue from the agent’s pri-
ority system. By casting even cases of captured attention in these terms, the priority view
claims to satisfy the first constraint on an actionist reply to the objection from attention
capture. In this section, I show how the priority view meets the second constraint. The
second constraint is to show why, in some cases of capture, attention operates poorly or
imperfectly. Specifically, in some cases of attention capture, the agent’s attention is dis-
tracted and, as a result, behavioural coherence decreases. Since the function of attention
is to compensate for distraction and, in so doing, to promote behavioural coherence (see
§1.5), it follows that attention fails to fulfill its role in these cases. The priority view recog-
nizes multiple paths to prioritization failure. Charting these paths will allow us to grasp
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the limitations of automatic attention as a form of control and the different sources of
distraction that skilled agents must face in acting, ranging from the purely internal to the
purely external.
The first way prioritization failure can occur is if the agent lacks a fully coherent sys-
tem of priorities. Intuitively, this is a form of distraction whose source is within the agent.
To develop this point, I need to introduce the concept of “motivational interference”. With
this, I refer to the processing interference that arises when distinct motivational aspects of
the agent’s priority system compete for control of attention. Conflicting priorities present
an obvious barrier to successful prioritizing. It is important to observe, however, that
motivational conflicts do not undermine attention. Automatic attention is simply the
top-down biasing of perceptual and perceptuomotor processing by the agent’s priority
system. And a biasing process can occur whether or not the source of bias is internally
coherent. For example, if two individuals decide to direct traffic at an intersection but
do little to coordinate their activities, they will be biasing traffic flow even if they are not
doing so coherently (as measured by the likelihood of collision). Similarly, it is possible
for the motivational elements comprising the agent’s priority system to generate states
of processing that, while motivationally modulated and therefore attentional, are never-
theless not fully coherent. Here, the agent’s priority system continues to attentionally
bias perceptual and perceptuomotor processing, but the coherence of attention (and ul-
timately of behaviour) is impaired because of motivational interference. It is distracted
and thus defective attention.
On the priority view, many central examples of captured attention turn out to be re-
flect motivational interference. To illustrate, return to the example of experts “choking
under pressure”—i.e., performing significantly below their skill level because of high
anxiety about failure. As discussed in Chapter 1 (§1.4.2.3), according to one influential
account (“attentional control theory”), experts control their skilled performances, in part,
by deploying “goal-directed” attention when guiding a task’s execution. Further, accord-
ing to this account, choking occurs when the expert’s attention automatically shifts away
from task-relevant information toward task-irrelevant information—i.e., when they be-
come distracted. (For this reason, the theory is also called a “distraction” theory of chok-
ing). Thus, when the expert golfer chokes, her attention is diverted from the ball and her
swing, say, to distractors in her environment or worries about failure. It is this automatic
attention shift that is claimed to underlie the expert’s sudden control loss and failed putt
(Vine et al. 2013).
Unsurprisingly, the attentional control theory links this automatic attention shift
specifically to anxiety. In making this suggestion, proponents of the account draw on
the well-established finding that anxiety is a partial determinant of automatic attention.
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For example, with respect to tasks that require detecting and responding to threat-related
stimuli, anxious individuals are at a clear advantage over non-anxious subjects. In visual
search tasks that require one to detect an angry face in a crowded display of emotionally
neutral faces, anxious individuals are significantly quicker than non-anxious individu-
als to notice and respond to the angry face (Byrne and Eysenck 1995). When the search
target is, instead, a happy face in a crowd of angry faces, the opposite pattern is found:
search time for the anxious subjects is impaired relative to that of non-anxious subjects.
On the basis of these and related findings, proponents of attentional control theory there-
fore propose that choking consists in an automatic anxiety-induced attention shift away
from task-relevant information and toward threat-related stimuli or thoughts.
The priority view regards choking as an example of attention capture based in motiva-
tional interference. On the one hand, the golfer’s intention to swing motivates devoting
processing resources to the ball and to key aspects of her swing. On the other hand, her
anxiety motives devoting processing resources to threat-related information (e.g., her anx-
ious thoughts or the threatening-looking audience members) to the exclusion of the ball
and swing execution. Here, processing that is relevant relative to one motivational factor
is irrelevant relative to the other, and so interference arises. While this is how the priority
view interprets these claims, it should be noted that this is not how proponents of atten-
tional control theory typically express their position. More commonly, proponents continue
to frame their account, as described in the previous paragraph, in terms of a traditional
distinction between a “bottom-up” and “salience-driven” form of attention and a “top-
down”, “goal-directed” form of attention (e.g., Eysenck et al. 2007, 343). On this formula-
tion, choking consists in a shift from goal-directed, top-down attention to salience-driven,
bottom-up attention. The priority view rejects this aspect of the account. After all, chok-
ing is not salience-driven if by “salience” one means environmental salience. As Eysenck
et al. themselves emphasize, attention during choking is directed by anxiety, which they
aptly explain as “an aversive emotional and motivational state” concerned with the pres-
ence of threat (Eysenck et al. 2007, 336). What proponents of the theory should say is that
choking results from motivational interference between one aspect of the priority system
and another. Anxiety-induced capture has less in common with a brute reflex than it does
with, for example, unskillfully attempting to do two things at once.4
Motivational interference tends to undermine an agent’s intentional control. Although
4DeCaro et al. (2011) consequently come closer to adequately formulating the attentional control theory
when they summarize its core claim as that “pressure essentially creates a dual-task environment in which
situation-related worries compete with the attention needed to execute the task at hand” (391). However,
this formulation isn’t quite right either. Specifically, it is wrong to suggest that the expert’s anxiety provides
her with a task in addition to that of executing the skilled performance (as DeCaro et al. implicitly acknowl-
edge by ending their sentence by speaking of “the” task at hand). What DeCaro et al. mean is that anxiety
motivationally interferes with the subject’s intention to execute a task (for control of attention).
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it is possible that the anxious golfer will execute a flawless performance, her attention is
more likely to move to task-irrelevant stimuli when focus on the ball and her swing is
critical. If she nevertheless executes a perfect shot despite being anxious, luck will have
been more of a factor in her success than if her attention had been more fully engaged
on the task at hand. Similar points will likely apply to acting with weak overall motiva-
tion: when you are tired or bored, attention will tend to be riveted by more personally
interesting topics, resulting in task-neglect (cf. Shepherd 2017b). And when trying to
break a bad habit, “value-driven” attentional biases based in reward history can interfere
with successfully acting on one’s intention (e.g., Berridge 2004; Robinson and Berridge
2008; Anderson et al. 2011; Anderson and Yantis 2013). More generally, if attention ex-
ists to achieve behavioural coherence through the avoidance of distraction, this role will
tend to be sabotaged by motivational interference. It is difficult to attend well—i.e., to
prioritize—if one’s priorities are not coherent. Motivational conflicts tend to undo what
attention exists, in the first place, to achieve.
Given the many ways motivational interference can undermine attentional prioriti-
zation, one might wonder how agents cope with distractions that have a motivational
source. To answer that question, I think we would need to go beyond automatic atten-
tion. Automatic attention is at the whim of total motivation or the agent’s overall prior-
ity system, including arousal levels (e.g., anxiety vs. boredom) and affective tendencies
linked with habit and personality. One might conjecture that a more volitional and ef-
fortful form of attention developed, in part, to aid with the motivational interference that
can plague automatic attention. In particular, a more volitional and effortful variety of
attention might be used to bias the outcome of motivational competitions for attention
in a certain direction. Though there will likely be limits to the efficacy of effort, there is
evidence that the likelihood of choking under pressure decreases with increased effort
(Eysenck et al. 2007). This might consist in volitionally directing effort to how one at-
tends in light of one’s awareness of one’s attentional biases. It seems to imply making
a decision about how one will attend, whereas automatic attention does not depend on
deciding how one will attend (see Chapter 1 §1.3). Automatic attention may be sufficient
to act successfully when one’s priorities are coherent; otherwise, effortful attention might
be required.
I’ve been focusing till now on examples of distracted attention that have their basis
in the attentional source state—i.e., the priority system. One might ask whether all cases
of distracted attention can be explained in terms of motivational competitions within the
agent. In response, I think that would be too simplistic. It is true that, on the priority view,
many more cases of attention capture are apt to be explainable in this manner than has
traditionally been assumed. However, we should allow that attention can fail in its aim
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without there being any defect or incoherence in the agent’s priorities. For the remainder
of this section, I want to highlight two other ways prioritization failures could arise on the
priority view. The first concerns task-contingent capture (Folk et al. 1992). The second
concerns the influence of physical salience.
To begin, recall the putative phenomenon of task-contingent capture (Folk et al. 1992).
These are cases in which a peripheral cue captures attention because it possesses a feature
in common with one’s target. For example, something red might automatically summon
attention if one’s task requires finding something red. This is found to occur even if
the subject knows that a cue will appear before the target and is confident that the cue
is merely a distraction that should be ignored. Nonetheless, Folk et al. argue that target-
congruent cues reliably impair target detection by capturing attention. Let’s suppose such
cases occur and that Folk et al.’s explanation of them is the correct one.
What makes this case seem to stand apart from those considered earlier (e.g., being
drawn to attend to stimuli associated with threat or with past reward) is that, in this case,
there is a strong case for saying that the cue is wholly irrelevant to the agent. Since the
subject does ignore the cue when it is task-incongruent, the only plausible basis of signifi-
cance to the subject is its connection to her current task. And yet, the cue is task-irrelevant
and understood as such by the subject. It seems that the agent’s priorities could be fully
coherent in a case like this one. The subject could be single-mindedly focused on the task
at hand and motivationally well-balanced. And yet distraction arises in the transition
from the agent’s priority system to the state of the priority map. If we understand the
priority map as a representation of the relevance of incoming visual information to the
agent given her priorities, then the priority map misrepresents locations that are in fact
of low priority (namely, the location of the cue) to the subject as being of high priority.
Under the guidance of the nonveridical priority map, what is in fact a distractor receives
selectively enhanced visual processing and performance suffers as a result. The agent’s
attention is captured by a distractor. Here, distraction arises not because of interference
within the priority system, but because of a mismatch between the agent’s priorities, on
the one hand, and the state of her priority map (and, ultimately, her completed state of
attention), on the other. In principle, nothing precludes other forms of misrepresentation
from entering at this stage as well.
Whatever the empirical fact of the matter about task-contingent capture, the possi-
bility of such cases should not surprise us. This is so especially when we recall that we
are dealing with an automatic and pre-attentive process. The calculations that go into
determining a new state of the priority map (i.e., a new priority ranking) are occurring
outside the focus of attention (since they are responsible for determining what will be
focused on next). Consequently, one might well expect these processes to be less flexibly
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sensitive to the agent’s explicit goals than processes that are possible with the benefit of
focused attention. Further, we might expect the limits of the flexibility of those automatic
processes to come to light under special laboratory conditions similar to those Folk et al.
designed. The process whereby the agent’s psychological processing becomes aligned
with her motivational priorities is, unsurprisingly, fallible.
I’ve suggested that task-contingent capture may present a case in which discrepancy
arises between the agent’s priority system and the state of her integrated priority map
(and ultimately of her completed state of attention). In such a case, the map represents a
location as having high priority to the agent which, given the agent’s actual priorities, is
of very low priority. Whereas this type of failure arises in the transition from the agent’s
priorities to the state of her priority map, the last type of case I will consider points to
a role for purely bottom-up influence in undermining attentional prioritization. These
are failures of prioritization that arise after the priority map has been formed, but before
the priority map has successfully biased other areas. If we understand the priority map
as an initial stage in an attentional process, then this sort of failure would arise after at-
tending is already underway. In this context, one possibility that deserves consideration
is whether environmental salience could exogenously influence the course of attention
at this point—i.e., after the priority map has generated a priority ranking. I’ve already
allowed that environmental salience may bias a priority map’s rankings. What I’m enter-
taining now is the possibility that environmental salience also exerts a biasing influence
on the course of attention that is unmediated by the priority map. If perceiving a physi-
cally salient distractor could cause the unfolding process of attention to deviate from the
priority map’s ranking, this could, in turn, occur in either of two ways. First, it could
be that salience merely interferes with attending so that it deviates from its priority rank-
ing. We can think here of the buzzing fly tugging on one’s attention as one tries to work.
Second, it could be that the salient distractor utterly overwhelms the priority map’s bias-
ing and so fully “captures” perceptual processing (cf. Buehler 2014). In this second case,
whatever bias the priority map had (or would have had) is nullified. We might think here
of a loud crash or explosion.
The priority view implies a very different view of the two cases with respect to the
presence of attention. On the plausible assumption that all actions are influenced or biased
externally, the first scenario would not undermine the status of attending as an exercise of
an agential capacity. The squash player’s swing, for example, is influenced by the phys-
ical properties of the racquet itself (e.g., its weight), but she continues to actively guide
its progress. That an action’s course is biased exogenously doesn’t entail that it is deter-
mined exogenously—i.e., stimulus-driven. The latter requires not only the presence of
exogenous factors, but the absence of endogenous ones. In the case where environmen-
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tal salience merely biases attention from below, the agent’s priorities remain engaged in
guiding attention. There is merely interference from a foreign element, which diminishes
but need not eliminate agential control. In the second scenario, however, matters are dif-
ferent. If salience not only biased but overwhelmed the influence of the agent’s priorities,
then on the priority view this would not be attention at all, but pure distraction. A purely
exogenously induced change in perceptual processing is not a change in attention (see also
Chapter 4).
It should be noted that while nothing on the priority view precludes salience from
overwhelming the influence of the priority map, scenarios like automatically reorienting
to a loud crash involve a confound that is important in the present context. Physical
salience, on its own, may have some automatic biasing effect on attention (though the
matter is unclear, see Burnham 2007). But what exerts a strong automatic bias on our
attention, and has the potential to completely interrupt our focus, is the emotional valence
of a stimulus. Novel or infrequent information can be highly emotionally arousing. And
it is novel or infrequent stimuli that appear to engage the brain areas associated with
the “interrupt” of attentional focus rather than physical salience per se (see Shulman and
Corbetta 2012, 117-118).5 Physical salience and emotional valence are hard to disentangle
in examples like a loud, unexpected crash because these events are highly emotionally
arousing. They startle us and cause fear. Since I am including emotional systems as a
motivational constituent of agential priority, cases like the loud, unexpected crash are
already accounted for on the priority view.
I’ve considered the main ways attention can potentially fail to achieve its proper func-
tional role or prioritization. In each case, we find acts of attention that result in a state of at
least partial distraction—i.e., in failures to prioritize what’s relevant given one’s agential
priorities. This delivers the result I’ve suggested we should want from an actionist con-
ception of attention: it depicts attention as essentially the exercise of an agential capacity.
Yet it accommodates the observation that attention can be captured in a way which results
in distraction or failure to prioritize. In such cases, attention continues to be governed by
the aim of prioritization, but, for a variety of possible reasons fails to achieve that aim and
so is flawed attention. Recognition of the category of defective attention is absent from
5In particular, Shulman and Corbetta discuss a study by Indovina and Macaluos (2007) showing that
“irrelevant stimuli of high sensory salience that occur as a regular part of an ongoing task, in which other
stimuli have been designated as behaviorally relevant, do not activate the ventral network” (where the
ventral network is the one that, on Shulman and Corbetta’s influential framework, underlies the capture
(or “interrupt”) of focus from a task to something more behaviourally significant) (Shulman and Corbetta
2012, 118). Shulman and Corbetta quite explicitly link this and related findings to the known anatomical
and likely evolutionary ties between the right-lateralized attentional ventral system and the known seats
of emotional arousal (which, they note, also tend to be strongly right-lateralized). The central thrust of
Shulman and Corbetta’s discussion is not that the ventral network is “stimulus-driven” (as they themselves
tend to put the point), but rather than it is primarily emotionally driven.
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extant actionist proposals, including proposals that are otherwise strikingly different, as
I’ll now explain.
2.5.3 An alternative to “rigorism” and “permissivism”
In this section, I contrast the priority view of automatic attention with two more extreme
views of attention: what I’ll call “rigorism” and “permissivism”. I’ll argue that the prior-
ity view avoids shortcomings confronting each position.
According to rigorists, attention is essentially an absence of distraction. Like propo-
nents of the priority view, they maintain that the nature of attention is to be understood
in relation to the agent’s priorities or goals. They further claim that wherever one is dis-
tracted by what one understands to be low-priority or goal-irrelevant information, one
thereby fails to be in a state of attention. For example, if subjects understand that a direct
cue in Posner’s spatial cuing paradigm is a mere distraction, rigorists are likely to deny
that the allocation of selectively enhanced visual processing resources toward the cued
location realizes a form of attention at all. According to the rigorist, matters would be
different if, once one had been distracted by the cue, one took up a new task whose per-
formance was understood to involve selectively enhanced visual processing of the cued
location. In that case, we could then, in rigorist terms, speak of the agent’s attention as
having been captured by the cue. But suppose the agent takes up no new task. In that
case, rigorists must regard the subject’s impaired performance in the invalid condition
not as a consequence of the subject visually attending to the cued location, but of the
agent merely being distracted by the cue. Like the priority view, rigorists emphasize that
an episode of attention should be assessed relative to the standards of success established
by the agent’s goals or priorities. But unlike the priority view, rigorists are led to reject
the possibility of “distracted attention” as an oxymoron. Mole’s (2011) account can be
read as suggesting this verdict about the effects of a direct cue in Posner’s spatial cuing
paradigm.
Permissivists, by contrast, happily accept the idea of distracted attention. They can
therefore allow that the agent counts as visually attending to the directly cued location
in Posner’s spatial cuing paradigm, even though they understand the cue to be a mere
distraction. The permissivist goes further, however, and claims that there is nothing sub-
optimal or defective about attention in such cases. At least by the standards of success
imposed by attention itself, one attends fully successfully in being distracted. According
to Watzl (2017), for example, attending consists in the mental activity of structuring one’s
mental states into relations of relative priority: what Watzl calls “priority structures”. In
cases of capture by a direct cue, Watzl claims that the agent’s structuring activity is guided
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by “psychological salience”, which he takes to be an imperatival aspect of perceptual rep-
resentational content. For example, on Watzl’s view, the subject’s perception of a direct
cue in a spatial cuing paradigm includes, as part of its intentional content, the imperative
<prioritize this!> or <put this perceptual state at top of priority!>. That one’s perception
of the cue is a distraction from one’s task is, on Watzl’s view, orthogonal to the ques-
tion of whether one qualifies as having attentionally prioritized it. On Watzl’s view, one
prioritizes the distractor in the fullest sense of that term.
Rigorism and permissivism are each open to criticism from the other side. To begin,
permissivists will criticize rigorists for being out of step with the science of attention, as
well as a central fragment of common sense thought about attention, when they suggest
that things we understand to be distractions from our goals can never be objects of our
attention. When a direct cue flashes, for example, we are not only distracted by it; our
attention is captured. And this can be so, even if we have at no point abandoned our
original task. To deny this is to be simply at odds with the science of visual attention and
folk intuition.6
Rigorists, in turn, can criticize permissivists for draining attentional prioritization of
its normative dimension by erasing any essential link between this activity and the agent’s
actual priorities. Permissivists are thus in a position similar to that of the environmental
salience view. Specifically, permissivists seem to inadequately accommodate the intuition
that often it is our being distracted that constitutes our failing to prioritize. For example,
suppose Jane has the priority in the morning of getting ready to leave her apartment
on time. In that case, Jane’s prioritizing will consist in, among other things, avoiding
getting absorbed in an engaging conversation with her roommate about current affairs
or browsing the internet while sipping leisurely on her coffee. Likewise, she will have
failed to prioritize in the relevant sense if she becomes involved in one of these activities
without having taken the steps required to leave her apartment on time. The permissivist
6Wu (personal correspondence) has suggested an interesting revisionary interpretation of the facilitation
effects of the direct cue in Posner’s spatial cuing paradigm to which a rigorist might appeal in order to
deny that subjects shift attention to the cued location. He suggests that perhaps the direct cue merely
primes one to attend to the cued location, such that were one’s target to appear there, one would be quick
to attend to it (i.e., on Wu’s view, select it for action). However, I do not think this proposal sits well with
how researchers working on attention capture conceive the relation between attention and priming (e.g.
Chelazzi et al. 2013). Very roughly, a running theme of this work is that the subject’s history of attentional
selection history with a certain target-type (in roughly Wu’s sense of having selected the target for task-
response) in earlier experimental trials primes the subject to select stimuli of that type again when they
later appear as cues in later trials. That is, if one has selected a target for action in the past (likely with some
accompanying reward), and if the cue in a subsequent trial is of the same stimulus-type as the target that
was earlier selected for action, then the subject is already primed to select the cue when it appears in the
later trial. Wu’s proposal requires that the cue prime one to attend to the target, but it seems that one is at
least sometimes already primed to attend to the cue at the start of the trial precisely because of one’s history
of selection for action in Wu’s sense. So, this alternative interpretation of the effect of the direct cue seems
not to provide a successful reply to the objection I have attributed to the permissivist above.
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might reply that, on an imperativalist account of “salience”, Jane possesses a reason to
prioritize such things as reading the news in the morning, even if doing so takes her
further from achieving her expressed goals. To this, the rigorist can plausibly respond
that merely being told to prioritize something does not give one any reason to do so (even
if, as on Watzl’s view, it is your perceptual state issuing the imperative) (cf. Aydede
and Fulkerson 2019). To have a reason to prioritize something requires that it bear some
connection to one’s own priorities.
The priority view of automatic attention I’ve sketched in this chapter presents us with
an alternative to permissivism and rigorism that avoids the shortcomings of each. The
alternative is, briefly, to recognize two standards as relevant to assessing an episode of
attention and to maintain that cases of distracted attention capture satisfy only one of the
two standards. The first standard establishes the presence or absence of attention. It con-
cerns whether or not the agent’s motivational states are directing information-processing.
If they are, then attention is instantiated. The second standard establishes whether or not
attention fulfills its proper functional role. This concerns whether or not the motivation-
ally modulated information-processing successfully removes states of distraction. If the
latter condition is met, then not only does one attend in virtue of motivationally biased
information-processing, but one prioritizes in the full-fledged sense of resisting distrac-
tions in service of one’s priorities. In this way, it is possible to attend distractedly (contra
the rigorist), but distracted attention is deficient as attention (contra the permissivist).
Rigorists mistake the second standard for an existence condition rather than a success
condition, whereas permissivists (like the environmental salience view before it) simply
fail to recognize the second standard at all. The permissivist is therefore right to complain
that the rigorist makes attention too difficult. Attending is easy, but attending properly is
difficult.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that every episode of attention consists in the exercise of an
agential capacity. Specifically, it consists in the exercise of a capacity to prioritize what is
important to the agent in light of her overall system of priorities. Combining this with the
less controversial claim that non-automatic deployments of attention are also exercises of
an agential capacity, we reach the conclusion that all attention manifests a sort of agency.
The actionist’s claim to have discovered an essential link between attention and agency is
thus on secure ground. But like a false belief or an unfulfilled intention, sometimes atten-
tion does not achieve what it aims at. In attending, we do not always avoid distraction.
In such cases, interference within our perceptual and perceptuomotor states prevents us
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from exercising perfect control over what we do and as a result action can suffer.
In the next chapter, I turn to address a traditional challenge to accounts, like my own,
that have a certain reductive aspiration. In Chapter 1, I argued that attention is the pro-
cess whereby an agent’s intention settles the fine details of its own execution. In doing so,
I suggested, the agent acts. In this chapter, I extended this claim to include not only in-
tentions but the agent’s overall priority system or total motivational state (warts and all).
But what warrants the alleged reduction of an agent’s control to control by a motivational
state—whether an intention or the more encompassing total motivational state of which
an intention is a fragment? How, in other words, can an account framed wholly in terms
of mental states, events, and processes avoid depriving the agent of her rightful role in
the generation of behaviour? I take up this question next.
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Appendix
In this appendix, I want to sketch some implications of the priority view for how we
should understand the functional profile of the “attentional” or “integrated priority
map”. In the body of the chapter, I suggested that if the priority view is right, then the
integrated priority map may play a less fundamental role in automatic attention than
is sometimes supposed. My view is that the source state for automatic attention is the
subject’s overall priority system, by which I mean total motivation. Further, my view is
that the priority map itself instantiates a form of attention, insofar as it brings to bear the
agent’s priorities on visual information to yield a priority ranking of visual information
in the form of a map. I now want to expand on the implications of the priority view for
how we should conceive of this map and its relation to emotions and affects. In doing
so, I will assume that the priority map plays a mediating role in attention. I’ll approach
these points by comparing how the environmental salience view and the priority view
interpret the functional role of the map in, e.g., lateral intraparietal cortex in mediating
the flow of attention.
Recall that whereas the salience map was said to be organized according to the distri-
bution of salience in a scene, the priority map is organized according to the agent’s current
overall priorities. If we understand the priority map to be a type of representation, then
it is not a representation of the agent’s priorities, but of the relevance of locations in the
scene to the agent given her priorities. As with the salience map, the priority map plays a
monitoring or tracking role with respect to some property of the environment. And like the
salience map was hypothesized to do, the priority map also regulates attention automati-
cally in response to detection of this property—e.g., by biasing the processing of feature
maps in visual ventral areas in ways that are sensitive to the map’s priority rankings. The
main difference I’ve stressed between the salience map and the priority map as potential
mechanisms of attentional control (or mediation) concerns the motivated character of the
control. I’ve suggested that whereas the environmental salience view depicts automatic
attentional shifts as a brute, reflexive response triggered by the detection of environmen-
tal salience, automatic attention shifts possess the profile of a motivated response on the
priority view. On the priority view, the representation of a location as having relevance to
68
one’s goals or priorities motivates turning one’s attention toward it. Whereas a perception
of environmental salience may be able to trigger selectively enhanced processing at a lo-
cation, the representation of information as having high priority to one’s goals motivates
its prioritization.
By both monitoring incoming information for its relevance to the agent’s goals and
automatically regulating attention in light of its detected relevance, the integrated priority
map, on this conception of it, bears a functional profile similar to that of a “valenced”
representational state is sometimes said to possess.7 Examples of valenced states include
affects like hunger and fatigue and emotions like fear and sadness. The nature of valent
mental states is a matter of ongoing controversy, but, on a broad family of views, these
states possess the dual role of automatically monitoring and regulating the presence of
organism-environment relations pertaining to an organism’s well-being (“concerns”). 1
For example, fear serves to detect the relation of danger and, in virtue of its negative
valence, to trigger responses aimed at eliminating its presence—e.g., by withdrawing,
fleeing, etc. Pleasure in eating, by contrast, signifies that the attempt to replenish is going
well and, in virtue of its positive valence, motivate the activity’s continuation (“more of
this!”). A valenced state, so understood, may simultaneously serve to monitor or detect
relations of concern or need (e.g., danger, loss, hunger, success, etc.) and automatically
to motivate responses that serve to regulate those relations (e.g., approach or avoidance).
In a related vein, the integrated priority map could be understood as realizing a valenced
role: to detect the relative priority of incoming visual information in relation to the agent’s
priorities and, in motivated response to these detections, automatically reorient attention.
The suggestion that the integrated priority map may be valenced or valence-like may
go further than possession of a common structure. It might also provide an insight into
instinctual or emotionally guided behaviour. Specifically, it is tempting to conjecture that
the priority map and paradigmatically valenced states (e.g., emotions like fear and anx-
iety, affects like pain and pleasure, etc.) mutually enable each other in the following re-
spect. The priority map, on its own, would have no role to play in the regulation of be-
haviour were there not a source of agential priorities feeding into it. The priority map de-
pends on the agent’s motivational priorities to serve as the basis for its priority rankings;
otherwise, there would be nothing for visual information to be represented as having pri-
7The idea that valenced states function simultaneously to monitor and regulate relations of concern is
a fairly standard claim in the literature on emotions (see, e.g., Prinz 2004; Cochrane Cochrane 2018). A
terminological point: the term “concern” as used in this context does not refer to a mental state, but to the
objective relations that the valenced mental state functions to monitor and regulate. Thus, danger, emo-
tional loss, and physiological hunger are the “concerns” tracked and regulated by feelings of fear, sadness,
and hunger, respectively. Alternatively, we might speak of the “needs” of safety, emotional connection,
satiety, etc. In claiming that valenced states track such states, one does not thereby commit to regarding
them as perceptual states.
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ority to or for. If so, the priority map could not simply be one among other valenced states.
Rather, to play its monitoring or detecting role, it requires input from motivation. At the
same time, emotions and affects might have the opposite deficit. Although these states
have no trouble monitoring for relations of concern (often doing so outside the focus of
attention), they may need to harness the priority map if they are to regulate behaviour
once a concern has been detected.8 By harnessing the priority map, a concern (i.e., one
of the agent’s priorities) becomes prioritized, and opportunities for its regulation (e.g., its
removal, continuation, approach, withdrawal, etc.) become selectively enhanced. This
points to a very basic role for attentional prioritization in enabling motivationally guided
behaviour.
8Cf. Cochrane (2018): “Overall, my claim is that the most plausible output function of pleasant and
unpleasant affect is to capture attentional priority” (55). Cochrane links this with the claim that affective
states of pleasure and pain succeed in motivating behavioural response only by triggering attention to the
pleasurable or painful sensation. However, I think Cochrane would reject my suggestion about the priority
implementing a valence role.
70
Chapter 3
Attention and the Problem of the
Disappearing Agent
3.1 Introduction
The next two chapters are about conscious attention. On the view that I’ll defend, to at-
tend consciously is to adopt a distinctive sort of point of view. I call this sort of point of
view ”motivational perspective”. On my account, motivational perspective contributes
both to our experience of ourselves as agents and to our perceptual experience of the
world around us (including our own moving bodies). Its possession is consequently
a genuine point of intersection between the phenomenology of agency and the phe-
nomenology of perception. As I hope to show, failure to adequately grasp the character
of this subjective perspective has the potential to distort our grasp of the relationship be-
tween these domains of experience. In the present chapter, I will be concerned with the
role motivational perspective plays in the experiences of acting. In the next, I discuss how
motivational perspective helps shape our perceptual awareness of the world.
In showing what difference conscious attention makes to the experience of acting, I
am also showing what difference conscious attention makes to agency itself. In particular,
I am concerned in this chapter with a traditional problem in philosophy of action called
the “Absent” or “Disappearing Agent Problem”. To see the problem, consider that an
adequate theory of action must accommodate the intuitive difference between behaviours
that you, as an agent, do and those that merely befall or happen to you. For example, it must
account for the difference between the act of intentionally raising your arm and someone
else raising your arm despite you. The Disappearing Agent Problem is the charge that a
given theory or class of theories fails to accommodate that difference because it fails to
accord the agent with the necessary causal role in acting. If this charge is correct, then a
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theory that sets out to explain doings delivers only passive happenings.
In Chapter 1 , I mounted a version of the above challenge to Wu’s suggestion that
attention realizes the role of the agent in action. Specifically, on Wu’s account, attention
plays the role of the agent in the selection of one from many alternate possibilities (see
§1.6.2). Against Wu’s account, I objected that it ultimately accords no role to the agent in
action. It therefore confronts a Disappearing Agent Problem. At the time, I acknowledged
that a similar problem might seem to arise for my alternative proposal that agential con-
trol is guidance by a motivational state of the agent. Specifically, one can ask: why believe
that control by a motivational state amounts to control by the agent?
This chapter presents my answer to this question. I will argue that control by a mo-
tivational state can amount to control by the agent when the former plays the role of the
agent’s motivational perspective and that, furthermore, exercises of conscious attentional
control realize such perspective. In doing so, I uncover an essential link between the mo-
tivational control of conscious attention, on the one hand, and an agent’s ownership of
action, on the other. I thereby establish fundamental explanatory connections between
consciousness, attention, and agency.
However, there is an initial barrier to pursuing these connections. Beyond rough and
ready glosses like the one offered a moment ago, philosophers use the expression “Dis-
appearing Agent Problem” and its cognates to describe distinct explanatory challenges.
And, as we’ll see shortly, not all these challenges are equally compelling. Among those
versions that mount a genuine explanatory challenge, some pose a more fundamental
challenge than others. Accordingly, my first task (in §3.2) is to isolate the most fun-
damental, genuine, and outstanding explanatory challenge to accounts, like mine, that
claim to reduce agent-causation to a species of motivational state-causation. This chal-
lenge, I suggest, is to accommodate a central phenomenal property of the experience of
acting: the sense of first-person ownership of action. Having identified the Disappear-
ing Agent Problem in its most fundamental form, the remaining sections develop and
defend my positive account of this phenomenal feature of agentive experience. I do so
first for the case of “immersive” experiences of acting (§§3.3–3.4), and then extend it to
non-immersive cases (§3.5). In closing (§3.6), I explain how my approach hopes to accom-
modate various pathological or nonstandard experiences of acting (through a compari-
son with opposing “representationalist” accounts of these experiences) and draw broader
morals regarding the role of consciousness in being an agent.
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3.2 “The Disappearing Agent Problem”
According to “reductive” or “event-causal” theories of action, we can exhaustively char-
acterize action in terms of a specified class of mental events (understood liberally to in-
clude states and processes), behaviours, and causal relations between them. Typically, the
relevant class of psychological events are those that motivate and rationalize the agent’s
behaviour. For example, on Davidson’s theory, an action is an event that is intentional,
and an event is intentional iff caused by reasons that motivate and rationalize it—e.g., a
desire to Φ and a belief that Ψ-ing is a way to Φ (Davidson 1963). Whereas Davidson’s
theory identifies the action with the product of a certain process of mental causation (i.e.,
the resultant behavioural event), other reductive accounts identify action with the pro-
cess consisting of the mental event causing the behavioural event (e.g., Dretske 1988, Ch.2;
Searle 1983, Ch.3). Each type of account qualifies as “reductive” or “event-causal” insofar
as it explains the actions of an agent wholly in terms of the causation of bodily movement
by mental states or events of the agent (e.g., her intention).
But why should we believe that the causation of bodily movement by mental states
of the agent amounts to the agent moving her body, i.e., acting? This is the question that
animates the Disappearing Agent Problem against reductive, event-causal theories of ac-
tion. As Velleman (1992) summarizes the worry, “the standard story of action” (approxi-
mately, Davidson’s) “fails to include an agent or, more precisely, fails to cast the agent in
his proper role. In this story, reasons cause an intention and an intention causes bodily
movement, but nobody—that is, no person—does anything” (461). Such a view could at
most describe a “defective” sort of agency in which:
. . . various roles that are actually played by the agent himself in the history of
a full-blooded action are not played by anything in the story or are played by
psychological elements whose participation is not equivalent to his. In a full-
blooded action, an intention is formed by the agent himself, not by his reasons
for acting. Reasons affect his intention by influencing him to form it, but they
thus affect his intention by affecting him first. And the agent then moves his
limbs in execution of his intention; his intention doesn’t move his limbs by
itself. The agent thus has at least two roles to play: he forms an intention
under the influence of reasons for acting, and he produces behaviour pursuant
to that intention. (Velleman 1992, 462)
The difficulty with the standard Davidsonian story, Velleman suggests, is that none of the
psychological elements that it posits are suitable to occupy the functional roles that we
intuitively attribute to the agent in relation to his reasons, intention, and behaviour—e.g.,
of considering reasons, of forming an intention to act on the basis of considered reasons, and
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finally of executing that intention in pursuit of his intended goal. On such a view, the agent
seems to disappear from the story altogether. What is left are passive causal connections
between bodily movements and various mental events that the agent undergoes. This,
briefly and roughly, is the “Disappearing Agent Problem” for the standard Davidsonian
account of intentional agency.1
Beyond this relatively neutral formulation, philosophers elaborate the worry in
markedly different ways. As noted earlier, in my view some elaborations are more com-
pelling than others. I will begin (in §3.2.1) by briefly discussing a version of the Disap-
pearing Agent Problem that does not, to my mind, present a genuine objection to reductive
accounts. I then turn to discuss a version that does pose a genuine challenge but that, in
my view, is not the most fundamental challenge in the neighbourhood. This will pave the
way for what I take to be the deepest challenge in the vicinity.
3.2.1 Ambitious formulations
According to the first version of the Disappearing Agent Problem I will consider, there are
a priori reasons why action—and so the relation of ownership that agents stand in to their
actions—cannot be analyzed in purely event-causal terms. As some authors make the
point, event-causal accounts like Davidson’s invariably identify the agent with an entity
of the wrong metaphysical category—e.g., a mental state or event.2 A related complaint
is that event-causal accounts inevitably replace the agent’s acting or doing with a mere
1It is important to distinguish the Disappearing Agent Problem from a different problem sometimes
raised against reductive theorists: that of deviant causation (Davidson 1973). Those mounting the Disap-
pearing Agent Problem to event-causal theories tend to regard the former as the more fundamental of the
two problems. For example, Velleman (1992) writes:
[T]he discussion of "deviant" causal chains has diverted attention from simpler counterex-
amples, which omit the agent without lapsing into causal deviance; and it has thereby en-
gendered a false sense of confidence in the requirement of causal normality, as sufficient to
protect the standard story from counterexamples. In reality, an agent can fail to participate
in his behaviour even when it results from his motives in the normal way. Consequently, no
definition of causal normality will fix what ails the standard story. (1992, 464)
2This appears to be one of Michael Brent’s (2017) central objections to event-causalism about action in a
recent defense of non-reductive agent-causalism:
[I]f causation is a relation among discrete events, and if your mental events are causing the
relevant movements of your body during an action, then, in order to ensure that you are
playing a causal role when moving your body during an action, proponents of typical [event-
causal] solutions must claim that you are identical with the causally relevant mental events.
However, it is implausible on metaphysical grounds that you are identical with your mental
events, so it follows that your mental events are not causing the relevant movements of your
body during an action. Thus, typical solutions to the problem of action are in trouble (Brent
2017, 660-1, italics original).
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“happening” in relation to which the agent is merely a passive “subject”, “witness”, or
“bystander”, or that they replace the agent with a mere “arena” within which internal
events interact like billiard balls to cause behaviour.3 These versions of the Disappearing
Agent Problem make the ambitious claim that any attempt to reduce the action of an
agent to a species of event-causation necessarily results in failure to describe action at
all. It at most describes one event passively causing another. For this reason, I call these
“ambitious formulations”. Perhaps unsurprisingly, those endorsing ambitious versions
of the Disappearing Agent Problem typically espouse some form of primitivism about
agent-causation, with the latter often (though not always) being explained in terms of the
notion of substance-causation (see e.g., Alvarez and Hyman 1998; Hornsby 2004; Steward
2012; Brent 2017).
If ambitious formulations were successful, they would pose a very fundamental prob-
lem for reductive theories of action. However, ambitious formulations do not seem to
present a genuine challenge. This is because ambitious formulations either mischaracter-
ize the event-causalist’s position or are unduly dismissive of it. Consider the claim that
reductive proposals wrongly imply that the agent is an event. Event-causalists can reply
that their position lacks the putative implication. They can even accept that the agent is
an object or substance of some kind and that, in acting, this substance moves itself or its
body—i.e., causes itself or its body to move. They will simply add that when an agent
acts, she does so in virtue of certain mental states or mental properties (cf. Mele 2003,
225). This is analogous to the claim that when a rock shatters a window, it does so in
virtue of certain of its causally relevant properties (e.g., its mass and velocity). The ob-
jection that event-causalists misclassify the agent as an event therefore misunderstands
their position. On closer examination, the second variant of the ambitious challenge fares
no better than the first. In response to the claim that event-causalists invariably replace
actions with “mere happenings”, the reductionist can reply that such passive language
is question-begging (cf. Schlosser 2011, 23). An individual’s involvement in an event
or happening is not clearly sufficient to render the individual a passive “victim” to the
event. Nor is it clearly sufficient for the event to “befall” or “overwhelm” the individual
in question. Indeed, event-causalists have proposed criteria for distinguishing happen-
3Melden (1961) writes: “It is futile to attempt to explain conduct through the causal efficacy of desires—
all that can explain is further happenings, not actions performed by agents” (128-9, italics original). When
reflecting on the world as an event-causal order, Nagel (1986) writes that “my doing of an act ... seems to
disappear when we think of the world objectively. There seems no room for agency in [such] a world. . .
there is only what happens” (110-11, italics original). Hornsby (2004) writes “I have claimed that there is
alienation of an unthinkable sort when an agent is portrayed as if she were merely an arena for events” as
Hornsby claims the agent is portrayed on all event-causal accounts (185). Hornsby also writes that “human
agents are not merely things within which things happen, and they clearly do play a role in the arena within
which their actions are found” (176, italics added). Many more examples could be provided.
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ings that are intuitively passive (e.g., reflexes and externally generated movements) from
those that are exercises of an agent’s control. To claim that no attempt to accommodate
the pre-theoretical active-passive distinction in event-causal terms can succeed is not to
engage seriously with the event-causalist’s position.
For these reasons, we should be wary of ambitious formulations of the Disappearing
Agent Problem. While there may be other grounds for rejecting event-causal accounts,
ambitious versions of the Disappearing Agent Problem seem not to provide a genuine
objection. Accordingly, I set aside ambitious versions of the challenge.
3.2.2 Velleman’s Problem (the Shrinking Agent Problem)
Like ambitious theorists, Velleman (1992) argues that a Disappearing Agent Problem con-
fronts the standard Davidsonian story of action. Unlike the ambitious theorists, though,
he does not object to the event-causalist’s reductive aspiration. Velleman ultimately
shares this aspiration. Rather, Velleman claims that the problem is with the proposed re-
duction. Furthermore, as Velleman proceeds to explicate the difficulty, the Disappearing
Agent Problem for the Davidsonian story is not that it fails to explain action of any sort.
Rather, in Velleman’s view, the problem with the Davidsonian story is that it can explain
only specific “defective” cases of action, such as the motivated activities of mere wan-
ton addicts.4 “Wantons” are agents who engage in motivated activity, but who never—
whether through lack of concern or lack of ability—consciously reflect on the quality or
merits of their motives. They can be subject to competing motives—e.g., a desire to take
a drug and a simultaneous desire to not take the drug—but the outcome of such compe-
titions is entirely settled by the relative strength of the competing motives.
As Velleman sees things, the Davidsonian story is adequate to describe the motivated
activities of unreflective wantons. But he thinks Davidson’s story fails to explain the ac-
tions of agents who attempt to intervene upon motivational competitions in order to bias
the outcome in a particular direction. Following Frankfurt, Velleman suggests that a hall-
mark of distinctively “human” agents (or “persons” in Frankfurt’s terminology) is that,
when faced with opponent motivational tendencies (e.g., between the desire to take the
drug now and the desire to quit), the agent is typically not a passive bystander or wit-
ness to the competition occurring inside him (as the wanton is). Rather, the agent tends
to “put his weight behind” the motives that he “endorses” or “identifies with” and to
4This is at least least how Velleman explains the notion of defective or lower-order agency in Velleman
(2000b). In doing so, Velleman appeals to distinctions familiar from the work of Frankfurt (e.g., 1971; 1976),
including Frankfurt’s trichotomy between actions, motivated activities, and passive bodily movements.
In Velleman’s terms, Davidson’s account can at most accommodate Frankfurt’s intermediate category of
motivated activities.
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suppress the influence of those he disavows as “external” to himself (cf. Frankfurt 1971).
Through processes of reflective identification (and dis-identification), Velleman and oth-
ers in this tradition suggest, it becomes possible for the objectively weaker motive (e.g.,
to persevere in one’s resolution to quit) to triumph over the objectively stronger one (e.g.,
to take the drug now). Where an agent’s act of identification with a given motive is suc-
cessful in generating behaviour congruent with the endorsed motive, the agent exercises
self-control (or “autonomy”). This self-control is said to yield a form of psychological
ownership over one’s own conduct that mere wantons would never experience, given the
latter’s lack of concern over the quality of their own motives. Relatedly, where the agent’s
act of identification fails to produce behaviour congruent with the identified-with motive,
the agent is thereby alienated from his conduct. In such cases, the agent experiences his
behaviour as not fully his own. As Frankfurt puts it when describing someone whose
drug addiction has overpowered his decision to quit the drug, such an unwilling addict
“finds himself a helpless or a passive bystander to the forces that move him” (Frankfurt
1971, 17).
Finally, the Disappearing Agent Problem, on Velleman’s conception, is to explain the
crucial psychological processes of reflective identification and disavowal without illegit-
imately presupposing the agent as the active director or causal force behind these psycho-
logical processes. If such a reductive account could be given, Velleman supposes, then
the event-causalist will have demonstrated how it is possible for agents not merely to be
caused or moved to act by states to which they are passively subject (in the manner of wan-
ton addicts). The event-causalist will have further shown how it is possible for agents to
exercise genuine self-control and so to be truly active in the generation of behaviour. Be-
cause Velleman’s objection to the Davidsonian does not concern the possibility of agency
per se, but a specific subset of human agential capacities, Mele (2003, 220) proposes re-
naming Velleman’s puzzle the “Shrinking Agent Problem”.5
Velleman is right that self-control presents a genuine explanatory challenge to the orig-
inal Davidsonian story. Event-causalists must explain not only the activities of unreflec-
tive wantons, but the autonomous acts of persons. However, there is also a difficulty
with formulating the Disappearing Agent Problem as Velleman does. The difficulty is
that it exaggerates the successes of the Davidsonian story from the very start. Velleman
assumes, wrongly, that the only situation in which the standard Davidsonian story re-
quires amendment in order to accommodate an agent’s “ownership” of her actions is one
5Velleman proceeds to offer a reductive solution to his puzzle in terms of a higher order motive to
“make sense” or conform to one’s understanding of oneself. See also Mele (2003, Ch. 10) for a reductive
proposal invoking a higher order motive to act on the basis of one’s strongest reason. On Mele’s view, this
motive, when instantiated, enters into the “positive motivational base” of the endorsed first-order motive,
increasing its motivational strength (222).
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in which the agent’s behaviour is controlled by a self-consciously endorsed motive (and is
controlled partly because of the agent’s reflective endorsement of the motive). Similarly,
he assumes that the only type of disownership in need of explanation is the sort exem-
plified when behaviour is guided by a motive that the agent self-consciously rejects as
not part of herself. Consequently, Velleman concludes that if we can simply enrich the
standard Davidsonian story with an account of self-control and its potential losses (in,
e.g., unwilling addiction), we will have remedied the deficiencies of the standard story.
Against this, I will now argue that the Disappearing Agent Problem is in fact more funda-
mental than Velleman acknowledges. This is because the problem of explaining agential
ownership arises earlier. In particular, it arises for even rudimentary manifestations of
agency, including those of unreflective wantons.
We can motivate the problem by way of a contrast between two sorts of “alienation”
experiences (cf. Schlosser 2011, 25-6). On the one hand, there is the type of alienation that
unwilling addicts experience when they are moved to act on the basis of motives they
reflectively disavow. On the other hand, there is the more radical type of alienation ex-
perience reported by patients suffering from, for example, anarchic hand syndrome and
schizophrenic delusions of control. In the empirical literature, the latter are often called
“passivity experiences” (Spence et al. 1997; Blakemore et al. 2000). For example, after per-
forming a task involving intentional finger movements, a schizophrenic patient suffering
from experiences of alien control reported: “I felt like an automaton, guided by a female
spirit who had entered me during [the movement]” (Spence et al. 1997, 2001). While
Frankfurt, Velleman, and others may be right to regard unwilling addicts as in some sense
passive in relation to their addictive behaviour, it’s equally clear that unwilling addicts
retain a sense of agency over their addictive behaviours: a sense of agency that the patient
experiencing alien control reports lacking. Presumably even unwilling addicts experience
exercising conscious control as they deliberate about, for example, how they will obtain
their next hit, even if they don’t self-consciously endorse or approve of their intention
to take the drug. No less than their willing counterparts, unwilling addicts experience
themselves as considering reasons for and against different courses of action (e.g., about
whether to look for the drug in location A or in location B), forming intentions on the basis
of earlier deliberations (e.g., to look for it at location A), and finally executing these in-
tentions by moving their bodies. Any account of unwilling addiction that is inconsistent
with these points would be guilty of attributing an excessively alienated form of agency
to the unwilling addict—one more akin to the passivity experiences of alien control and
anarchic hand patients.6
6Cf. Hornsby (2004), who, in response to Velleman, writes:
But a person who appreciates that her conduct is out of accord with what she values, or is
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This suggests that there is a sense of action ownership that is not only different, but
psychologically more basic than the sense of reflective ownership that distinguishes self-
controlled actions from less self-controlled ones. The former variety of ownership expe-
rience is more basic than the latter because it does not depend on metacognitive abilities,
such as the ability to consciously reflect upon one’s own motivational states, to evaluate
whether they provide one with strong reasons for action, and finally to endorse or dis-
avow them on the basis of one’s assessment of their relative merits. Consequently, the
sense of ownership that is retained in unwilling addiction will likely also be enjoyed by
mere wantons. A wanton’s states of captivation by her first-order motives, and the ac-
companying immersion and engrossment with which she pursues their fulfillment, may
disqualify her from the kind of ownership and alienation experiences that self-controlled
and unwilling addicts experience. But it presents no barrier to experiencing a more mini-
mal variety of action ownership that is present automatically in action rather than actively
conferred on action through endorsement of it as “truly one’s own” (cf. Schlosser 2011,
26). For these reasons, I call this more basic form of ownership experience “basic subjec-
tive ownership for action” or “basic subjective action ownership”.
The requirement to accommodate basic subjective action ownership is, I suggest, the
most fundamental, genuine Disappearing Agent Problem facing extant event-causal ac-
counts. For the remainder of this section, I consider two potential responses one might
offer to my claim to have identified a genuine challenge to extant reductive accounts.
3.2.3 Already owned?
The first response to my claim to have identified a genuine challenge for the event-
causalist accepts that event-causalists are required to accommodate basic subjective ac-
tion ownership, but argues that extant forms of event-causalism already meet this require-
ment. Specifically, one might argue that agents experience their actions as their own when
there is a rationalizing causal explanation of those movements in terms of the agent’s
swayed by factors whose influence she regrets, admits her own motivations even if she does
not approve of them. The desires and emotional states which explain what she does are after
all states of hers—of the human being whose capacities to make movements are exercised—
and, even where she feels alienated from them, they are not adventitious forces in her brain.
(To think of adventitious forces in the brain seems more appropriate in understanding, say, the
involuntary movements of sufferers from anarchic hand syndrome, which lack any personal
psychological explanation) (Hornsby 2004, 182-183, italics original).
Hornsby raises an important objection here to Velleman. However, she appeals to it in the course of mount-
ing a more ambitious Disappearing Agent Problem against Velleman’s account, similar to the kind dis-
cussed in the previous section. In my view, her observation instead suggests that there is a more basic
variety of ownership experience which Velleman has incorrectly assumed to already be adequately under-
stood on the Davidsonian picture.
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conscious motivational states—e.g., conscious intention. Consequently, where agents ex-
perience a movement as not their own doing, this is because there is no rationalizing
explanation for the behaviour in terms of the agent’s conscious attitudes.7
To elaborate this suggestion, we might appeal to Searle’s (1983) thesis that conscious
intentional actions are accompanied by an “experience of acting” and moreover that this
experience of acting is identical with an “intention in action” (87). As he explains, an in-
tention in action is the phenomenally conscious, present-directed mental state responsible
for initiating and guiding an agent’s behaviour when she acts intentionally. Searle further
holds that an intention in action possesses token-reflexive intentional content along the
lines of (very roughly) <my arm rises as a result of this intention in action> and the con-
tent of this state is satisfied iff the intention in action brings about the behaviour it rep-
resents (and does so “continuously” and with “plannable regularity”) (see Searle 1983,
136 ff.). Whereas the canonical means of linguistically expressing a “prior” (or “future-
directed” or “distal”) intention is “I will do A” or “I am going to do A”, Searle suggests
that the canonical mode of linguistic expression for an intention in action is “I am do-
ing A” (Searle 1983, 84). Drawing on this suggestion, one might propose that wherever
bodily movements are controlled by one’s intention in action to move one’s body, one
experiences those movements as one’s own doing. And where one experiences disown-
ership toward one’s movements, the movements are controlled by something other than
an intention in action. Significantly, on this view, the same psychological elements that
account for the motivated and rationalized status of the act simultaneously secure basic
subjective ownership for the action—namely, the intention in action.
Searle’s proposal seems to generate the correct prediction for some passivity experi-
ences. For example, in anarchic hand syndrome, subjects report that their bodily move-
ments (e.g., grasping a piece of food from another person’s plate) are incongruent with
their consciously expressed goals or intentions (e.g., to eat only from their own plate).
Often, this is reflected in the subject actively attempting to suppress the hand’s anarchic
movement (e.g., by sitting on it). In such cases, one might plausibly infer that if there is
an intention or motor command guiding the subject’s movements at all, this state is not
an intention in action in Searle’s sense. This is because it is introspectively inaccessible to
7While Hornsby would not endorse the strategy I am now sketching on behalf of the event-causalist
(because she rejects event-causalism on ambitious grounds), we might recall her claim that “To think of
adventitious forces in the brain seems more appropriate in understanding, say, the involuntary movements
of sufferers from anarchic hand syndrome, which lack any personal psychological explanation” (Hornsby
2004, 183). Hornsby hints here that what explains the alienated status of the anarchic hand patient’s be-
haviour (as opposed to the disavowed status of the unwilling addict’s actions) is the absence of “any per-
sonal level psychological explanation” for the movements (e.g., in terms of a conscious intention to move
her arm). This is the suggestion I am now exploring on behalf of the event-causalist in accommodating
basic subjective ownership.
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the subject as well as functionally unintegrated with the subject’s other attitudes. If so,
then Searle’s account is consistent with the finding that anarchic hand patients experience
their behaviours passively. The experientially alienated status of these behaviours reflects
their unconscious and subpersonal source.
However, Searle’s account does not fare as well in other cases. Consider that patients
experiencing schizophrenic delusions of alien control are often able to follow task in-
structions successfully. They also recognize that their behaviour is congruent with their
explicit goals and show no tendency to desist or intervene upon behaviour once it is
under way.8On the face of things, this provides evidence that, unlike in anarchic hand
patients, it is the schizophrenic patient’s conscious intention to execute task instructions
that controls—i.e., initiates, sustains, and guides—behaviour. And yet these patients re-
port feeling disownership over their actions. They report experiencing their actions as
possessing an outside source. Against Searle’s proposal, these agents appear to feel no
ownership of their actions despite these actions being under the control of conscious in-
tentions.9
The evidence from schizophrenia suggests that it may be possible for a conscious
intention to control an agent’s action without the agent thereby feeling ownership of
the action. Some have attempted to defend related conclusions on purely introspective
grounds. In particular, some have challenged the assumption that even the experience of
motivational causation is ever sufficient for experiencing oneself as acting. For example,
Horgan and colleagues (Horgan et al. 2003; Horgan 2015) ask us to imagine scenarios
in which one is introspectively aware of a motivational state to behave somehow—e.g.,
of a conscious urge to clench one’s fist—and one is also aware of this motivational state
causing the motivated behaviour—e.g., a fist-clenching. Under the described conditions,
they suggest, one would not experience oneself as acting or having acted. In particular,
insofar as the felt source of one’s behaviour is the felt urge rather than oneself, Horgan and
colleagues suggest that one’s experience of the motivated behaviour—e.g., the urged fist-
8As Frith et al. (2000) note, for example, one of the distinguishing features of schizophrenic patients
(in marked contrast with anarchic hand patients) is that “In most cases the actions made when the patient
‘feels’ that he is being controlled by alien forces are not discrepant with his intentions. Thus the patient may
be correctly performing the task set by the experimenter (e.g. making random movements of a joystick) at
the same time as having the experience of passivity (Spence et al. 1997). The patient does not try to correct
these ‘controlled’ actions or prevent them from occurring.” (Frith et al. 2000, 1784).
9One might object that while the prior or distal intentions (e.g., to execute a certain task in the near future)
of these patients are conscious, it is not obvious that their present-directed intentions in action are conscious.
The point is a fair one, though the cases discussed in the next paragraph sidesteps this particular worry.
Furthermore, if we examine the patient’s subjective report quoted earlier, we see that the subject feels as
though the alien agent control began during the movement, rather than at its outset. If the agent’s present-
directed intention were unconscious, one might expect the subject to start experiencing alien control at
the beginning of the movement (which is when the present-directed intention commences). Rather, the
passivity experience appears to commence part way through.
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clenching—will remain subjectively passive (as well as “strange and alienating”) (Horgan
2015, 35). It would be, they suggest, akin to watching an external causal process unfolding
in nature. While their specific example is an urge, they take the observation to generalize
to all motivational states, including presumably intentions. They conclude that an experi-
ence of acting does not “present your own behavior to you as having your own occurrent
mental events as its source” (Horgan et al. 2003, 225). Instead, when you act, the apparent
source of your behaviour is you, the agent. They call this the “phenomenology of self-as-
source” and claim that it is a key phenomenal component in ordinary, non-pathological
experiences of acting.
If Horgan and colleagues are right, then it seems Searle crucially mischaracterizes the
experience of acting when he characterizes its intentional content as, for example, <this
intention-in-action to raise my arm causes my arm to rise>. To experience one’s own
behaviour as controlled by one’s own mental states—even one’s own intentions—does
not amount to experiencing oneself as controlling one’s behaviour. Indeed, Searle himself
seems implicitly to acknowledge as much when he characterizes the canonical linguistic
expression of an intention in action as “I am doing A”, rather than the token-reflexive
content that he in fact attributes to the intention in action. Consequently, I think we can
plausibly reject the suggestion that basic subjective action ownership exists wherever the
action is the product of control by a personal level motivational state (or the process of
the motivational state causing motivated behaviour).10
In §3.6, I’ll return to examples of alienated experiences of acting, both hypothetical
and actual, and propose an alternative explanation of them. For now, I wish to draw a
tentative moral from the possibility of phenomenologically passive motivational state-
causation. First, extant event-causalist accounts appealing only to control by the agent’s
attitudes (e.g., intentions) fail to preclude profoundly alienated experiences of acting, both
in actual clinical populations like schizophrenia and in purely hypothetical examples like
Horgan et al.’s. They are consequently vulnerable to the objection that their view falsifies
the experience of acting. Second, we can identify the principal feature of extant event-
causalist proposals that leave them open to this challenge. Specifically, there is nothing
to preclude a conscious intention from controlling the agent’s behaviour while the agent
experiences herself as observing the control process “from the outside”. A more ade-
quate event-causalist account of basic ownership would therefore invoke mental elements
whose deployment within the control of behaviour forecloses the possibility of such sub-
jective detachment. These would be mental elements whose deployment in behavioural
10For further criticisms of Searle’s intention-based account of the experience of acting, see Bayne and Levy
(2006); Bayne (2008, 2011); Mylopoulos (2017) and Shepherd (2017a). Kriegel (2015) defends an account
of the experience of acting much like Searle’s, which he frames in terms of “phenomenal tryings”. It is
vulnerable to many of the same objections as Searle’s.
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control are sufficient for the agent to experience herself as immediately engaged within
the process of behavioural control as an active participant rather than as a spectator ob-
serving the process as it unfolds from without. In later sections, I put forward an account
that meets this explanatory demand and thereby solves the Disappearing Agent Problem
in its most fundamental form.
3.2.4 Yes, this is agency (not merely sense of agency)
Let’s turn to the second response one might give to my claim to have identified a gen-
uine explanatory challenge to event-causalists. This response grants that extant versions
of event-causalism have not accounted for the subjective experience of basic action own-
ership. However, it then argues that they are under no burden to accommodate such an
experience. Whereas basic subjective action ownership is a matter of the sense of agency,
event-causal accounts are attempting to provide an account of agency itself. And it is no
objection to an account if it “leaves out” what it has never claimed to explain. Even if an
account like Davidson’s, for example, fails to account for the phenomenology of acting, it
might still be fully adequate as an account of action itself.
The above response in effect claims that an account of the sense of agency isn’t a re-
quirement on an account for action. A similar intuition will probably incline one toward
affirming the converse point: namely, that an account of the sense of ownership is not suf-
ficient for an account of action ownership. Just as we will not have explained the nature of
a material object (e.g., an apple) by giving an account of our representation of it (e.g., how
it visually appears to us), similarly we will not come closer to understanding the relation
of ownership that agents bear to actions simply by investigating their experience of that
ownership relation. An account of ownership should tell us what it is for an agent to act,
which means giving an account of the fact of action ownership. And one cannot meet that
explanatory demand by providing an account of how it subjectively feels or appears to one
to act—i.e., to give an account of the sense of action ownership.
In response, this would be a decisive objection to the approach that I am taking in this
chapter if it were true that questions about action ownership can be entirely separated
from questions about the phenomenology of action ownership. It would be decisive to
my approach because I am indeed proposing to account for the metaphysical relation of
action ownership by attempting to accommodate its phenomenology. The reader will ac-
cordingly have grasped my account of subjective action ownership and its motivations
over rival accounts once they have grasped why we cannot treat the nature of action own-
ership as wholly independent of its phenomenology. As we shall see, the relation between
the fact of ownership and the sense of ownership is much more intimate than the above
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response depicts it as being.
Let’s take stock. I have identified the most fundamental, genuine version of the Dis-
appearing Agent Problem confronting extant event-causal theories of action. This is to
accommodate basic subjective action ownership. I will now answer this challenge. I will
do so within the context of my thesis from Chapter 1 that agential control is guidance
control by a motivational state of the agent. I will defend my account of basic subjec-
tive ownership on the basis of its ability to solve a puzzle that arises as soon as we be-
gin to reflect on how the agent manifests subjectively within “immersive” experiences of
acting—i.e., experiences of acting that even an unreflective wanton is apt to enjoy.11 After
motivating my attentional account of basic subjective ownership as providing a solution
to this puzzle, I elucidate the proposal by reference to the structure of attention as a form
of conscious control.
3.3 A puzzle about the sense of ownership in “immersive”
action
In this section, I present a puzzle about how the agent figures subjectively within immer-
sive experiences of acting. After considering some unsuccessful solutions, I sketch my
own solution in terms of conscious attention. I begin by drawing a couple of distinctions.
To begin, we must draw on a distinction between two types of ownership experience.
These experiences are distinguished by what the subject feels ownership toward. First,
one sometimes experiences being the subject of a bodily change. This experience is salient
in experiences of passive or involuntary movement, as when one shivers from the cold,
trembles in fear, or is tickled. If these movements are consciously perceived at all, one
will usually experience them as changes in oneself (or one’s own body). Second, one
sometimes experiences being the agent of a bodily change. Usually when one acts—e.g.,
lifts one’s arm—one’s sense of ownership extends beyond the bodily changes that one
undergoes to include the process of causing and controlling those bodily changes. In
these cases, one not only experiences one’s own body moving. One also experiences
oneself making it move. Put differently, one experiences ownership of the act of moving
one’s body. The latter is a “first-person experience of acting”.
Some experiences of acting are “immersive” in the sense of being characterized by
heightened sense of engagement, absorption, or engrossment in a task or activity.12 Plau-
11See Velleman (2008) for the relationship between the wanton and the sorts of immersion experiences I
will discuss in §3.3.
12I draw the terminology of “immersed” versus “detached” experiences of acting from Marcel (2003) and
Pacherie (2008).
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sibly, immersion experiences can differ along several dimensions of variation, including
in their affective tone (e.g., whether boring or arousing, neutral or pleasant, etc.) and vo-
litional character (e.g., whether characterized by subjective exertion or relative ease). The
most well-known examples of immersion experience are so-called “flow” states (Csik-
szentmihalyi 1990; Csikszentmihalyi et al. 2005). Agents acting in flow frequently report
(retrospectively) “losing themselves” in an engrossing activity, including a dance or a
musical performance. We instinctively associate these immersive experiences with the
highest achievements of skilled agency and flexible control—e.g., with a record-breaking
athletic performance or an especially creative and dynamic play.
Immersive experiences of acting, like those enjoyed in flow, raise a puzzle about the
sense of agency. The puzzle concerns how the agent, as such, manifests in the experience
of acting. On the one hand, for an immersion experience to be an experience of acting,
it seems that the agent’s behaviour must have its apparent causal source in the agent.
Otherwise, the experience would not be an experience of acting at all, but merely of one’s
own body moving passively. If it is to be an experience of acting, then, the agent must be
subjectively present as the source of the movement. On the other hand, what subjectively
distinguishes an immersed experience of acting from a more detached one—i.e., one in
which one mentally “steps back” in order to monitor oneself or one’s performance—is
that, in immersion experiences, agents feel they lose themselves in the act. To feel gen-
uinely immersed rather than detached, it seems the agent must be absent from the expe-
rience. The puzzle is to explain the agent’s simultaneous presence and absence from the
same experience.
Some will be tempted to solve this puzzle by rejecting the first of the inconsistent-
seeming claims: that immersive flow experiences are genuine experiences of acting. As
evidence, they might cite subjective reports like this rock-climber’s: “when things become
automatic, it’s like an egoless thing, in a way. Somehow the right thing is done without
you ever thinking about it or doing anything at all ... It just happens” (Csikszentmihalyi
1990, 62-3, italics mine). If agents in flow claim not to experience themselves “doing
anything at all”, one might doubt whether this is really an experience of acting.
An initial reason to be dissatisfied with this response is that agents in flow typically re-
port feeling heightened control over their behaviour and environment. One dancer reports:
“I feel enormous power to effect something of grace and beauty”, and a chess player
says: “I have a general feeling . . . that I am in complete control of my world” (ibid. 59-
60). Indeed, this feeling of control is thought to explain why flow-engendering activities
are enjoyable to the point of being addictive. It isn’t clear how to interpret such reports
except as expressing a feeling of oneself as the agent of heightened control. If so, then acting
in immersion is, in at least in some instances, characterized by sense of agency.
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Against this, one might try to accommodate subjective reports of heightened control
by distinguishing the experience of control possession from the experience of control exer-
cise. Specifically, one might suggest that while an agent acting in flow feels in control over
what is happening with her body, she lacks any experience of exercising control. Provided
experiences of acting entail experiences of exercising control rather than merely possess-
ing control, flow experiences aren’t genuine experiences of acting but perhaps of being
poised or ready to act if necessary.
In response, it’s true that agents in flow often emphasize control possession in their
subjective reports. However, there’s a crucial respect in which the same subjects report
experiencing themselves as exercising greater control than they usually do. In particular,
these subjects report feeling highly focused. For example, the rock-climber that I quoted
earlier—the same one who said that, in flow, her behaviour “just happens” without her
“doing anything at all”—finishes her statement by saying “And yet you’re more concen-
trated”. With that caveat, the climber acknowledges that, even in flow, she is aware not
merely of being able to control what she’s doing, but also of allocating a certain kind of
control to her performance. In particular, she experiences herself directing her perfor-
mance by focusing her attention on the task at hand. This experience of heightened con-
centration on an activity seems to suggest that flow experiences are genuine experiences
of acting.
If flow experiences are experiences of acting, one might wonder why subjects often
describe them in intuitively passive terms. Let’s set aside the possibility that the repre-
sentational content of the experience is either paradoxical—e.g., in the way the waterfall
illusion is sometimes suggested to be (Crane 1988)—or alternates between experiences
of activity and passivity. Neither of these possibilities seems plausible on its face. The
answer may come from the fact that experiences of acting possess multiple dimensions
of variation, with flow occupying an unusual location in this space. Typically, when one
performs at the upper threshold of one’s skill level (not to mention in a potentially dan-
gerous situation, as in some flow-inducing activities) one will have experiences variously
of: self-evaluation about the quality of one’s performance, anxiety about failure, and, per-
haps most of all, effort or volition. Insofar as flow experiences lack many or all of these
typical marks of agentive experience, they are apt to be reported as seeming agentively
sparse. Nevertheless, as noted, there is one dimension along which these subjects expe-
rience directing more control to their task than they would otherwise: they experience
greater concentration or focus. Partly for this reason, the experience is sometimes called
“relaxed concentration”: a state of being calmly, effortlessly, unreflectively, yet attentively
responsive to a challenging task situation.13
13For more on the difference between attention and effort (and their history of being conflated), see Bruya
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Supposing, then, that immersion experiences are genuine experiences of acting, we
need a solution to our puzzle that can accommodate the agent’s felt presence as the source
of control. One natural suggestion at this point would be to adopt a representationalist
account of the experience of acting. According to this type of account, the phenomenal
character of an experience of acting can be characterized, at least in part, by how the
experience represents the world as being—in particular, by how the experience represents
what the agent is currently doing (Peacocke; 2003; Bayne and Levy; 2006; Bayne; 2011;
Mylopoulos; 2017; Shepherd; 2017a).14 To accommodate the agent’s felt presence in the
experience of acting, one might hold that the experience explicitly represents the agent
via some indexical component. Mylopoulos endorses a version of this representationalist
strategy when she writes:
The deployment of the essential indexical in their content makes it so that
agentive thoughts explicitly represent oneself, as such, as the agent of the ac-
tion in question. More specifically, if I have the thought that I am Φ-ing, the
essential indexical makes it the case that my thought represents the thinker of
that very thought as Φ-ing. In this way, an intimate link is forged between the
subject of agentive awareness and the agent of the action, which might very
well yield a robust sense of oneself as the source of that action. (2017, 557)15
Mylopoulos’s idea is that we should explain subjective action ownership through the
explicit representation of the agent as such within the representational content of a judg-
ment. Agentive experience is revealed as a mode of explicit self-awareness whose content
we might express by saying “I (the subject of this experience) am the agent of this action”.
A natural worry to raise for the above strategy is that by requiring that agentive ex-
periences explicitly represent the agent through the deployment of a first-person indexi-
cal, it cannot accommodate the second of our puzzle-generating claims about immersion
and Tang (2018) and Bruya (2010).
14An internal debate among representationalists concerns the format of the representation they take to
realize agentive experience. Bayne (2011) argues that the representation is sensory and low level, whereas
Mylopoulos (2017) argues that the representation is a belief or judgment that one is acting a certain way
(see also Peacocke 2003). Shepherd (2017a) develops a distinctive view of the relevant representational state
as “multi-categorial”—a product of the representational integration of the subject’s conscious intention to
move her body and of a concordant perceptual experience of her body moving. (Note: Shepherd doesn’t
explicitly advertise his account as a version of representationalism about experiences of acting. But that
is nevertheless what his view appears to be. As I read Shepherd’s proposal, the phenomenology of an
experience of acting consists in a representation of one and the same event as being jointly a trying-by-me
and a movement).
15Similarly, Peacocke writes:
The awareness of the agent from the inside is not merely one whose correctness condition im-
plies that he himself is the agent of the Φ-ing in question; further, the experience represents this
as being so, as part of its representational content (Peacocke 2003, 103-4, italics added).
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experience. In particular, it cannot accommodate the sense in which the agent seems ab-
sent from the experience. Mylopoulos (2017) is unique among recent representationalists
about agentive phenomenology in having addressed this worry. She proposes that in im-
mersion, a first-person agentive representation still occurs (as it must on her view in order
for the agent to experience herself acting), but it occurs without the agent being conscious
of it (Mylopoulos 2017, 555). That is, when subjects are immersed in some activity, agen-
tive representations are formed in the normal way so as to realize an experience of acting.
But the subject does not notice its content because she is not introspecting the experience.
For example, if I am immersed in performing a drop shot, on Mylopoulos’s view, I may
have the thought that I am performing a drop shot, but I am unaware of this thought. So,
on Mylopoulos’ view, my experience of performing a drop shot is an immersive rather
than reflectively detached one.
However, we should resist Mylopoulos’s proposed way of accommodating immersion
experiences. Most significantly, her proposal seems to conflate the subjective recessive-
ness of the agent in immersive action with the subjective recessiveness of acting. Recall
the original intuition behind the immersed/detached distinction. This was that although
the agent and her internal states might figure prominently in a reflectively detached ex-
perience of acting, the agent and her internal states seem, in some sense to be explained,
absent from more immersive experiences. By contrast, Mylopoulos’s proposal requires
that the entire experience of acting becomes subjectively vivid for the subject only when
she steps back and introspects that experience. That is a less plausible claim than the
earlier one. For one, the retrospective reports of flow states are of experiences of acting
that were subjectively vivid for the subject when they originally occurred. What was (some-
how) subjectively remote was the experience of oneself as agent. Relatedly, Mylopoulos’
proposal in terms of introspection would seem to predict that the agent’s sense of engage-
ment in the activity should tend to increase or intensify as she comes to reflect more and
more on her performance compared to when she was unreflectively absorbed in the act.
After all, it is with introspection, on Mylopoulos’s view, that the content of the experience
of acting becomes conscious. But this prediction seems false on its face: famously, explicit
reflection on one’s own performance tends to interfere with one’s sense of engagement in
a task, potentially leading one to “choke”.16
16This appears to be the grain of truth behind “self-focus” or “explicit monitoring” theories of choking
under pressure (e.g., Beilock et al. 2004). According to these accounts, choking under pressure tends to re-
sult from explicit attentive monitoring of one’s performance (e.g., the execution details of highly practiced
actions). However, as Montero (2016) discusses, the correct observation that certain forms of conscious atten-
tion during an expert performance impair one’s performance (and one’s sense of subjective engagement in
it) has sometimes been mistaken, both in empirical work and elsewhere, as evidence for the stronger claim
that all forms of conscious attention to an expert performance are detrimental. I agree with Montero that the
evidence cited in support of explicit monitoring theories falls far short of supporting the latter claim (and
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For the above reasons, Mylopoulos’s attempt to explain basic subjective action own-
ership in terms of occurrences of the first-person indexical is unlikely to respect the dis-
tinction between immersive and more reflectively detached agentive experiences. My-
lopoulos’s is just one account, but we can expect similar difficulties to arise for any purely
representationalist account of agentive experience. To see why, it is useful to distinguish
two ways to understand what it is to act or to control one’s behaviour consciously. On one
understanding of these phrases, for an agent to act consciously is for the agent to perform
an action of which she is conscious. Here, the agent’s action is the intentional object of a
monitoring state that functions to register or to track such things as whether the agent is
acting, what the agent is doing, and the agent’s manner of doing it. Similarly, to exercise
conscious control, on this understanding, is to engage in a process of control of which one
is conscious. This is the meaning of “conscious control” and “conscious action” that repre-
sentationalist accounts like Mylopoulos’s target. However, this is different from the sense
these expressions seem to have when used to describe immersion experiences. Here, we
are confronted with an action or a process of control to which the agent’s own conscious
perspective seems actively to contribute. To explain the latter sense of “conscious control”
or “conscious action”, we would need to understand the basis of the subject’s experience
of her own subjective perspective as functionally integrated within the process of con-
trol rather than as witnessing that process unfold from without. Insofar as they provide
no account of this more basic experience of oneself as practically engaged in an activity,
representationalist accounts of the experience of acting falsify the phenomenology of im-
mersive action. And in particular, they falsify the phenomenological status of the agent
within these experiences of acting by suggesting that the agent is always explicitly rep-
resented in the content of the experience. In short, representationalist accounts yield an
excessively detached conception of agentive experience.17
Let’s turn, finally, to my solution to the puzzle about how the agent figures in the im-
mersive experience of acting. My solution rests on the suggestion that the phenomenal
character of an immersive experience of acting possesses a perspectival character. More
specifically, on this proposal the sense of first-person ownership for an immersive action
consists in a perspectival feature of the experience of acting related to the subjective or-
also that there is compelling evidence to the contrary—e.g., Eysenck et al. (2007); Eysenck and Derakshan
(2011); Vine et al. (2013)).
17I include Shepherd (2017a) as one of the targets of this critique. While Shepherd has made a valuable
contribution by emphasizing the constitutive role of the subject’s engaged perceptual perspective in the
experience of acting, his background commitment to representationalism prevents him from adequately
accommodating this insight. The experience of acting, on Shepherd’s view, as on Mylopoulos’s, remains
one of passively informing the agent about what she is actively doing. If so, then no explanatory significance
is given to the fact that the subject’s conscious perspective in an immersion experience is itself an active or
controlling state.
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ganization of the agent’s conscious attention. We can think of this on analogy with how
the egocentric character of a visuospatial experience is able to convey a sense of the per-
ceiver’s spatial presence within a scene without having to explicitly represent the per-
ceiver as such.18 In a similar way, I suggest, the agent does not manifest in an immersion
experience as any entity within the experience that conscious attention targets. Rather,
the agent manifests as the implicit origin of conscious attention during the immersive task
performance. By understanding the agent’s subjective status as a perspectival feature of
agentive experience, we simultaneously accommodate the agent’s felt absence from im-
mersion experience—namely, as an explicit object of conscious attention—and also the
agent’s felt presence—namely, as the origin of conscious attention. And in so doing, we
solve our puzzle about the agent’s subjective status in immersion experience. As it iden-
tifies the agent’s subjective presence in immersive experiences of acting with the perspec-
tival origin of conscious attention, I’ll call this an “attentional account” of basic subjective
ownership of action.19
The notion of “perspective” as it applies to immersive agentive experiences calls for
elucidation. The type of conscious perspective agents bear in virtue of enjoying a first-
person immersive agentive experience plausibly isn’t identical to the kind of perspec-
tive subjects possess in virtue of enjoying a visuospatial perceptual experience. Notably,
whereas “origin” has a literal geometric meaning when used to characterize a perceiver’s
felt location within a visuospatial experience, the same term has a non-geometric mean-
ing when used to describe how the agent figures within experiences of immersed activity.
The way the agent figures subjectively in an experience of acting is no more than anal-
ogous to how the perceiver manifests as located at the egocentric origin of a visuospa-
tial experience. At the same time, however, it would be wrong to conclude from these
genuine differences that an agent’s first-person perspective in immersive experiences of
acting is wholly unrelated to the agent’s first-person perceptual perspective on the world.
To draw that conclusion would be to miss something important about what makes the
18Cf. Campbell (2002), who holds that we do not need to use ‘relational’ egocentric notions (e.g., ‘x is
above me’ or ‘y is to the right of me’) to state the content of a visual spatial experience, but only simpler
‘monadic’ egocentric notions (e.g., ‘x is above’ and ‘y is to the right’). Ordinary human vision, Campbell
suggests, “represents things as ‘to the right’ or ‘above’ using the monadic egocentric notions, rather than
the relational terms” (2002, p. 184; see also Campbell 1994, 129 129). Similarly, Perry denies he is explicitly
represented anywhere in his visual experience (at least in virtue of his experience’s spatial perspectival
character):“I am not in the field of vision: no component of my visual experience is a perception of me.
How then can this experience provide me with information about how objects are related to me?” (1993,
205). Peacocke (2003) and Schwenkler (2014) offer dissenting voices in this context.
19Marcel (2003, 84 ff.) also proposes to understand the immersive sense of action ownership as a “perspec-
tival” feature of experiences of acting. But whereas Marcel unpacks the notion of perspective involved in
immersion in terms of the egocentric spatial frame of reference implicit in the motor specifications govern-
ing movement execution, I do so in terms of the motivational framing of conscious attention. See Peacocke
(2003, 97-8) for a convincing rebuttal of Marcel’s proposal in terms of egocentric spatial frames of reference.
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phenomenology immersive. We must say more to unpack these claims.
I propose the following way forward. I will use what we know already about atten-
tion from Chapters 1–2 to cast light on what an agent’s “first-person perspective” in an
immersion experience means. If I am successful here, I will have done two things. First,
I will have explained the sense of basic ownership of action in terms of the perspectival
structure of an immersive experience of acting. Second, I will have explained the latter
property of agentive experiences in terms of the actual structure of attention as an exercise
of conscious control. I’ll now turn to the second of these aims.
3.4 The perspectival structure of an experience of acting is
based in the causal structure of conscious attention
As discussed in Chapter 1, any episode of attention can be understood as a psycholog-
ical process constituted by two types of mental state: an attentional source state and an
attentional resultant state (see §1.3). In this section, I want to suggest that we can use
the source-resultant structure of attention in order to make explicit the sense in which
the agent manifests as the “origin” of conscious attention in an immersive experience of
acting. I’ll start by reviewing the source-resultant structure of attention.
An “attentional source state” is the mental state that sets the goal for an episode of
attention and also directs its course. In Chapter 2, I argued that we should understand
the attentional source state for an episode of automatic attention as played by the agent’s
total motivational state and proximately mediated by the agent’s integrated priority map
(§2.5.1). The “resultant state” of attention refers to the biasing effect or result of the source
state on the mental states upon which the agent is relying to execute the goal that the
source state sets. These are nonconceptual perceptual and perceptuomotor states in the
case of perceptual attention. For example, in visual attention, the resultant state will be a
visual state that has been modulated by the goal-setting source state. This is a visual state
in which the subject is preferentially sensitive to visual information registered as of high
priority according to the priority rankings of the integrated priority map. The subject
is also disposed to respond to this information, when detected, in ways conducive to
attaining the goal that the source state sets. Whereas the psychological process of visual
attention is the biasing of visual states by source states, a psychological state of visual
attention is the resultant biased visual state (whose status as attention partly consists in
its having been biased by the source state). The causal structure of attention is therefore
comprised of both motivational states (i.e. states of the agent’s priority system) and lower
level implementational states (e.g., sensorimotor states).
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I argued in Chapter 1 that the process of attending realizes a central part of the guid-
ance control that agents manifest in skilled bodily action. Through the twin process of
enhancement and suppression, agents cope with the obstacle to successfully coordinated
action that distractor interference poses. I am assuming that the actions performed in sub-
jective immersion are no exception to this claim. Indeed, subjectively immersive actions
arguably provide paradigm examples of attentional guidance. Regarding the attentional
source state for immersive actions, I will assume that the agent’s attention is governed by
the agent’s total priority system. In this sense, I take it that we are dealing with a kind
of automatic attention in action. However, the objectively heightened control exhibited,
together with the subjectively immersive character of the accompanying experience, sug-
gests that a single behavioural goal tends to predominate and stably govern attention and
action. I assume that the guiding goal in these cases is the agent’s intention to complete
a certain task. Consequently, when discussing immersive actions in particular, it will not
be misleading to speak simply of the agent’s intention (or task set) as source state. We
will return to more complex examples later.
When we actively guide our conduct, I assume that we do so, in part at least, on the ba-
sis of phenomenally conscious states and processes—i.e., conscious states and processes
that “there is something that it’s like for the subject” to be in (Nagel 1974). And when
the agent exercises guidance partly on the basis of conscious states and processes, I will
say that the agent deploys “conscious control” over her behaviour. This is consistent with
allowing that there are nonconscious contributions to exercises of motor control. It is also
consistent with there being forms of unconscious attention recruited in such control (e.g.,
Milner and Goodale 1995/2006, 204-5; Kentridge 2011; Wu 2011b, 71; Mole 2014). It is
simply to affirm that conscious states and processes sometimes directly contribute to as-
pects of motor control, if only to relatively coarse-grained action parameters (see Briscoe
2009; Briscoe and Schwenkler 2015; Shepherd 2016a,b). One form of conscious control is
conscious attentional control. By “conscious attentional control”, I mean that states and
processes of conscious attention are among the conscious states and processes that agents
deploy in guiding behaviour. Finally, I understand the notion of “conscious attention” as
an attentional resultant state that is phenomenally conscious and whose phenomenology
is partly the product of attending. For example, a state of conscious visual attention is,
on my understanding, simply a conscious visual state whose phenomenology has been
shaped through a process of motivational biasing. The characteristic phenomenal contri-
bution of attending to conscious visual states is frequently expressed using various spa-
tial metaphors, including that of “foreground” vs. “background” (e.g., Jennings 2015) and
“center” vs. “periphery” (Watzl 2017). In each case, the former term is meant to connote
what is experientially in the focus of one’s attention, and the latter what is suppressed.
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In the next chapter, I examine this characteristic subjective organization of conscious at-
tention in more detail and examine alternative ways of conceiving of this subjective or-
ganization. Till then, I appeal to it merely as a placeholder for the phenomenological
contribution that the process of conscious attention might make to an action-guiding vi-
sual experience and that qualifies it as a state of conscious visual attention.
With these materials in place, let’s return to the first-personal structure of an immer-
sive experience of acting. If, as I’ve suggested, conscious attention is sufficient for a type
of subjective perspective, then we can pose two questions about this perspective: what
is it a perspective from—i.e., what is its “origin”—and what is it a perspective on or of —
i.e., what occupies the “field of view”? We can now use the source-resultant profile of
conscious attention to answer these questions.
To begin with, the “origin” of the subject’s motivational perspective corresponds to
the attentional source state—e.g., the agent’s current priority of completing a certain task.
In saying this, we accommodate well-known properties of the immersion experience. For
example, we respect the familiar observation that “flow tends to occur when the activity
one engages in contains a clear set of goals” and that the specific importance of having
clear goals (at least for engendering a sense of flow) “lies in their capacity to structure ex-
perience by channeling attention” (Csikszentmihalyi et al. 2005, 601). In an experience of
engaged activity, one’s conscious attention emanates from a particular set of goals, which
serves to frame and structure one’s attention in the situation at hand. Metaphorically,
agents consciously attend in immersion from the perspective of an attention-structuring
motive or set of goals, including those specified by the agent’s intention.
If agents consciously attend from the perspective of a clear set of goals, then what is
that perspective a perspective on or of? I take this to be a question about the objects of con-
scious attention. In other words, it is a question about what, in attending, agents attend
to. Here, some caution is required. It’s often convenient to speak loosely about the objects
of attention in terms of the goal that the agent is deploying attention to accomplish, and
I’ve sometimes allowed myself to speak this way. For example, if Sanjeev is immersed
in a squash match, it may be natural to describe Sanjeev as attending to the task of win-
ning the match. More generally, it can be convenient to speak of the object of an agent’s
attention in terms of the fulfillment condition that is specified by the attentional source
state—e.g., by Sanjeev’s current task set. This is a natural way to interpret task-based
accounts of attention. According to these accounts, the “theoretically fundamental” con-
cept of an attentional object is the task that the agent is working to achieve (see e.g., Mole
2011, 72-3; Koralus 2014, 37). If we interpret “task” to mean the goal state that is specified
by the agent’s task set, then task-based accounts yield the verdict that agents attend to
their goals in acting—e.g., to the goal of winning a squash match or, to use an example
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of Koralus’s, the goal of finding an incompetently played part in an orchestral perfor-
mance. Put in terms of the notion of motivational perspective, this generates the result
that conscious attention realizes a perspective on a task or goal.
But that seems incorrect. The agent’s goals (including those specified by the agent’s
task set) feed into the “subject side” of an episode of conscious attention. They are our
point of view or frame of reference. They are not what we take that perspective on or
toward. When Sanjeev is immersed in the task of winning the match, the task that guides
his conscious attention could itself be secluded from his conscious attention. Unless one is
strategizing about what to do next, it may even be that attending to one’s goals will tend
to distract one from successfully acting on them. For example, devoting too much atten-
tion to certain incentives may be detrimental to spontaneity. Consequently, we should not
regard the agent’s goal or task as providing the object or objects of her attention. Rather,
I propose to understand the object or objects of conscious attention in terms of the enti-
ties figuring in the contents of attentional resultant states (e.g., perceptual states). On a
resultant-based conception, the objects of attention include the objects of perception (in
the case of perceptual attention) and of thought (in the case of intellectual attention). For
example, when Sanjeev is attentionally engrossed in a squash match, his focus will be
on such things as the changing position of his opponent and the ball, his own grip and
foot placement, and his current distance from the “T”.20 Unless he becomes distracted, he
won’t be attending to the conversation occurring outside the court or to the colour of his
opponent’s watch or socks. At least, he will be attending to them less than he is to other
things. On this proposal, a statement like “Sanjeev is attending to the task of winning the
match” is therefore shorthand for a statement describing the selective organization that
Sanjeev’s conscious perceptual states have acquired as a result of top-down biasing by his
intention to win. “Attention to a task” amounts to, for example, patterns of perceptual
attention to the world structured according to the agent’s goals.21
20I limit myself to the objects of Sanjeev’s conscious perceptual attention. A fuller discussion would
include the objects of his intellectual attention (e.g., the contents of strategic planning and decision-making).
I assume that there is a parallel sense in which Sanjeev’s intellectual attention is directed toward the world
rather than explicitly toward his goals.
21My view here is partly inspired by the following passage from Alan White (1964):
Whether or not a man is giving attention to his fishing depends on whether he looks at the
water, listens to the rustling of the reeds and thinks about the habits of fish or whether he looks
at his watch, listens to the aeroplane in the sky and worries about his children’s education and
his stocks and shares. The attentive is distinguished from the inattentive fisherman by the
relevance or irrelevance to his fishing of what he gives his attention to . . . To be attending as
an agent to what one is doing . . . signifies attention, by way of looking, listening, thinking or
doing to various objects relevant to the general task attended to and absence of attention, in
such ways, to objects not relevant to the general task. (16)
Here, White gestures at a way to translate statements about a fisherman’s attention to a task (e.g., fishing)
into statements about attention to various “objects” (e.g., objects of perception and thought) that are rele-
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I’ve suggested that an agent’s motivational perspective within a first-person experi-
ence of acting is a matter of how the agent is consciously attending in acting. I’ve further
suggested that the objects of the agent’s conscious attention partly coincide with the ob-
jects of perception. It follows that an agent’s motivational perspective in a first-person
experience of acting partly coincides with her perspective on the objects of perception,
including her own intentional movements. These two perspectives only partly coincide
for two reasons. First, motivational states structure cognitive states in addition to percep-
tual states. So, motivational perspective encompasses more than perceptual perspective.
Second, there are elements of a perceptual perspective that are not part of motivational
perspective (e.g., egocentric spatial perspective). Still, motivational and perceptual per-
spectives genuinely intersect where conscious perceptual states are motivationally struc-
tured through the process of conscious attention. Adopting a motivational perspective on
one’s action constitutively endows that action with the basic feeling of being one’s own.
Whichever way we choose to characterize the objects of the agent’s conscious attention
in immersion, what is crucial is the way conscious attention is being directed. Whether
we describe agents as attending to the task at hand or instead to task-relevant informa-
tion, the experience of basic ownership of an action depends on the practical use to which
conscious attention is put in action—i.e., in service of goal execution. Specifically, my
view is that the agent will experience basic ownership over an action if the motivational
state guiding her behaviour is also the source state of her conscious attention. Put more
metaphorically, the agent feels basic ownership toward an action if her motivational per-
spective is engaged in guiding action, where “motivational perspective” refers to the mo-
tivational state that occupies the functional role of attentional source state. I’ll conclude
this section with a few clarifications about the proposal.
First, I mean this to be a supervenience thesis. In particular, there can be no change in
the experience of action ownership without a corresponding change in how the agent ex-
ercises her conscious attention in action. I am suggesting that facts about the way an agent
is exercising her conscious attention in action necessitate facts about the phenomenology
of subjective ownership. My main concern here is to defend this as a thesis about the
actual world. In particular, in §3.6 I will respond to potential empirical challenges that
one might raise against the claim that the phenomenal property of action ownership does
in fact depend on exercises of attentional control. Against this, I will suggest that my
necessity claim is consistent with the known empirical conditions under which subjective
vant to this task or goal. In particular, White seems to regard attending to a task as a less basic notion than
attending (as a “spectator”) to the world around oneself, where spectator attention is harnessed motiva-
tionally by one’s task. For complementary points, see Evans (1970, 109 ff.) and Roessler (2000; 2003, 389-90)




Second, while I’m only defending a supervenience claim for action ownership expe-
rience, the condition explains salient features of a wide range of cases of agentive expe-
rience. First and foremost, it captures that, in ordinary cases of skilled bodily action, the
agent’s conscious attention is motivationally structured. The motivational state that guides
the agent’s action is also the source state governing how conscious attention is allocated.
And it is this fact—that the behaviour-guiding motivational state occupies the role of
conscious attentional source—that I take to explain why the agent experiences herself as
engaged in the task at hand.
Third, while it highlights that, in ordinary bodily action, conscious attention is har-
nessed in service of behavioural guidance, my account does not overstate conscious atten-
tion’s behaviour-guiding role. In particular, it does not imply that felt ownership extends
only to actions or properties of actions that conscious attention guides. This is important
because there are contexts in which an agent feels ownership over an action or proper-
ties of an action, but the agent plausibly doesn’t use her conscious attention to guide that
action or those properties of the action. Two such cases warrant mention.22
First, it could turn out that agents experience ownership toward properties of their
actions that, as a matter of empirical fact, are settled outside conscious attention. Fine-
grained properties like precise finger placement during a rapid, highly practiced routine
might be like this (though, as discussed in Chapter 1 (§1.4.2.1), it is not a straightforward
matter determining whether the states responsible for fine-grained execution details are
conscious or not). While on my view these properties of action are the product of atten-
tion (see §1.4.2.3), they might not be the product of conscious attention. My proposal leaves
open the possibility that there are properties of the agent’s behaviour to which conscious
attention itself contributes little or nothing, but that are still subjectively owned. This will
be the case if the motivational state that is responsible for settling those fine behavioural
details is the same motivational state that occupies the source of one’s conscious atten-
tion. In that case, it is still one’s motivational perspective that guides one’s fine-grained
movements. Consequently, my proposal leaves open exactly to what degree a subjectively
owned motivational state guides behaviour in virtue of harnessing conscious attention.
What matters for establishing sense of ownership over some property of one’s action is
not whether conscious attention settles that property but whether it is settled under the
guidance of the source state of one’s conscious attention. My proposal in this chapter is
thus consistent with the possibility that agents experience ownership over even uncon-
sciously programmed properties of their behaviour.
To take another example in which conscious attention itself arguably does not play an
22I am indebted to Myrto Mylopoulos for raising versions of the following points in discussion.
96
action-guiding role, consider the mental act of consciously attending to something. Plau-
sibly, conscious attention is (or can be) an action over which one feels ownership, as when
one experiences oneself actively holding one’s attention on a body part. But, one might
think, it’s highly implausible to suppose that acts of conscious attention themselves require
guidance by a separate act of conscious attention in order to be subjectively owned. My
proposal does not suggest otherwise. Subjective ownership of an action, on my proposal,
does not require that conscious attention itself guide the action. Rather, it requires that
the motivational state guiding the action also be the source of one’s conscious attention.
This requirement trivially obtains in cases of active attending, since necessarily, any mo-
tivational state that directs an act of conscious attending thereby serves as the source of
conscious attention. Consequently, my proposal not only allows, but actually requires
that all acts of conscious attention be subjectively owned. Put differently, if conscious
attention is an action, then on the present account it is, apparently unlike other actions,
essentially subjectively owned. If conscious attention is an action, it is the agent’s act of
taking up a motivational perspective.
The consequence that acts of attention are uniquely subjectively inalienable might give
us pause. In particular, one might think that the case for the attentional account will
not be secure until it receives independent defense. I take up this challenge in Chapter
4. There, I will show that an independently motivated view of how conscious attention
perspectivally structures an agent’s perceptual awareness of the world requires that we
understand episodes of conscious attention as being necessarily subjectively owned. Till
then, I rest my case for this claim on its intuitive plausibility.
This concludes my account of basic subjective ownership of immersive actions. We
can summarize the proposal in terms of two steps. In the first step, I explained the phe-
nomenal property of basic subjective ownership in immersive experiences of acting in
terms of the “perspectival character” of immersion experiences. According to that pro-
posal, the agent is present subjectively in an immersive experience of acting in something
like the way a perceiver is subjectively located at the egocentric origin of a visuospatial
experience. In the second step, I explained what “first-person perspective” amounts to
in an immersive experience of acting by reference to the causal structure of attention as a
form of conscious control. According to this proposal, the agent manifests as the “origin”
of an experience of acting in the sense of occupying the source state of conscious atten-
tion in action execution. I turn next to show how we might extend this account of the
first-personal element of immersion experiences to various non-immersive experiences
of acting.
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3.5 Extension to non-immersive experiences of acting
Not all experiences of acting are immersive. Nevertheless, motivational perspective may
characterize all first-person experiences of acting, even if less vividly. In this section, I
extend the account of subjective ownership that I’ve given for immersion to paradigmati-
cally non-immersive agentive experiences, including experiences of acting half-heartedly,
of acting anxiously, and of acting with self-control.
One way to alter the immersive character of an agentive experience is to vary the
strength of the agent’s motivation to perform the action. To begin with the clearest sort
of case, actions performed with only weak motivation are unlikely to be subjectively im-
mersive. To take an example of weakly motivated action from Shepherd (2017b), consider
the act of grading papers when you want to be doing something else, like playing with
your dog. Your action of grading is intentional, but, let us suppose, weakly motivated or
halfhearted—e.g., you are not marshaling special effort toward the task. Shepherd argues
that acting halfheartedly (i.e., with weak overall motivation) decreases the control one
possesses over an action. For example, supposing one has already initiated Φ-ing, then
weak motivation to Φ leads to decreased guidance over Φ-ing. And as he notes, perfor-
mance costs associated with weak motivational levels are widely taken to be mediated by
increased distractibility (e.g., “goal-neglect”). Weak motivation to Φ decreases the agent’s
guidance over Φ-ing by decreasing focus on information pertinent to Φ-ing (2017b, 268-9).
To these points about attentional guidance control, I add a claim about how the phe-
nomenology of action-ownership. Specifically, I propose that the same variable underly-
ing decreased guidance control in halfhearted action—i.e., increased distractability—also
underlies its non-immersive phenomenology. When motivation to Φ is weak, motiva-
tional factors other than one’s intention to Φ come partly to occupy the source of con-
scious attention, sometimes diverting attention from Φ-relevant information toward Φ-
irrelevant information. Since attention is central to action-guidance, goal-attainment will
be more due to luck under conditions of weak motivation than when attention controls
performance. Action success will also be less up to you (or less your doing) and will phe-
nomenally manifest as such. You are less engaged.
For analogous reasons, it’s possible that being too strongly motivated to act also dis-
rupts immersion. Specifically, if beyond a certain threshold, motivational strength in-
duces anxiety about failure, then the relaxed focus of immersion will give way to a more
anxious performance. Conscious attention is apt to become diverted from intention-
relevant information to intention-irrelevant information. For example, attention may turn
(counter-productively) to well-rehearsed execution details, toward hypothetical negative
outcomes, or to possibly hostile faces in the audience. If so, then in conditions of both
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weak and (very) strong motivation, one is likely to lose experience of being immersed
in a single action. Under both conditions, one’s motivational perspective partly loses its
internal coherence (because jointly occupied by interfering motives), and behaviour will
be less coherent and smoothly guided than in immersion.
So far, I’ve been discussing forms of ownership experiences that could be enjoyed even
by an unreflective “wanton”: an agent whose behaviour is exclusively guided by first-
order desires and who never considers the question of how they want to be motivated.
However, as discussed in §3.2.2, philosophers of action have sometimes been concerned
with loftier forms of agency (“agency par excellence” or “autonomous agency”). As we
saw, one theoretical challenge, in this context, is to understand how agents achieve au-
tonomy in the face of competing motivational states, biasing the outcome in favour of
a self-consciously endorsed motive. Does the attentional control account of subjective
ownership have anything to say about the self-reflective ownership associated with self-
controlled agency?
It may. Autonomous ownership may be a special case of conscious attentional control.
In this context, it’s illuminating to consider a constraint Velleman (1992) posits regarding
the psychological state whose role in behavioural is constitutive of the agent’s participa-
tion. Against Frankfurt’s suggestion that the agent can be reduced to higher-order moti-
vational states, Velleman objects that merely being of a higher-order isn’t sufficient to oc-
cupy the role of the agent, since a motive of a higher-order can also come under reflective
scrutiny and, in principle, be reflectively disavowed. Regarding the agent-constituting
mental state, Velleman writes:
[T]he reason why it cannot be played by anything that might undergo the
process of critical review is precisely that it must be played by whatever directs
that process. The agent, in his capacity as agent, is that party who is always
behind, and never in front of, the lens of critical reflection, no matter where in
the hierarchy of motives it turns. (Velleman 1992, 477, italics added)
Velleman’s idea is that to occupy the role of the agent, a psychological state must be in-
alienable in the sense of always directing practical reflection without ever becoming an
object of such reflection. His solution is to claim that practical reasoning is directed by the
motive to act on the basis of reasons (or to make sense to oneself). Such a motive would,
Velleman notes, function to direct practical reasoning, but could not itself be reflectively
disavowed. This is because to call it into question would be to manifest the concern to act
for reasons and so for the motive to continue to direct one’s thought. Consequently, Velle-
man suggests, we have uncovered a motive suitable to serve as the agent: a motive that
occupies one’s conscious perspective when and only when one is engaged in practical
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thought. Because it is a motivational state, moreover, its contribution to practical reason-
ing may be sufficient to tip the balance in favour of behavioural tendencies that, without
it, would not be strong enough to prevail (e.g., the desire to not use a drug). Hence, it
would also be able to solve Velleman’s puzzle around self-control (see §3.2.2).
While we may dispute the details of Velleman’s proposal, the constraint that he pro-
poses in the above passage seems to me fundamentally right. Moreover, it seems to imply
commitment to a version of the attentional account of subjective ownership. In particu-
lar, Velleman assumes that the agent figures in practical thought not as a potential ob-
ject of conscious (in this case, intellectual) attention, but essentially as that which directs
conscious attention. However, Velleman seems to assume that we must individuate the
agent-constituting state by its distinctive content or satisfaction condition. And it is this
assumption that leads Velleman to search for a motivational state that, given its content,
cannot but figure as the agent’s mental perspective when thinking practically. I reject
that assumption. My alternative is to say that the agent-constituting mental state is not
individuated by a distinctive content or satisfaction condition. It is simply individuated
by the functional role of directing conscious attention. This allows us to retain the as-
sumption that the agent-constituting state is what directs processes of conscious atten-
tion. But we can allow that states with different satisfaction conditions will tend to play
this attention-directing role on different occasions: each with an equal claim to fulfilling
the role of the agent (when it is playing this role). In special contexts of self-control, it
may be that a motivational state with particular satisfaction condition comes to direct
conscious attention—perhaps the motive to act for superior reasons. This is an important
and distinctive agential capacity, and one that can be made sense of on the present ac-
count. However, it is also just one of many motives that can direct conscious attention.
We do not need to single it out as the unique setting in which the agent is genuinely active.
Having indicated how the attentional account might be extended to explain the sense
of ownership for non-immersive agentive experiences, there is hope for a fully general
account of the first-personal aspect of agentive experience in terms of motivated deploy-
ments of conscious attention.
3.6 Losing ownership?
In this final section, I will explain how my proposal accommodates intentional behaviours
that are abnormal with respect to subjective ownership and also identify some con-
sequences of my proposal for the relation between consciousness and agency. I will
use (“thetic”) representationalism about agentive experience as my main foil, as it most
clearly embodies assumptions that I take myself to be rejecting. It should be noted, how-
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ever, that my aim in this section is not to argue against representationalist accounts (which
I did in §3.3 ), but to further elucidate where our views differ and also to fend off a poten-
tial line of objection to my position arising from nonstandard experiences of acting.
Recall that the attentional account in this chapter commits to a supervenience claim:
there can be no change in the experience of action ownership without a corresponding
change in the control the agent exercises—specifically, in how the agent deploys conscious
attention to the action being performed. Consequently, the account will be in trouble if
it is possible for a pair of actions to differ in subjective ownership but not differ in the
conscious attentional control the agent exercises in executing the action.
By contrast, representationalism is consistent with the possibility that subjective own-
ership fails to supervene on action control. On that view, an experience of acting is re-
alized by a mental representation whose role is to monitor the agent’s own actions, and
the phenomenal character of the experience of acting is explained by the representational
content of the monitoring representation. This view can allow for pairs of cases in which
action control remains fixed, but in which subjective action ownership differs. It can do so
because it can allow that how the action is represented in the two cases differs. For exam-
ple, there is no barrier, on representationalism, to an action that is normally subjectively
owned occurring without agentive experience at all. This would be expected to occur, on
their view, if control were exercised without an accompanying agentive representation.
Just as the same type of object or event that is perceptually experienced at one moment
can also exist or occur unperceived at another moment, similarly the representationalist
about agentive experience can accommodate the possibility that the same type of agen-
tial control that is at one time accompanied by a first-person experience of acting can at
another time occur wholly unconsciously.
To take another example, the representationalist can allow for the possibility that an
agent performs an action and even experiences what she is doing as an action, but does
not experience herself as the agent of the experienced action. For example, the representa-
tionalist can accommodate the possibility that the monitoring state that realizes an expe-
rience of action misrepresents the owner of the experienced action—e.g., misattributing
the represented action to an external source. Thus, they have their own way of accommo-
dating the extreme examples of “alienation” or “passivity experience” discussed in §3.2.3.
Just as on a standard representationalist view of perceptual experience, a perceptual ex-
perience can be illusory in virtue of misrepresenting the properties of a perceived thing
or event, similarly a representationalist about agentive experience can accommodate the
possibility of an agentive experience that inaccurately represents who is acting. On such
a view, it is possible that the only factor distinguishing a first-person experience of acting,
an unconscious action, and an alienation experience is how the action is represented as
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being. There need be no difference at the underlying level of action control (e.g., in the
causal basis of the agent’s performance).
It might seem that the apparent possibility of alienation experiences and unconscious
action is evidence for representationalism and against my attentional account of subjec-
tive action ownership. In particular, such cases might appear to provide evidence against
the claim that action control processes necessitate agentive experience. As I’ll now show,
however, the attentional account has its own way of accommodating these putative prob-
lem cases. I’ll suggest that, in each case, there is a difference at the level of action control—
specifically, in deployments of conscious attention—that can explain the observed differ-
ences in agentive experience. If this is right, then there are not clear empirical grounds
favouring one of the views over the other, at least with respect to the class of phenomena
under consideration. The case for deciding between the two views instead lies elsewhere.
Let’s begin with alienation experiences: experiences in which a kind of motivational
control over behaviour is exercised without any felt ownership. In particular, let’s be-
gin with the hypothetical examples of subjectively passive motivational state-causation
Horgan and colleagues use in order to motivate the existence of “self-as-source” phe-
nomenology within ordinary experiences of acting (see §3.2.3) . I suggest that we can ex-
plain the subjectively passive character of these experiences by grasping how the agent’s
conscious attention is allocated while her motivational state is being executed. Recall that
on the attentional account, when the conscious motivational state directing an agent’s
behaviour also directs conscious attention (i.e., occupies the attentional source role), the
agent experiences the behaviour as her own doing. Now, consider that the alienated sub-
ject in Horgan’s cases is described as “witnessing”, “watching”, or “observing” her own
motivational state as it generates the motivated behaviour (e.g., observing her urge to
clench her fist passively causing her fist to clench). Arguably, these acts of reflective self-
observation—acts of conscious attention—are not themselves motivated by the state that
the subject is observing—namely, the urge. That is, in reflecting on a motive (in the way
Horgan invites us to imagine), the subject’s self-reflective attention is not contributing
to the satisfaction of the motive that is being reflected upon. If so, then the behaviour-
guiding motivational state (e.g., the urge to clench) fails to occupy the source of the sub-
ject’s conscious attention. Consequently, on the attentional account, it doesn’t manifest as
the agent’s motivational perspective. So, the type of conscious control that, on the atten-
tional account, explains the agent’s felt presence in the experience of acting is manifestly
absent in the sorts of cases Horgan and colleagues describe.
The conceivability of passive motivational state-causation does not show that when
agents have normal experience of acting, they experience their behaviour as controlled by
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something other than a motivational state.23 And it certainly does not present evidence
that in order to accommodate self-as-source phenomenology we must include an explicit
representation of the agent, as such, within the content of a “thetic” or “mind-to-world”
mental representation—e.g., <I am clenching my fist>. As I argued in §3.3, that would
itself generate an excessively detached conception of agentive experience.24 Rather, the
conceivability of passive motivational state-causation suggests that the presence or ab-
sence of basic action ownership depends on how the agent’s conscious attention is being
deployed during the implementation of motivated behaviour. In particular, it depends
on whether or not conscious attention is harnessed toward that motivational state’s ful-
fillment.
The attentional account thus has its own explanation of the alienated phenomenol-
ogy Horgan’s cases vividly illustrate. Let us turn, then, to consider real-life alienation
experiences, like those present in extreme cases of schizophrenia. Since these patients
suffer alienation experiences while intentionally moving their bodies, one might think
these cases establish that subjective action ownership fails to supervene on exercises of
conscious control. Indeed, I agree that alien control experiences are evidence for a kind
of conscious control without subjective action ownership. As I emphasized when consid-
ering Searle’s account (§3.2.3), such cases suggest that a conscious intention can control
behaviour without the subject experiencing action ownership. However, to refute the su-
pervenience claim, one must claim not only that there is conscious control exemplified
during an alienated experience of acting, but that the conscious control exercised is the
same as that exercised in the first-person experience of acting. And the empirical support
for the latter claim is weak.
To begin with, it is now well-established that schizophrenic patients exhibit significant
attentional disfunctions. In a review of current research on a neural system sometimes
23Here, we would do well to distinguish the claim that (i) in a normal experience of acting, one does not
experience one’s behaviour as controlled by a motivational state, and (ii) in a normal experience of acting,
one experiences one’s behaviour as not controlled by a motivational state. Claim (ii) strikes me as less well-
supported than (i) both introspectively and from reflection on the cases Horgan and colleagues advance.
Notably, though, the attentional account is not only consistent with claim (i) but predicts it. If in a normal
experience of acting, the behaviour-controlling motivational state directs conscious attention (i.e., occupies
the role of attentional source), then this state will tend to remain secluded from conscious attention, leaving
determinate information about it inaccessible introspectively.
24Admittedly, it’s not fully clear if this is the moral Horgan himself believes we should draw from his
reflections on passive phenomenology of motivational-state causation. In most contexts, Horgan writes as
though this is the moral we should draw. He seems to suggest that we can account for self-as-source phe-
nomenology by explicitly including a representation of the agent, as such, within the experience’s veridi-
cality conditions (e.g., <I am Φ-ing >). Elsewhere, Horgan says things more congenial to the type of account
I’m proposing—in particular, by denying that we should explain self-as-source phenomenology with an ex-
plicit “I” representation (see e.g., Horgan and Nichols 2015). Whatever Horgan’s own views on the matter,
others (e.g., Bayne & Levy 2006 and Bayne 2008) have clearly wished to draw representationalist morals
from Horgan et al.’s observations.
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called the “motivated attention system”—an integrated collection of neural regions un-
derlying the general “ability to direct attention to stimuli relevant to the current goal and
respond to those stimuli while ignoring competing responses”—Liddle (2006) concludes
that “recruitment of this motivated attention system is impaired in schizophrenia.” (196).
Specifically, “patients with schizophrenia devote greater resources to processing novel
stimuli, even though these stimuli are irrelevant to the current task, implying a decreased
ability to allocate resources in accord with current goals” (200). Liddle primarily discusses
schizophrenic impairments at oddball target detection tasks, but attentional deficits in
schizophrenic patients have also been discovered for other tasks, including visual search
(Gold et al. 2007) and visual selective attention (Carter et al. 2010). In short, schizophrenic
patients exhibit disruptions in the control of conscious attention when executing a variety
of tasks: they are likely not exercising the same kind of cognitive control as neurotypical
subjects are.
The above evidence is sufficient to show that schizophrenic alienation experiences
are not counter-evidence to the supervenience of subjective ownership on deployments
of conscious attention. Still, it would be desirable to see evidence for an explanatory
connection between the impairments in attention and the abnormal experiences of act-
ing. While nothing in this area is uncontroversial, there is reason to take seriously the
claim that these two facts are explanatorily related.25 A frequently discussed feature of
schizophrenic patients exhibiting passivity experiences is decreased sensory attenuation
of self-administered tactile sensations. Whereas in neurotypical patients subjective inten-
sity (e.g., pleasantness and ticklishness) of a self-generated tactile sensation is dampened
relative to externally generated ones, in schizophrenic patients suffering from passivity
experiences tactile sensations are comparably subjectively intense in both self-generated
and externally generated conditions (Blakemore et al. 2000). A standard explanation for
schizophrenic alienation experiences is framed in these terms. Unlike neurotypical pop-
ulations, who are focally aware of bodily sensations only when acted upon passively,
schizophrenic patients experiencing alien control are focally aware of these sensations
also while acting, making those sensory states “hypersalient”.26 That is, according to this
25Cf. Spence et al. (1997), who, on the basis of PET scan evidence of schizophrenic patients experienc-
ing alien control, propose an explanation of these experiences in terms of abnormalities in the control of
attention:
Given that these hyperactive cerebral regions subserve attention to internal and external bod-
ily space, and the attribution of significance to sensory information, they provide a plausible
anatomical substrate for the misattribution of internally generated acts to external entities: the
cardinal feature of delusions of passivity (alien control) (1997, 1997).
26Cf. Frith:
I believe we can now achieve some understanding of PH’s experiences because of what we
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explanation, passivity experiences partly consist in subjectively unattenuated sensory ex-
periences of one’s own body while acting. Significantly, selective sensory attenuation
(i.e., inhibition or suppression) and dis-attenuation (i.e., enhancement) are the hallmarks
of conscious perceptual attention. For example, according to Treisman’s classic “attenua-
tion model” of attention, the strength of unattended stimuli is attenuated (rather than its
channel completely blocked) relative to attended stimuli (Treisman 1964; cf.Mylopoulos
2012, 113). These standard claims about both schizophrenic passivity experiences and
perceptual attention are consistent with an account of passivity experience as arising
from a disturbance in the motivational harnessing of conscious attention. It may be that
schizophrenic passivity experiences during bodily action arise, at least partly, from fail-
ure of the agent’s guiding intention to harness conscious perceptual attention. This could
lead to an uncharacteristically observational deployment of conscious perceptual atten-
tion during intentional movement, somewhat like the hyper-observational posture de-
scribed in Horgan’s hypothetical cases. The pathologically third-personal experience of
acting may be based in an anomalous allocation of conscious attention during intention
execution.27
Whereas subjectively alienated agents consciously attend as spectators toward their
own purposive bodily movement, putative cases of unconscious action (“phenomenal
automatism”) arguably are not performed with any conscious attention to the action.
The claim, here, is not merely that aspects of the agent’s action are controlled without
conscious attention. That alone would not distinguish phenomenal automatism from or-
dinary skilled actions in which fine-grained motor parameters are programmed outside
conscious attention. In the latter case, the agent plausibly experiences ownership over the
entire action, even if properties of the action are specified unconsciously. I’ve accommo-
dated the latter possibility with my claim that an agent feels ownership over an action
so long as the same motivational state directing unconscious parameter setting also di-
rects conscious attention. By contrast, in phenomenal automatism, conscious attention
is not serving action execution at all. In the latter respect, phenomenal automatism is
similar to alienation experience. Unlike the latter, though, during phenomenal automa-
tism conscious attention is not deployed observationally toward one’s own bodily move-
have discovered about the brain. In our normal state we are hardly aware of the sensations
that occur whenever we move. This is because our brain can predict these sensations and
suppress our awareness of them. But what would it be like if something went wrong with
the prediction and we became aware of the sensations? Normally I am only aware of the
sensations when someone else moves my hand. Such a brain abnormality could explain why
PH feels as if her arm is being moved by someone else. She is abnormally aware of her bodily
sensations when she moves her hand. For her it really does feel as if someone else were
moving her hand. (2007, 109)
27See Clark 2016, 217-19 for related suggestions within a Bayesian predictive coding context.
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ments either. Rather, the agent is simply not consciously attending to what she is doing
in phenomenal automatism, whether practically (as in ordinary experience of acting) or
observationally (as in alienation experiences).
My aim in this section has not been to defend my account on empirical grounds.
Rather, it has been to show that the supervenience claim to which the attentional ac-
count commits is sustainable in the face of alleged counterexamples. In particular, we
can acknowledge the subjective differences that exist between first-person experiences of
acting, alienation experiences, and unconscious actions, while maintaining that subjec-
tive action ownership supervenes on conscious attentional control. The reason that I em-
phasize this point is that representationalists can also acknowledge the above empirical
evidence showing differences in how conscious attention is allocated in different cases of
agentive experience. They will simply attribute a different significance to these findings.
For example, a representationalist is likely to interpret the hyper-observational de-
ployments of conscious attention that schizophrenic patients engage in while acting as the
effect of an antecedent alienation experience that misrepresents the agent’s own action as
that of another (e.g., “I am not the one doing this!”). On such a view, the schizophrenic
subject represents an action as not her own doing, and this (combined with violation of
expectations) motivates a shift of perceptual attention, in an observational manner, to
the sensory details of how the subject’s body is moving (Mylopoulos 2012, 113-4; My-
lopoulos 2015, 773). By contrast, on the attentional account, there is no antecedent alien-
ation experience—e.g., a mental representation as of oneself being passively moved—that
causes the agent to attend observationally to how her body is moving. Rather, these ob-
servational deployments of conscious attention to movement execution constitute the ex-
perience of acting as being alienated rather than subjectively owned. On the latter view,
what explains the active rather than passive character of the agent’s experience during in-
tentionally controlled movement is how the agent’s motivational perspective is deployed
in that process. Only in a first-person experience of acting is the agent’s conscious at-
tention recruited toward ensuring the success of the motivational state that is guiding
bodily movement. So, both the attentional account and the representationalist have ways
of understanding the available evidence. The real case against representationalism, in my
view, comes from their inability to provide a satisfactory solution to the puzzle about the
agent’s presence in immersive experiences of acting (see §3.3).
I’d like to close by remarking on ownership itself on this account. This will allow me
to answer an objection raised in §3.2.4 against my claim to be offering a solution to the
Disappearing Agent Problem. The objection, recall, was that the Disappearing Agent
Problem is a problem about the nature of action ownership, not about its phenomenology.
According to the objection, we can no more grasp the relation that agents bear to their
106
actions through an account of how it feels to the agent to enter into that relation than we
can explain the nature of a material thing (e.g., an apple) by offering an account of how it
looks.
We are now in a position to grasp why this objection fails. In particular, the objection
assumes that the agent’s sense of ownership of some action is “of” herself as the agent
of the action in the same way that, for example, a visual experience of an apple is of the
apple one is looking at. But the attentional account reads the “of” in “sense of ownership”
differently. The agent’s experience of ownership does not consist in a representation of
herself as an agent—e.g., “I, the subject of this experience, am the agent of this action”.
Neither is the experience of ownership any other contingent sign or marker of one’s own
agency. Rather, on the attentional account, the sense of ownership is “of” ownership in
the way one’s experience of seeing an apple is an experience of seeing (rather than of, say,
hearing). That is, it is a type of conscious occurrence. If so, then just as there is something
it is like for you to see the apple, so there is something it’s like for you to direct conscious
control toward your conduct and for that control to be your own. Most will agree that it
is an error to suppose that one can grasp the nature of a conscious visual experience apart
from grasping its phenomenal character. For the same reasons, it is an error to suppose
that we can grasp the ownership agents bear to their actions apart from grasping its phe-
nomenal character. This is because, on the attentional account, the ownership that agents
bear to their conscious actions consists in the instantiation of a phenomenally conscious
point of view. It consists in the instantiation of a motivational perspective. Therefore,
to adequately characterize the ownership relation that holds between an agent and an
action, we must grasp the constitutive role that is played by the agent’s conscious per-





In the previous chapter, I drew an analogy between egocentric visuospatial perspective
and the subjective perspective agents possess in virtue of attending consciously (i.e., “mo-
tivational perspective”). I suggested that the agent is subjectively present in an experience
of acting in something like the way a perceiver is subjectively present at the egocentric
origin of a visuospatial experience. As the perceiver is subjectively present at the unrep-
resented origin of egocentric space, so too the agent is present subjectively at the unrep-
resented “source” or “origin” of conscious attention. This fact, I suggested, helps us to
explain the first-personal element of an experience of acting.
Reflection on this analogy invites a corresponding question about the structure of a
motivational perspective. Given that how the world appears to the subject is organized
by a visuospatial perspective into egocentric spatial relations (e.g., of near and far, to
the left and right, etc.), is there some corresponding way that acts of conscious attention
subjectively organize a subject’s perceptual experience? And if there is, what is that sub-
jective organization? In this chapter, I address these questions. In doing so, I shift my
focus from how the agent figures in conscious attention to how the world appears to the
agent in virtue of conscious attention.
There are two main options for an account of the subjective organization of conscious
attention. The first is to regard this organization as primitive or irreducible to other phe-
nomenal elements (e.g., Watzl 2011, 2017; Jennings 2015). Primitivists take conscious at-
tention to endow a unique organization on perceptual experience. In their view, just as
spatial perspective organizes a scene into egocentric spatial relations (e.g., of near and
far), attentional perspective organizes visual experience into sui generis attentional rela-
tions of “central” and “peripheral” or “foreground” and “background”. On their view,
the latter organization is wholly original to attention. Absent conscious attention, noth-
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ing in the world or in experience would, in the relevant sense, be central or peripheral
to anything else. The second option is to attempt to explain the subjective structure of
conscious attention reductively in terms of aspects of perception that are already, at least
partially, in place pre-attentively. Whereas primitivists regard an act of conscious atten-
tion as the absolute source of novel subjective organization, reductionists view attentional
organization as an elaboration of forms of perceptual organization that do not originate
with conscious attention.
This chapter defends the latter, reductive view of attentional organization. I argue
that the difference conscious attention makes to the phenomenal character of perceptual
experience is the product of top-down modulation by the subject’s motivational states
on how the world perceptually appears to the subject. On this view, attending does not
contribute a totally novel subjective organization to perceptual experience. Instead, it
contributes to perceptual experience by modifying and elaborating upon structures that
are inherent in a visual appearance. At least with respect to the subjective structure of a
perceptual appearance, conscious attention does not contribute anything original or sui
generis.
It is important to distinguish my reductive claim about the subjective structure of con-
scious attention from the stronger claim that all of attentional phenomenology can be
explained reductively. I reject the latter position. As we will see, conscious attention is
a mental act. And attentional phenomenology includes a sense of ownership over one’s
act of attention. But on the position that I defended in the previous chapter, we cannot
characterize the experience of first-person action ownership independently of conscious
attention. My account of ownership phenomenology crucially invoked conscious atten-
tion as an ingredient. Since ownership of an act of conscious attention is an aspect of
the phenomenology of conscious attention, and since action ownership is itself explained
in terms of the control of conscious attention, then a fully reductive account of atten-
tional phenomenology seems to be off the table. What remains available and, in my view,
attractive is a partly reductive account of attentional phenomenology. This account is
non-reductive about the sense of ownership but reductive about the subjective structure
of our attentional awareness of the world. This is the account that I defend here.
Part of what is at issue in this debate is the extent of the agent’s active role in per-
ceptual experience. According to a traditional view of perception, a sharp distinction ex-
ists within consciousness between what you are passively “given” in experience and the
“constructive acts” you perform on the given (Lewis 1929; Price 1932). The former refers
to what is “immediately present in consciousness”. The latter refers to the way that you
“select from it, emphasise aspects of it, and relate it in particular and avoidable ways” to
your purposes and interests (Lewis 1929, 52). Traditionally, philosophers who insist that
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there is a given element in experience claim that it “is what remains unaltered, no matter
what our interests” and that “no activity of thought can create or alter” it (Lewis 1929,
53). These authors intended these claims to extend to attention. For example, Price (1932)
dismisses the claim (which he attributes to Bradley but reportedly finds in “many of the
critics of the Given”) that “as we attend to something, this something becomes more and
more ‘clear”’(1932, 16). Price finds the proposal “so extraordinary that it is hard to see
how any one can have the audacity to hold it” (1932, 16). By contrast, the philosophers I
will be engaging with in this chapter are ready to grant that attention alters how things
appear to the subject—e.g., by making them look “more and more clear” in Price’s words.
Nevertheless, even here a distinction is frequently upheld between the organization that
accrues to an experience in virtue of the appearances that it passively presents to the sub-
ject and the organization that agents actively impose on their experiences through acts of
attention. In upholding a strict distinction between the appearances that are immediately
presented to the subject and the organization that the subject adds to these appearances
through acts of attention, shades of “the given” persist into contemporary philosophical
discussions of attention.
Against this, I’ll argue in this chapter that proper grasp of conscious attention’s contri-
bution to the subjective organization of perceptual experience requires a more thorough
rejection of the traditional separation between whatever is passively presented in visual
experience and the active structure superimposed on appearances through attention. In
rejecting primitivism and nearby views, I will be advancing a view of appearances as
themselves partly the product of a motivationally guided process. On my account, at-
tending consciously is the process whereby the agent’s motivational states guide the con-
struction of an appearance. The subjective organization of conscious attention, as we’ll
see, is the product of that process.
The plan is as follows. I begin in §4.2 by introducing some empirically established
effects of attention on visual appearances, including what I call the “sharpening” and
“boosting” of visual appearances. In §4.3, I consider an important recent argument from
Watzl (2011, 2017, Ch. 9) and, independently, from Wu (2011c; 2014b, Ch. 4) against the
claim that the phenomenology of a state of conscious visual attention consists in any prop-
erty of how things appear to the subject of the experience. According to this argument,
attentional phenomenology cannot consist in a type of visual appearance because, for any
difference that attending might make to how things visually appear, this difference can
be replicated without replicating what it’s like for the subject to consciously attend (the
“replication argument”). In response, I argue that the introspective evidence on which the
replication argument draws is consistent with a reductive account of the subjective struc-
ture of conscious attention. Further, I argue that the latter account is preferable to either
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of the proposals Watzl and Wu advance in light of the relevant introspective evidence. In
§4.4, I respond to an objection that reductive proposals like mine fail to accommodate in-
tuitively holistic aspects of attentional phenomenology. Lastly, in §4.5, I argue that though
the replication argument fails to achieve its official aim, the introspective evidence that it
draws on supports a different conclusion about attentional phenomenology. In particular,
it supports a conclusion about its distinctive status as a mental act. This will allow me to
provide independent support for a critical, but until now undefended, consequence of
the account that I defended in Chapter 3: namely, that acts of attention are subjectively
inalienable.
4.2 The sharpening and boosting of perceptual appear-
ances
This section introduces some of the empirically documented effects that covert visual at-
tention has been shown to have on visual appearances. I will be focusing in particular
on two such effects: what I will call the “sharpening” and “boosting” of visual appear-
ances. While I do not believe these effects exhaust the contribution that attention makes
to visual appearances (for reasons I’ll explain in §4.4), they are all that we need to grasp
the replication argument and the points that I wish to raise in response to this argument.
Having introduced sharpening and boosting as my paradigm cases of attention-induced
appearance enhancements, I then outline the thesis that I will be defending in subsequent
sections: the attentional appearance view.
At least on the face of it, conscious attention possesses its own phenomenology: there
is “something that it’s like for you” to consciously attend (Nagel 1974). To get an initial
grip on this phenomenology, it helps to consider the way conscious attention is described,
both within folk psychological and empirical contexts. For example, conscious attention
has been described as a “clear and vivid . . . focalization, concentration, of consciousness”
(James 1890/1950); a “searchlight”, “spotlight”, or “zoom lens” (see Styles 2006, 65 ff);
“experiential highlighting” (Campbell 2002); “phenomenal salience” (Wu 2011c),1 and
“prominence” (Ganson & Bronner 2013). It is also commonly described using spatial
terms—e.g., as imposing “center-periphery” or “foreground-background” organization
on experience (Watzl 2010; 2011; 2017).
Confronted with these descriptions, an initially attractive hypothesis is that each of
1In this context, “salience” does not have the same meaning it usually has in the empirical literature. In
the empirical literature, “salience” typically refers to the property of being attention-capturing or possibly
the intrinsic basis of that dispositional property (see §2.3). In the present context, “salience” refers instead
to the characteristic phenomenological upshot of conscious attention.
111
the above expressions picks out features that accrue to visual phenomenology in virtue
of foveating an object—i.e., physically positioning the eye so that a target stimulates the
foveal region of the retina, which is the area of the retina with greatest visual acuity and
chromatic colour sensitivity. When one looks at an object overtly, for example, one is
likely to experience it more clearly, distinctly, and centrally than when one experiences it
out of the corner of one’s eye—i.e., parafoveally. According to what we could call “the
foveation view” of attentional phenomenology, the phenomenal contribution that visual
attention makes to visual phenomenology reduces to the effects of foveation.
While there are ongoing empirical controversies about the explanatory relation be-
tween visual attention and oculomotor systems (Armstrong 2011; Smith & Schenk 2012),
the possibility of covert conscious visual attention seems to show that we cannot sim-
ply identify visual attention’s contribution to visual phenomenology with the effects of
foveation (Posner 1980). To illustrate, pick an object in your immediate surroundings.
Now, without taking your eyes off that object, shift your visual attention from it to some-
thing else in your surroundings. Most will agree that when they do this, there is an intro-
spectively accessible phenomenological change accompanying the shift of attention from
the object of fixation to the object spatially peripheral to the fixated object. Introspectively,
what it’s like to visually experience the object in the spatial periphery differs depending
on whether or not one is focusing one’s attention on it, even when foveation remains un-
changed. There remains a sense in which the attended object feels clearer, more vivid,
and more central in one’s experience than the unattended one, even while the attended
item is in the spatial periphery. This seems to suggest, against the foveation view, that the
phenomenology of visual attention does not simply reduce to the effect of foveation on
visual phenomenology. It seems to show a sense in which objects can be in some sense
subjectively “central” within one’s experience despite not being central to foveation.
Although the contribution that conscious attention makes to visual appearances can-
not be reduced to the effects of foveation (contra the foveation view), it may be that acts of
attention nevertheless mimic certain effects that foveating has on visual phenomenology.
This is approximately Stazicker’s (2011a; 2011b) view of (some instances of) conscious
covert visual attention. Building on the empirical results of Yeshurn and Carrasco (1998),
Stazicker argues that that “attending enhances spatial resolution in the visual signal itself,
by mimicking the effect of foveation, by effectively making the spatial filters for a location
more finely tuned”—an effect sometimes called “position” or “filter tuning” (Stazicker
2011b, 180). As Stazicker interprets these findings, some shifts of conscious covert visual
attention consist in increasing the determinacy with which visual experience represents
properties. By this, he means that attending makes it the case that a visual experience
represents more determinate or precise properties than would be represented outside the
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focus of attention, thereby enabling the subject to better resolve fine details of informa-
tion at the attended location. I’ll call putative cases in which attending achieves enhanced
visual determinacy (e.g., increased spatial resolution via filter tuning) cases of “sharpen-
ing”.2
Apart from sharpening visual experience, attending has also been found to boost the
apparent degree of magnitude of various visual parameters. To illustrate a core finding,
consider the following experiment from Carrasco et al. (2004) investigating the effect of
visual attention on the appearance of contrast. In their experiment, subjects are told that
they will be shown two “Gabor patches” (one on the left and one the right) (see Figure 1
for examples of Gabor patches with varying levels of contrast). Subjects are given the task
of reporting the line orientation of the Gabor patch that looks higher in contrast (“is the
stimulus that looks higher in contrast tilted to the left or to the right?”). In one condition
they see a neutral cue at the fixation point, and in another condition their attention is cued
(automatically and covertly) to the left or right side of a visual display by a direct cue. In
each case, the Gabor patches appears about 50 milliseconds after the cue offset, and is
visible for about 40 ms. Subjects have 1 second to respond. The basic result is this: if two
Gabor patches of equal contrast are shown (one on the left and one on the right), subjects
report the patch at the cued location as looking higher in contrast than the other patch.
Similarly, if one of the patches is a bit lower in contrast than the other, cuing attention to
the location of the lower contrast patch will make it appear equal in contrast to the higher
contrast patch. The difference to apparent contrast can be up to 6% when higher contrast
patches are being used. For example, a patch with 22% contrast might be made to look
equal in contrast to a patch with 28% contrast.
2See also Nanay (2010) for the proposal that visual attention contributes to perceptual experience by
increasing representational determinacy. Like Stazicker, Nanay explicates representational determinacy
in terms of the determinable-determinate relation. He suggests that a shift of visual attention consists in
coming to visually represent a more determinate property than would be visually represented without
attention. Whereas Nanay seems to put this proposal forward as a fully general account of the difference
attention makes to perceptual phenomenology, Stazicker puts it forward as an account of some instances of
conscious attention.
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Carrasco and colleagues have argued that the effect is genuinely perceptual, rather
than a consequence of post-perceptual decision bias or response bias.3 They explain the
increase in apparent contrast in terms of an enhancement made to the visual signal—
specifically, to an increase in the contrast gain of the visual representation of the stimu-
lus. According to this explanation, when attention to a location is increased, the signal
strength of a neuron responding to that location becomes amplified, mimicking the effect
that an actual increase in stimulus contrast would have under conditions of inattention.
This process of gain modulation is thought to work in concert with other mechanisms
to improve signal-to-noise ratio and make attended stimuli more discriminable to the
subject (Carrasco 2011, 1489). In this way, an intelligible relationship is found between
3Various critiques have been made to Carrasco’s methodology, including that the result might be due to
decision bias (e.g. Schneider and Komlos 2011; see also Beck and Schneider 2017 for a more theoretical dis-
cussion). Carrasco and coworkers have responded to these methodological criticisms (e.g., Anton-Erxleben
et al. 2011), and I will be following their interpretation here.
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familiar neural signatures of visuospatial attention at early stages of visual processing
(e.g., contrast gain modulation) and the behavioural data showing attentional changes
in visual appearance. As Carrasco and colleagues put it, there is “a strong link between
the attentional mechanisms improving visual processing and the concomitant effects on
appearance” (Barbot et al. 2018, 1831). The suggestion, in particular, appears to be that
the same properties of neural states—e.g., contrast gain modulation; filter-tuning, etc.—
that explain enhanced visual processing (signal enhancement) also help to explain the
enhanced appearance that subjects report. The former visual signal enhancements (e.g.,
amplified contrast representation) are reflected in the visual phenomenology.
Similar subjective “boosts” in degree of magnitude have been discovered for other vi-
sual parameters, including: gap size, speed, brightness, and saturation (though not hue)
(see Wu 2014b, Ch. 4 for a helpful review).4 Because these attentional effects on visual
appearances mimic an actual boost in the magnitude of a visual parameter (e.g., contrast),
I shall call such effects cases of “appearance boosting”. Whereas visual sharpening plau-
sibly connects with our intuitive idea of attention as a form of focus, visual boosting con-
nects with our intuitive idea of attention as a kind of highlighting or spotlight that makes
attended items appear more distinct from their surroundings. As Carrasco (2011) notes,
it is likely that mechanisms of filter tuning and gain modulation work cooperatively to
improve signal discriminability. Each provides a likely basis for the subjective changes in
appearance that commonly accompany shifts of visual attention.
I’ve discussed two ways that reorienting visual attention (in this case, visuospatial at-
tention) can make a difference to visual phenomenology: namely, to sharpen and to boost
the appearance of properties like spatial resolution and contrast. Various philosophical
controversies have arisen around these attentional effects on visual appearance. One such
controversy is about which metaphysical theory of perceptual experience is best able to
accommodate the observed effects of attention on visual appearances: whether “qualia”
or “mental paint” theory (Block 2010; 2015); naïve realism (Brewer 2013); or “represen-
tationalism” or “intentionalism” (Stazicker 2011a; Watzl forthcoming). I want to set this
particular controversy aside here and focus instead on a different one. The controversy
I am interested in concerns what significance effects like sharpening and boosting have
for our understanding of conscious attention and its phenomenology. I’ll conclude this
section by introducing the controversy I will be considering.
Let the “attentional appearance view” be the view that: (i) a state of conscious visual
attention consists in a certain enhanced visual state; and (ii) the phenomenal character of a
4A possible explanation for why attention does not alter hue, unlike saturation and the other tested
visual dimensions, is that hue cannot in any obvious sense be “increased” or “boosted” in order to facilitate
stimulus discrimination (Fuller & Carrasco 2006: 4043). A stimulus could be experienced to change in hue
(e.g., from blue to purple), but this would not make it appear to have more hue.
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state of conscious visual attention consists in the enhanced way things appear to the sub-
ject in having that visual experience. According to the attentional appearance view, a state
of conscious visual attention to something consists in a certain enhanced visual awareness
of the thing. So, for example, earlier when you turned your attention covertly from one
object in your environment to another one, the status of the latter as subjectively “cen-
tral” or “foreground” within your experience, according to the attentional appearance
view, consists in its possessing a certain enhanced appearance. Opponents of the atten-
tional appearance view deny that an enhanced visual appearance itself ever constitutes a
state of conscious attention to an object. On this view, whatever enhanced visual appear-
ances may be associated with conscious attention are merely the effects of one’s conscious
attention on something non-attentional. On this view, we fail to identify the distinctive
phenomenology that subjects access when introspecting an attentional episode—its char-
acteristic “foreground-background” subjective organization—by citing an enhanced vi-
sual appearance of the attended entity. On this view, attentional phenomenology, itself,
consists in something over and above any such changes in visual appearance.
An attentional appearance view can, in turn, be either reductive or non-reductive.
According to a non-reductive version of the view, we explain the sense in which an ob-
ject’s appearance becomes “enhanced” through attention in terms of its coming to look
more attended or (as this term is sometimes used) more “salient” (see Chalmers 2004 for
this suggestion). This view does not attempt to elucidate the meaning of “enhanced” in
“enhanced appearance” in non-attentional terms. On a reductive version of the view, by
contrast, “enhanced appearances” are appearances of a kind that are, in principle, also
available without attention: for example, sharpened spatial resolution and boosted ap-
parent contrast. In this chapter, I am defending a reductive version of the attentional
appearance view. I will focus on the sharpening of spatial resolution and boosting of
apparent contrast as my main examples of how an act of conscious attention enhances
visual appearances. To be clear, my claim is not that sharpening and boosting exhaust
the phenomenology of conscious attention. This is for two reasons. First, as I’ll discuss
in §4.4, I doubt that effects like sharpening and boosting exhaust the contribution that
conscious attention makes to visual appearances. But they are all that I need in order
to make the points that I want to make in the following section. Second, I endorse the
attentional appearance view as a thesis about states of conscious attention and specifi-
cally about their characteristic subjective organization. As we’ll see, it is important, in my
view, that a state of conscious attention always manifests within a larger act of attention.
I therefore reject the attentional appearance view as a thesis about total attentional phe-
nomenology. Nevertheless, I think the view, appropriately qualified, is more secure than
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recent philosophical work on attentional phenomenology has made it out to be.5
4.3 The replication argument
My aims in this section are the following. First, in §4.3.1, I outline the replication argu-
ment against the attentional appearance view. According to this argument, there is intro-
spective evidence against the attentional appearance view in the form of a phenomenal
contrast. Second, I argue that the replication argument is unsuccessful because, while I
acknowledge the phenomenal contrast, there is an alternative explanation for the contrast
that proponents of the argument have not considered, and moreover this alternative ex-
planation is consistent with the attentional appearance view. Then, in §4.3.2, I argue that
the neglected alternative is superior to the explanations that proponents of the replication
argument have offered. If this is right, then not only is the introspective evidence put for-
ward by the replication argument consistent with the view that it claims to undermine,
but better explained by it. Appreciation of the flaws in the replication argument will, in
turn, reveal the best version of the attentional appearance view.
4.3.1 Replying to the replication argument: Step 1
The replication argument against the attentional appearance view is developed most sys-
tematically by Watzl (2017, Ch. 9) and is also a central argument in Wu (2011c; 2014b,
Ch. 4).6 The argument purports to show that the distinctive phenomenology that we
access when introspecting conscious visual attention cannot consist in any property of
how things look or appear to the subject. It purports to demonstrate this by construct-
ing pairs of experiences that are phenomenally alike in the appearances they present, but
phenomenally different overall because of how the subject’s attention is distributed. The
argument exploits the assumption that for any visual appearance that might accompany
an attentional episode, this appearance can be replicated by judiciously altering proper-
ties of the stimulus. For example, to replicate the sharpening of apparent determinacy that
occurs with attention, one might insert a pane of glass possessing differential resolution
5It might be noted that, among philosophers who have directly spoken to the issue, the attentional
appearance view seems unfashionable. My focus in this chapter will be on Watzl and Wu because they
have been the most explicit critics of the view. However, they are not alone in rejecting the claim that a
state of conscious attention consists in a distinctive modification of visual appearances. Others who I read
as rejecting that claim include: Speaks (2010); Jennings (2015); Pautz (2010); and Beck and Schneider (2017).
Among these authors, Speaks, Jennings, and Beck and Schneider seem to endorse primitivist positions
about attentional phenomenology. Pautz explores the view that conscious attention is a form of conscious
thought, and Stazicker (2011a) defends this cognitivist view in the case of “voluntary” attention (though he
defends a version of the attentional appearance view for the case of involuntary attention).
6Watzl, in turn, traces the argument to Husserl (1983/1913) (see Watzl 2017, 181-2).
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and blurriness between the subject and the object (with higher resolution at the location
of the relevant object). To replicate the boosting effect, one could increase the physical
contrast of the stimulus. (Recall that the underlying neural process of gain modulation is
thought to imitate the effect that an actual increase in stimulus contrast would have on
the visual signal under conditions of inattention). And yet, on the face of it, a scenario
in which the sharpened and boosted appearance is the product of attending (the “atten-
tion scenario”) differs phenomenally from a scenario where the same appearances are
achieved as a result of environmental manipulation (the “appearance replica” scenario).
I will grant the claim that it is possible to replicate, without attention, every difference
in visual appearance that occurs as a result of an act of conscious attention. Moreover, I
will grant that the phenomenal contrast between an attention scenario and its correspond-
ing appearance replica establishes that an enhanced (e.g., sharpened and boosted) visual
appearance, on its own, is insufficient for the phenomenology of attention. I want instead
to challenge two further conclusions that Watzl and Wu each draw from the possibility of
appearance replicas. The problematic inferences are the following. First, they infer that
the enhanced visual appearance of an attended object could not constitute an instance of
conscious attention to the object but could at most be an effect of conscious attention on
visual appearances. Second, they infer that the phenomenology of conscious attention
consists in something other than an enhanced visual appearance.7 Though their posi-
tive accounts of attentional phenomenology are quite different, Watzl and Wu each take
the possibility of appearance replicas to show that the subjective structure of conscious
attention consists in something other than how things appear to the subject.
However, the possibility of appearance replicas offers little support to the conclusions
Watzl and Wu draw from it. Appreciation of why this is so will point us toward the posi-
tion that I will be defending in this chapter. I will focus on shifts of attention to make my
point. In such a case, the corresponding appearance replica would be a scenario in which
an object’s visual appearance changes because of changes occurring in the environment.
For example, the object might come to appear higher in contrast because the object’s con-
7For example, after discussing the possibility of appearance replicas, Watzl concludes that any difference
conscious attention makes to how things appear perceptually to the subject “do not flow from the nature
of attention. While they are [causally] explained by attention, they are not constituted by attention. For
this reason it is possible to have these effects also without attention” (2017,174). Watzl is explicit that “The
reason we could find a replica for each effect of attention on the appearances was that all of these are mere
effects or correlates of a certain distribution of attention”, rather than constitutive of attention (2017, 186, italics
added). Similarly, when examining the empirical findings showing the many ways attention alters how
things look to the subject, Wu writes that “This work in fact does not reveal a distinctive phenomenology
of visual attention, but rather the effects of attention on visual phenomenology” (2014, 111) and “It is not
clear . . . why one should speak of the resulting phenomenology as specifically attentional since it involves
changes in visual phenomenology such as alterations in apparent contrast, size, and saturation. Couldn’t
such changes occur in visual experience without attention?” (2014, 122, italics original).
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trast increases and the object might come to appear clearer because the resolution of the
intermediate pane of glass differentially changes.
Let’s begin with Watzl’s and Wu’s claim that the enhanced appearance of the attended
object does not constitute an instance of visual attention but is only an effect correlating
with attention. Against this, one could hold that the enhanced appearance of an object
constitutes conscious attention to the object only if the enhanced appearance is appropri-
ately generated. In particular, it could be that an object’s enhanced visual appearance to a
subject constitutes the subject’s state of visual attention to the object only if the enhanced
appearance is generated endogenously by the agent’s motivational states. This condition
is not met in the appearance replica scenario where one tampers with the stimulus. This
would make the case analogous to how, on causal theories of action, bodily movement
qualifies as action only if it is internally generated by the agent’s intention; otherwise, a
qualitatively similar bodily movement would be merely a bodily movement. In the same
way that a bodily movement is insufficient for an action, the enhanced appearance in an
appearance replica scenario may be insufficient for attention.
For parallel reasons, the possibility of appearance replicas does not establish that the
distinctive “foreground-background” or “center-periphery” structure that subjects access
when introspecting an attentional episode consists in something other than a property
of visual appearances. In particular, we can consistently reject the latter claim while ac-
knowledging an additional phenomenal factor present in the attentional scenario that is
absent in a corresponding appearance replica scenario. We can claim that whereas in
the attentional scenario the enhanced appearance is experienced as having its apparent
source in the agent, the same enhanced appearance in an appearance replica does not
manifest as originating in the agent. Instead, it manifests as having an external origin
(e.g., in the increasing resolution of the mediating pane of glass and in the physical con-
trast of what is behind it). It may be that the enhanced appearance of an object partly
constitutes the phenomenology of attending to it (in particular, the subjective structure
of the attentional state), even if the former experience is insufficient for the latter. This
would arguably make the phenomenology of attention analogous with experiences of
acting. In particular, an experience of one’s own body moving partly constitutes an expe-
rience of acting, even though the former experience is insufficient for the latter. In each
case, it could be that what more is required (i.e., to experience the enhanced appearance
as a state of attention; to experience one’s bodily motion as an action) is to experience
the change as a change of one’s own making. We could then acknowledge that the same
visual appearance that is achieved by attending can be achieved without attending, but
deny that whatever subjective organization an act of conscious attention contributes to
consciousness must be something over and above how things visually appear to the sub-
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ject. For the latter to manifest as a state of attention, one could argue, it must manifest as
coming from oneself.
The neglected alternatives to which I’ve been drawing our attention provide the core
of the position that I want to defend. It also has clear echoes in a view advanced by James
(1890/1950):
[I]t must be admitted that to some extent the relative intensity of two sensa-
tions may be changed when one of them is attended to and the other not . . .
But, on the other hand, the intensification which may be brought about seems
never to lead the judgment astray. As we rightly perceive and name the same
color under various lights, the same sound at various distances; so we seem
to make an analogous sort of allowance for the varying amounts of attention
with which objects are viewed; and whatever changes of feeling the attention
may bring we charge, as it were, to the attention’s account, and still perceive
and conceive the object as the same. (James 1890/1950, 426)
The explanation that I’m outlining of the phenomenal contrast between an attention sce-
nario and an appearance replica makes a point similar to the one that James makes in this
passage. My explanation claims that changes in attention consist in changes in the sub-
jective intensity (as well as “clarity”, as James goes on to discuss) of visual appearances
which we experience as of our own making rather than as originating in the world. If we
combine this with James’ thesis that attention is a kind of “focalization” or “concentra-
tion” of consciousness (“in clear and vivid form”), the way is open to understanding the
phenomenology of conscious visual attention as a subjectively owned perceptual enhance-
ment. Similar to how adopting a different spatial perspective on an object allows you to
vary how the object appears to you without it appearing to change, you can vary how
an object looks to you by moving your conscious attention around without the object (or
anything else in the environment) appearing to change.
So far, I’ve been assuming scenarios in which an object’s properties remain constant
throughout an attention shift. My proposal has been that, in the attention scenario, while
the object’s properties remain unchanged, its appearance changes (e.g., sharpens and
boosts) as a result of attention and this appearance change manifests as endogenously
generated by the agent.
However, we can imagine scenarios in which the object’s appearance changes at the
moment the subject reorients her attention to it. For example, it could be arranged that
as the subject’s attention turns to the left, the physical contrast of the object on the left
decreases and the resolution of the mediating pane of glass becomes a bit blurrier at its
location. In this way, we could “cancel” whatever sharpening and boosting of appear-
ance that the shift in attention would otherwise have caused. Does my proposal predict,
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counterintuitively, that under these circumstances the agent would lack any experience
of having shifted her attention, because the object’s visual appearance remains constant
throughout the attention shift? No. What matters for the experience of shifting attention
to an object is not that the apparent contrast and determinacy of the object increase as
one turns one’s attention to it. What matters is that one experiences the object’s appear-
ance as partly depending on one’s act of attention. In particular, one must experience
it as possessing an enhanced appearance relative to the appearance that it would have
were one’s attention directed elsewhere. The comparison class relevant to determining
whether a given appearance is “enhanced” is therefore not synchronic (since one might
be attending to the lowest contrast or blurriest object in a scene), nor diachronic (since
one could shift one’s attention from something of higher apparent contrast object and
resolution to something of lower apparent contrast and resolution). Rather, the compar-
ison class is counterfactual: one experiences the object’s current appearance as enhanced
relative to the appearance that it would have were one not attending to it or were one’s
degree of attention to it different. This accommodates cases in which one experiences one-
self attending despite the object of one’s attention decreasing in apparent intensity. Even
while its apparent contrast diminishes, one experiences its apparent contrast as higher
than what it would be were one not attending to it as one is.8
I’ve suggested that the evidence that the replication argument invokes is consistent
with the view that it claims to exclude. It remains to be seen whether there is, apart from
consistency with the introspective evidence, any reason to prefer one explanation over the
other. I’ll now explain why we should prefer my version of the attentional appearance
view over either of the rival explanations Watzl or Wu offer.
4.3.2 Replying to the replication argument: Step 2
I’ll begin by arguing that there are undesirable empirical and theoretical consequences
to claiming, as Watzl and Wu each do, that conscious visual attention is the cause of an
enhanced visual appearance rather than partly constituted by the enhanced appearance.
After that, I’ll examine Watzl’s and Wu’s positive proposals for how we should accom-
modate the phenomenal contrast between an attentional scenario and its corresponding
appearance replica. I’ll suggest that each problematically divorces the subjective structure
8When considering the possibilities for a reductive proposal of the phenomenology of conscious visual
attention in terms of apparent contrast magnitude, Wu (2011c; 2014b) considers proposals in terms of in-
creased apparent contrast relative to other perceived objects at a time (“synchronic salience”) and relative to
the same object at different times (“diachronic salience”). Having argued that the phenomenology of con-
scious visual attention (or “phenomenal salience”) does not track either of these properties, he concludes
that phenomenal salience is not a property of visual phenomenology, but rather of cognitive phenomenol-
ogy. He does not consider the proposal I’ve sketch here.
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of conscious attention from the subject’s perceptual perspective on the world. By contrast,
my proposal doesn’t have this result. So, we should prefer my proposal to theirs.
To begin with, the claim that conscious attention causes (rather than partly consists
in) an enhanced appearance seems to bring with it undesirable empirical commitments.
To see this, recall the suggestion from Barbot et al. of “a strong link” between properties
of visual neurons that underlie the enhanced visual signal (e.g., filter-tuning; gain modu-
lation) and the accompanying enhancements of visual appearance (e.g., sharpening and
boosting) (2018, 1831). As I noted earlier, the link they seem to have in mind here is ex-
planatory: namely, the same properties that explain visual processing enhancements also
partly underlie the enhanced appearance subjects report having when they are attending.
For example, we may experience the attended object as appearing higher in contrast than
when it is unattended because the gain of the visual signal is amplified in the attended
case relative to the unattended case. The amplified gain, the thought is, explains both im-
proved stimulus discriminability and its boosted appearance. So, when opponents of the
attentional appearance view assert that attention is the cause of changes in an object’s vi-
sual appearance, either they are affirming that attention is also the cause of the processing
enhancements that are realized by gain modulation and filter-tuning or they are rejecting
the explanatory connection that these researchers are drawing between signal enhance-
ment and enhanced visual appearance. The latter would be undesirable, given that this
is a leading account in the area. So, let’s consider the former claim—namely, that visual
attention is not itself the visual signal enhancement, but is rather the causal source driving
the signal enhancement.
In terms of the source-resultant framework that I laid out in Chapter 1, the natu-
ral way to read the above suggestion is as suggesting that attention is realized by the
“supramodal” source of bias rather than the resultant effect of biasing on visual process-
ing. However, this would be at odds with an emerging empirical consensus that takes
attention not to be the top-down source of bias into the visual system, but the globally
integrated state into which the visual system settles as a product of biased competition
(Desimone and Duncan 1995; Duncan 1998).9 I do not think that either Wu or Watzl
wish to identify attention with the source state of attentional bias. Wu explicitly argues
9Admittedly, some researchers working within the biased competition framework write as though they
maintain allegiance to the more traditional conception of attention as the higher level cause of signal en-
hancement (Kastner 2009; see Mole 2015 for discussion). But even these researchers can be interpreted as
claiming that there is a dedicated set of source regions for attentional control. The question of whether or
not there are dedicated mechanisms responsible for attentional control (e.g., within frontal-parietal areas)
seems to me an open question that can coherently be posed within the biased competition framework with-
out abandoning commitment to a conception of attention as the resultant state of biased competition. The
view that there is a privileged set of attentional control mechanisms does not, by itself, signal a return to
the view of attention as the cause of selectively enhanced processing.
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against the supramodal conception on theoretical and empirical grounds (see especially
Wu 2017, 24-5), and Watzl makes empirical claims that contradict it as well—e.g., by relat-
ing the neural correlates of visual attention to visual areas (e.g., 2011, 180) and relating the
driving states of visual attention (in both “active” and “passive” cases) to the LIP priority
map (see Watzl 2017, 132, 147). Perhaps Watzl and Wu will reply that attention is best
understood as functionally mediating between the source of attention and the resultant
state of visual signal enhancement. But while there could be intermediate stages in the
attentional process, it is unclear what would be gained theoretically by denying that the
enhanced visual signal itself exemplifies a form of attention once one has abandoned the
supramodal conception of attention. It is simpler to claim that the process of visual atten-
tion just is the biasing of visual states by source states, and that a state of visual attention
just is the enhanced visual state that results from that process (as realized by, e.g., prop-
erties like filter-tuning and gain modulation) (cf. §1.3). The move to regarding attention
as a further element in addition to the source state, the resultant state, and the bias process
seems theoretically unmotivated.
One response we should guard against at this point would be the reintroduction of
the replication argument at the level of processing enhancements. In particular, someone
might propose the following argument. We cannot identify the neural basis of visual
attention with states of selectively enhanced neural response within the visual system
(e.g., gain modulation) because it is possible to duplicate the latter effects in non-attention
involving ways. In principle, one could duplicate the same increase in signal strength that
accompanies a shift of visual attention simply by strengthening the physical stimulus,
so that the resulting visual signal is qualitatively identical to the one that would have
resulted from a weaker stimulus under attention. Consequently, the neural basis of visual
attention cannot consist in an enhanced visual signal. Rather, it must be the cause of that
signal enhancement. In response, though, this argument is no more persuasive at the
physical level of neural realizers than it is at the phenomenological level of appearances.
It could be that the enhanced visual signal qualifies as a basis of visual attention only
when it is appropriately endogenously caused.
In summary, there are empirical consequences to claiming that the relation between
attention and an enhanced visual appearance is causal rather than partly constitutive.
In particular, given the likely explanatory links between enhanced visual appearances
and enhanced visual processing, opponents of the attentional appearance view commit
to a questionable view of attention as the causal force that drives selectively enhanced
processing, rather than the achievement of states of selectively enhanced processing.
I will now turn to consider the rival explanations that Wu and Watzl give for the rele-
vant phenomenal contrast, and I will suggest that my proposal is preferable. On the view
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that I’m defending, recall, a state of visual attention is simply a motivationally modu-
lated visual experience, and the distinctive subjective organization of conscious attention
is a property of how things appear to the subject in this experience. On this view, the
subjective organization of a conscious state characterizes the agent’s perceptual perspec-
tive on the world. By contrast, when we examine the positive accounts that Watzl and
Wu offer for the phenomenal contrast between an attentional scenario and an appearance
replica scenario, we find each of them, in different ways, characterizing this subjective
organization more meta-cognitively. Let’s consider their proposals now.
The point is clearest in Wu’s case. Wu proposes to explain the phenomenology of con-
scious attention in terms of a subject’s introspective awareness. In particular, on Wu’s
view, the “foreground-background” structure that subjects access when introspecting at-
tention belongs to the thought that one would express by saying “I am attending to that”
(2011c, 95; 2014b, 130]). On this view, the phenomenology that one accesses when intro-
specting an episode of attention turns out not to be a property of one’s attention but of
the thought that one is attending. As Wu points out, this implies that, outside of special
contexts of introspection, visual attention does not intrinsically contribute to the subject’s
conscious perspective. If one is immersed in a game of squash or a climb, on his view, the
foreground-background organization of attentional phenomenology is absent: nothing
stands out as “central”, “prominent”, or “salient” to one in the way that it does when one
consciously reflects on one’s attentional state (2014b, 130). Wu appears to acknowledge
that he is saying something surprising to common sense here. It is natural to under-
stand him as attributing an introspective illusion regarding the ubiquity of attentional
phenomenology—as though it shows up in experience only when we self-consciously
reflect on attention. This is an unattractive result.
On the face of things, Watzl’s account of the subjective structure of conscious atten-
tion does not have the same shortcoming as Wu’s. Watzl’s account does not tie attentional
phenomenology to explicit self-reflection. On Watzl’s view, conscious attention is the sub-
ject’s mental activity of “structuring” her overall conscious state into what is more “cen-
tral” and what is more “peripheral”. This is an activity subjects engage in continuously
as they act in the world, not only in special contexts of reflection. Taken on their own,
Watzl’s claims about conscious attention are intuitive and plausible. However, their plau-
sibility diminishes on examination. We can bring this out by considering the difference
between the type of conscious perspective subjects possess in virtue of acts of attentional
structuring, on Watzl’s view, and other examples of perspective. For example, whereas
one’s egocentric spatial perspective contributes to orienting one to the world around one-
self, an act of conscious attention, on Watzl’s account, orients one to one’s experiences of
the world. Through acts of conscious attention, experiences, not their objects, manifest
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subjectively as central and peripheral to one another.
An apparent consequence of Watzl’s account is that foveating an object and covertly
attending to an object turn out to be acts with fundamentally different targets and aims.
By foveating, one arguably aims to enhance one’s perceptual relation to something in one’s
environment—e.g., by bringing a thing more clearly into view and into the center of one’s
visual field (with accompanying processing advantages). By contrast, on Watzl’s account,
conscious attention aims at enhancing the subject’s relation to her own conscious states—
e.g., by bringing an experience of a thing out from the conscious periphery and into the
center of consciousness. If conscious attention endows subjects with a distinctive kind
of perspective, then, on Watzl’s view, it endows them with a perspective on experiences.
Although Watzl does not wed the phenomenology of attention to explicit contexts of self-
reflection like Wu does, his account nevertheless is like Wu’s in being metacognitive. In
this regard, Watzl’s account, like Wu’s, draws a sharp distinction between a subject’s
perceptual perspective on objects and her conscious attentional perspective.10
The natural question to ask of Watzl’s account is whether acts of conscious visual
attention really are so different from acts of foveation or other activities which aim at en-
hancing the subject’s perceptual awareness of select parts of the environment. Of course,
the two are different: foveation incorporates overt movement while covert attention does
not. But beyond this, it is natural to suppose that they are activities with similar aims
and targets. Each is a way of bringing something into focus and making it more visually
discriminable from its surroundings. Each aims at seeing certain parts of the environ-
ment better. Covert visual attention may simply be one aspect of a more encompassing
perceptual activity of “looking” around at the world: an activity that consists in actively
10Watzl employs perspectival metaphors in connection with attention, but it is sometimes unclear what
these amount to on his view. Sometimes he characterizes conscious attention as itself a mental perspective
(Watzl in preparation). When he does so, he is careful to note that whereas more familiar examples of
perspective manifest as a perspective on objects (and thereby as structuring how the world perceptually
appears to the subject), attention is a perspective on appearances. This gives the impression of a higher
order view of attention as a perspective on conscious states ordered in terms of which experiences are more
central to which others. Other times, Watzl avoids suggesting that attention is a separate type of perspective
and instead describes it as simply the “structure” of one’s conscious perspective on the world:
Attention structures consciousness into what is more central and what is more peripheral.
Unlike spatial structure, the center-periphery structure of consciousness is not a structure of
how the world appears to the subject through her conscious perspective. It is the structure of
her perspective itself. (Watzl 2017, 183)
These descriptions remove the suggestion of conscious attention as higher-order, but they also risk collaps-
ing Watzl’s account into a version of the attentional appearance view. Suppose that the center-periphery
structure of attention constitutes a subject’s conscious perspective as a perspective on the world. In that
case, we can ask what difference there is between the subjective structure of a perspective and the subjec-
tive structure that characterizes “how the world appears to the subject through her conscious perspective”.
Plausibly, it is the structure of a subject’s conscious perspective that determines how things appear to a
subject from that perspective. If so, then it is not clear there really are two “structures” in that case.
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manipulating one’s perceptive point of view in order to enrich one’s information about
a thing (cf. Matthen 2014, 2005). Indeed, some researchers argue that covert visual at-
tention may simply be the visual processing enhancements that occur as a by-product of
saccade planning in oculomotor areas, with covert attention possibly being the product of
a sub-threshold motor command (see Armstrong 2011 for discussion). Such proposals are
not obviously in conflict with the phenomenology of covert attention to an object (which
can feel a bit like one is trying to see a thing better while simultaneously suppressing the
movement of one’s eye).
Watzl and Wu are led to their respective positions about conscious attention in light
of the perceived deficiency of the claim that the phenomenology of conscious attention is
a certain manner of enhanced visual appearance—e.g., a sharpened and boosted appear-
ance of an object. That each takes the attentional appearance view as their starting point
is an implicit indication that it is taken to be the default position. It is simple and it is nat-
urally suggested by the empirical work on attentional alterations in visual appearance. In
light of the perceived inadequacies of the position, these authors are led to characterize
the phenomenology of conscious attention meta-cognitively. They are led to characterize
it either as a subjective organization that is unique to contexts of introspective reflection
or as the phenomenological manifestation of the order subjects give to their conscious
mental states. I’ve argued that there is a simpler view available. Conscious attention is a
motivationally biased conscious visual state. And the characteristic phenomenology that
we access when we introspect conscious attention is simply the reflection of this motiva-
tional bias on the way things look to the subject, with some things being clearer and more
distinct than others. Assuming that each account is phenomenologically adequate, mine
is preferable. But some will object at this point that my proposal is not phenomenologi-
cally adequate. I’ll turn to this objection now.
4.4 Modulating perceptual organization with attention
Opponents of the attentional appearance view might acknowledge that my proposal in
terms of subjectively owned changes in visual appearance can explain aspects of atten-
tional phenomenology. For example, they might acknowledge that my proposal can ac-
commodate those aspects of attentional phenomenology that we intuitively describe us-
ing terms like “clarity”, “vividness”, and “distinctness”. Perhaps, they will grant, the
aptness of such language does come from subjectively owned changes in an object’s vi-
sual appearance like sharpening and boosting. Nevertheless, they may insist that my
proposal falls far short of accommodating attentional phenomenology as a whole. This
is because, they might suggest, my proposal cannot adequately accommodate the holistic
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and structural aspects of conscious attention that give certain spatial metaphors their in-
tuitive meaning. In particular, some may suggest that my proposal cannot accommodate
those aspects of attentional phenomenology that motivate us to describe an attended en-
tity as being more central or more foreground in our experience than unattended ones. And
one might doubt that the latter aspects of attentional phenomenology can be accommo-
dated exclusively in terms of a clearer, more distinct visual appearance, together with
subjective ownership. To see this, consider that while shifting attention covertly to an en-
tity might mimic some of the effects that occur as a result of foveation or environmental
manipulation (e.g., making a thing appear literally clearer and more distinct from its sur-
roundings), an attended entity need not appear literally more central to the subject than an
unattended one. A covertly attended entity appears to you as being in the spatial periph-
ery. And yet, when focusing one’s attention on the entity, it is (in some possibly primitive
sense) more central in your experience. Analogous points apply to the notion of “fore-
ground”, since what is in the attentional foreground can be in the spatial background.
One might thus suggest that it is this holistic structure which agents actively endow on
their experiences through acts of conscious attention. And one might further suggest that
it is this aspect of attentional phenomenology that most obviously resists reductive char-
acterization in terms of modulations in an object’s visual appearance. If this is right, then
conscious attention contributes something much more fundamental to experience than
superficial changes like apparent contrast and spatial resolution. It contributes novel or-
ganization that is simply absent from the appearances themselves. This is the real reason,
one might argue, the attentional appearance view is insufficient.
In response, proponents of the attentional appearance view should acknowledge that
effects like sharpening and boosting are insufficient to accommodate attentional phe-
nomenology. This is so even when sense of ownership is acknowledged to accompany
these changes in appearance. However, they should reply that it would be a mistake to
reject the attentional appearance view on these grounds. One can grant that effects like
sharpening and boosting are insufficient to capture attentional phenomenology but argue
that the former do not exhaust the explanatory resources available to an attentional ap-
pearance view. Even on the reductive version of the view that I am pursuing, one need
not understand conscious attention’s contribution to visual appearances only in terms of
qualities like contrast and determinacy. There is, after all, more to a visual appearance
than a bundle of qualities. Consequently, there are potentially more ways that an act of
attention could alter a visual appearance than by altering the apparent magnitudes of
those qualities. In particular, all will agree that visual appearances themselves possess
complex internal structure. This includes principles of “gestalt” organization (see e.g.
Wagemans et al. 2012). For example, visually resembling objects typically appear as be-
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longing together as members of a single visual group, whereas visually dissimilar objects
appear to stand apart from each other as members of different groups. Similarly, there
are many well-understood principles governing how one entity comes to be separated or
segmented from its surroundings. Beyond these gestalt principles of visual organization,
appearances also instantiate a complex “bound” organization. For example, when seeing
an object, one sees the thing as possessing multiple features—e.g., a certain colour and
shape. Further, we do not typically see only one object in isolation, but multiple objects
as spatially related to one another and to ourselves within one, overarching scene. These
are all aspects of what I mean by the “internal organization” of a visual appearance.
Confronted with doubts regarding the adequacy of the attentional appearance view,
a natural strategy for a proponent of this view is to ask whether they can invoke any of
the above organizational features of visual appearances to alleviate such doubts. This
would require asking: (a) whether acts of conscious attention might alter the internal
organization of an appearance in something like the way that we have seen it to alter
subjective magnitudes like contrast and spatial resolution; and, if so, (b) whether this,
when combined with subjective ownership, could remove lingering doubts that drive
theorists away from the attentional appearance view. This is the question to which I’ll
now turn.
Let’s begin with whether attention may contribute to the internal organization of a
visual appearance. While the topic of attention and its relationship to visual organiza-
tion is a complex one with a long history, current work suggests that visual attention is a
modulator of perceptual organization and that the relationship between the two is “mul-
tifaceted and mutually constrained” (Kimchi et al. 2016, 34-5). For example, de Haan and
Roden (2010) investigated whether similarity grouping—a principle of perceptual orga-
nization traditionally assumed to be established pre-attentively—is modulated by “atten-
tional relevance”. They gave subjects a task involving the simultaneous identification of
two targets (one on the left side of the display and one on the right side). They found
that if the two targets are similar along a task-relevant dimension (e.g., visually similar
in letter identity in a letter identification task), performance improves. This much, they
note, is consistent with the received assumption that the competitive interactions that cul-
minate in a state of visual attention occur among already organized groups of partially
bound visual individuals and, furthermore, that elements that are grouped tend to co-
operate rather than compete for processing. This is consistent with a picture on which
the process of biased competition that culminates in a state of visual attention operates
over a visual field already organized along gestalt principles. But de Haan and Roden
found that when the two targets are similar along a task-irrelevant dimension (e.g., in
colour identity in a letter identification task), similarity grouping was not observed. The
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result, they note, is surprising (though, they also note, consistent with recent work): “sup-
posedly pre-attentional grouping mechanisms might not operate as independently from
top-down attentional modulations as traditionally thought” (de Haan and Roden 2010).
Similar results have been found with respect to other gestalt principles of visual organi-
zation. For example, whether an ambiguous visual figure is treated by the visual system
as a dumb-bell or as a circular individual within in a larger dumb-bell—as measured by
the “same object advantage”—has been found to vary depending on whether the agent’s
intention is to grasp (in which case attention spreads to throughout the dumb-bell form)
or point (in which case attention spreads only through the embedded circle) (Riddoch
and Humphreys 2007).11 It seems that attention neither determines nor is determined by
a visual state’s internal gestalt organization. Rather, attending modulates such organiza-
tion.12
The above work on the modulatory effects of attention of perceptual organization does
not speak directly to the question of visual appearances. Less empirical work has been
devoted to the modulatory effects of attending on the appearance of visual organiza-
tion than to lower level properties like resolution and contrast magnitude (though Car-
rasco and colleagues have recently begun to investigate these questions see Barbot et al.
2018). But we perhaps do not need to wait on empirical evidence. The claim that atten-
tion alters visual organization is a familiar theme from the Gestalt psychological tradition
and familiar introspectively from examples of ambiguous figures and examples of aspect
(e.g., the duck-rabbit; the Necker cube) (Wagemans et al. 2012). It may also be a cen-
tral part of the experience of searching for something. When you look for a thing in a
crowded scene, you are intuitively attempting to “single it out” from its surroundings.
This will be easy if pre-attentive visual organization ensures that your target stands apart
from its surroundings—e.g., when there is weak target-distractor grouping (Duncan and
Humphreys 1992). But it will be quite difficult when your target is perceptually grouped
with its surroundings in virtue of visual resemblances—i.e., when there is strong target-
distractor perceptual grouping. Because competitive interactions tend to occur between
rather than within perceptual groups, all members of the same perceptual group will tend
11The “same object benefit” refers to the finding that if a subject’s target appears inside the same enclosed
figure as a previously presented cue, then the target is detected more quickly than if the target appears
equidistant from the cue but located within a different enclosed figure (Egly et al. 1994). There are contro-
versies surrounding the interpretation of this and related findings, though it is commonly cited as evidence
that attention operates upon already segmented visual objects, rather than being, for example, location-
based.
12A similar conclusion seems to be true for feature-binding. In a review article, Humphreys (2016) con-
cludes that “rather than thinking of visual binding being either fully bottom-up and preattentive, or fully
dependent on attention, it may be better to think of bottom-up and top-down processes interacting to op-
timize feature binding” (2016, 1933). He also puts the point by saying that it is more accurate to regard
attention as “modulating” binding than as being either necessary for it or irrelevant to it.
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to be selected together and this will frustrate your goal of identifying a specific individual
within that group.13 In searching for the target, perhaps part of what you are attempting
to do is reorganize a scene’s appearance to align it with your goals: to pull the target out
from the crowd to which it has been pre-attentively assimilated by similarity grouping.
You are trying to modulate the gestalt organization of the appearance so as to foreground
or single out your target from the crowd. This would be an active, intention-guided pro-
cess of perceptual reorganization.
Once we expand our view of the potential ways conscious attention can impact per-
ceptual appearances—including not only lower level changes like the sharpening of spa-
tial resolution and the boosting of apparent contrast but also gestalt principles of percep-
tual organization—it is unclear why we should conclude that the attentional appearance
view is phenomenologically inadequate. In particular, it is not clear that the features of at-
tentional phenomenology that motivate describing conscious attention as form of “struc-
turing” of experience into relations of “foreground” and “background” or “center” and
“periphery” are necessarily left out of the attentional appearance view (though specific
proposals would need to be put forward and assessed). We must, in particular, be care-
ful to distinguish the experience of partial ownership over the internal organization of a
visual appearance and the experience of a novel organization that originates with acts of
conscious attention and that is intrinsically foreign to appearances. The relative merits of
these proposals should not be settled solely on the basis of introspection. We must appeal
to broader theoretical considerations of the kind I appealed to in the previous section.
Until each hypothesis is properly examined, it is premature to abandon the attentional
appearance view on the grounds that it cannot accommodate the holistic or gestalt or-
ganization of conscious attention. Such features of attentional phenomenology may be
amenable to the same treatment that I earlier proposed for sharpening and boosting.
4.5 What appearance replicas show: the inalienability of
conscious attention
Recent philosophical work on the nature and phenomenology of conscious attention has
emphasized the theoretical significance of the possibility of appearance replicas. The driv-
ing intuition is that experienced changes in an object’s visual appearance are insufficient
to accommodate what it’s like for subjects to attend consciously to an object. This in-
sufficiency is thought to be revealing both about the nature of conscious attention and
13This is also one account of the “flanker interference effect” discussed in Chapter 1 (Driver and Baylis
1989; see §1.5)
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how it figures in total phenomenology. In particular, some have cited the possibility of
phenomenally contrastive appearance replicas as evidence that the distinctive subjective
organization of conscious attention consists in something over and above any organiza-
tion within appearances. This position acknowledges that conscious attention has var-
ious effects on how things look and it acknowledges that the “look” of things has its
own, highly complex internal structure. But it insists that acts of conscious attention add
their own structure to experience. This further structure reflects, to use Lewis’s phrase,
an agent’s “constructive acts” through which the agent confers selective emphasis on a
passive appearance.
I’ve argued that these are the wrong conclusions to draw from reflection on phenom-
enally contrastive appearance replicas. Conscious attention does not contribute an addi-
tional structure to experience. Rather, the subjective structure of conscious attention is a
structure within appearances. At the same time, appearances are not passively given or
presented to the subject. Instead, appearances are shaped under the guidance of our pri-
orities. This activity is reflected in the phenomenology—e.g., in the experience of aspects
of an appearance as the product of our own activity.
I want to close by suggesting that we are in a position to draw a different conclusion
about the nature of conscious attention from the possibility of phenomenally contrastive
appearance replicas. This conclusion relates to an implication of the account that I de-
fended in Chapter 3—namely, that acts of conscious attention are subjectively inalien-
able. Recall that, on the view defended there, an agent subjectively owns any action that
is controlled by a motivational state that controls conscious attention. This implies that if
conscious attention is an action, then, necessarily, it is a subjectively owned action, since
whatever motive controls the act of conscious attention is (trivially) controlling conscious
attention. Put differently, it is impossible to experience an episode of conscious attention
as an act of conscious attention, but as one that is not performed by oneself. Acts of con-
scious attention are subjectively inalienable. It follows that there can be no analog in the
domain of conscious attention of schizophrenic passivity experience (see §3.6).
This impossibility claim might give us pause for thought. Specifically, one might won-
der whether there are any reasons independent of my account for accepting the impos-
sibility claim.14 I’ll close by suggesting that the explanation that I’ve defended in this
chapter for the phenomenal contrast between an experience of conscious attention and
its corresponding appearance replica gives us independent support for this impossibility
claim. In so doing, I will be using the results of this chapter to reinforce the account of
subjective action ownership defended in Chapter 3. I will focus my remarks on subjective
ownership for shifts of conscious attention, though parallel remarks can be made about
14Thank you to Christopher Mole for pressing this worry to me in an earlier commentary on my material.
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maintaining states of conscious attention.
First, let’s recall examples of actions that appear to be only contingently subjectively
owned—e.g., an alienation experience like anarchic hand or schizophrenic alien control. If
we take patients’ subjective reports of these experiences at face value, they seem to show
that it is possible for a subject to lose subjective ownership over an action like reaching
for something or moving one’s fingers, yet remain aware of the movement as an action or
intentional movement. The subject remains aware of a certain action as being performed,
but experiences herself as not performing the action. For example, a patient might report
feeling as if an alien agent had entered her body and guided its movements (Spence et
al. 1998, 1998). This seems to describe a kind of experience of action, but one that lacks
the feature of first-person ownership or “mineness” that characteristically accompanies
action. It is a pathologically third-personal experience of acting. It may be like observing
another agent act (except, strangely, with one’s own body).
In order for a shift of conscious attention to be subjectively alienated, the following
would need to be the case. The subject remains aware of an attention shift as an attention
shift, but experiences this shift as not her own doing. It is the possibility of such an ex-
perience, I want to suggest, that reflection on the possibility of phenomenally contrastive
appearance replicas seems to foreclose.
We can develop these ideas more precisely as follows.15
1. An experienced change in an object’s visual appearance is experienced either as a
change in the object, a change in the object’s surroundings, or as a change of the
subject’s own making.
2. If x is a shift in attention to an object, x is an experienced change in an object’s visual
appearance that is experienced as not being a change in the object or in the object’s
surroundings.
Therefore,
3. If x is a shift in conscious attention to an object, x is experienced as of the subject’s
own making. [From 1, 2].
4. In a case of subjectively alienated action, the subject experiences the action as per-
formed, but as not performed by herself.
So,
5. There are cases of subjectively alienated shifts in conscious attention only if there
are cases where the subject experiences a change as both of her own making and not
of her own making. [From 3, 4]
15Thank you to Imogen Dickie for helping me with the details of this argument.
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But,
6. There can be no such cases.
Therefore,
7. There cannot be cases of subjectively alienated shifts in conscious attention. [From
5, 6].
The argument is valid. So, let us assess the premises.
The first premise is controversial. This is because it is possible that an experience could
remain “silent” about questions such as the causal source of an experienced change in an
object’s appearance. For example, it could be that changes in visual appearance are nei-
ther presented as changes in the world (whether in the object or in its surroundings) nor
as changes of one’s own making. Perhaps this is so in experiences like a fading afterimage
after seeing a camera flash. We do not feel any sense of agency over these experienced
changes of appearance, but arguably they also do not manifest as having occurred outside
us.
In response, I mean to restrict the domain of objects at issue in the first premise to ob-
jects of perception that manifest as objective or independent of the subject. This includes
experiences of what Siegel (2006) calls “object seeing”, which, as Siegel notes, differ expe-
rientially from sensation experiences like afterimages or phosphenes. One of the principal
differences between experiences of object-seeing and sensation experiences, Siegel argues,
is that the phenomenology of the former, but not the latter, reflects awareness of the sub-
ject’s perspective and capacities for interaction with the experienced object. For example,
part of the phenomenal character of an experience of object-seeing is an awareness of
how an object’s appearance will change systematically with changes in one’s perspec-
tive on it (“perspectival connectedness”). On this view, an experience of object-seeing
constitutively involves experience of an object as being a certain way and of oneself as
bearing a certain perspective on it. This view further suggests that the subject experi-
ences an object’s appearance as determined by both the state of the object and by the
subject’s current perspective on it. The first premise should therefore be interpreted as
relative to the class of experiences Siegel calls “object-seeing”. It says, with respect to ex-
periences of object-seeing, that an experienced change in an object’s appearance is either
experienced as resulting from an environmental change—whether in the object itself or
its surroundings—or as a change of one’s own making—i.e., as a result of a change in
one’s perspective on it.
According to the second premise, a shift of conscious attention to an object is an expe-
rienced change in the object’s visual appearance that manifests neither as a change in the
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object nor as a change in the object’s environment. My support for this claim comes from
the possibility of phenomenally contrastive appearance replicas. These cases suggest that
when one experiences a change in visual appearance as having an outside source (e.g.,
whether as a result of a change in the object or in the mediating pane of glass), one is
experiencing a fundamentally different sort of event than a shift of conscious attention.
In particular, one is experiencing an appearance replica of a scenario in which one shifts
conscious attention. By ensuring that a change in an object’s appearance manifest to the
subject as having a source outside the subject, we thereby remove the phenomenology of
an attention shift. We do not preserve the experience of an attention shift but render it
phenomenologically passive or alienated.
Opponents of the attentional appearance view will reject this appeal to appearance
replicas. Specifically, they will reject the assumption that an experienced change in an ob-
ject’s appearance is a shift in conscious attention. On their view, these two things merely
correlate. With the second premise, I am therefore presupposing the account that I have
been defending in this chapter.
It follows from premises 1 and 2 that a shift of conscious attention is an experienced
change in an object’s appearance that manifests as of one’s own making. More specifically,
it manifests as a change in one’s perspective on the object. This change in perspective
can occur as the result of an intention—e.g., to improve one’s perception of the thing,
possibly in order to do something with the object. It can also occur automatically, as
when one’s attention is captured by a loud crash. In each case, to manifest as a change of
attention, the change in appearance must manifest as arising from within the agent, rather
than exogenously from the stimulus. Unlike other forms of perspectival change, there is
nothing else that you need to do in order to change the object’s visual appearance. For
example, unlike changing your spatial perspective on an object, you do not need to first
move your body in order to adjust your attention to the object. Nor do you need to do
anything else (contra my opponents in this chapter). You change the object’s appearance
directly and covertly. That is what a shift of conscious visual attention consists in, on the
present account.
Finally, claims 4–7 draw out the implications of the above observations for alienated
experiences of attending: 4 states what I take an alienated experience of acting to consist
in; 5 draws the inference that a subjectively alienated attention shift would have to be both
an experience of oneself as both the agent of the shift and not the agent of the shift; and 6
claims that such cases cannot occur. Admittedly, it is difficult to conclusively demonstrate
the last claim. However, we also do not have any clear reason to deny it. For example,
when we examine actual examples of passivity experience, like those in anarchic hand
syndrome and schizophrenia, we do not find subjective reports of being the agent of the
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act and not being the agent of the act. The patients simply report feeling they are not the
agent of the act. A plausible explanation for why such inconsistent experiences do not
seem to occur is that an alienation experience simply consists in the absence of subjective
ownership toward an action of which one is conscious. If an alienated experience of
acting consists in an absence of subjective ownership over the action, then we have an
explanation for why cases of simultaneous ownership and alienation cannot arise.
If this is right, then the possibility of appearance replicas does establish something im-
portant about attentional phenomenology. It establishes that it is impossible to experience
a change in an object’s appearance as a change in attention without thereby experiencing
oneself as the source of the change. It shows that an act of conscious attention is essen-
tially subjectively owned: an act of changing one’s own perspective on an object.
4.6 Conclusion
In the last two chapters, I’ve defended a view of the phenomenology of conscious atten-
tion as the taking up of a motivational perspective. I’ve suggested that this element of
perspective impacts our experience of ourselves as both agents and as perceivers. In an
experience of acting, taking up a motivational perspective confers conscious ownership
over an action, ensuring that it is the agent who controls what she does. In adopting such
a perspective, the agent’s perceptual experience of the world becomes subjectively orga-
nized according to the standards of success set by the motivational states that function to
direct conscious attention. Consequently, the world perceptually appears to an agent in
relation to her agential priorities.
However, we must treat the attentional structure of the agent’s perceptual experi-
ence carefully. Specifically, I’ve argued that the case for primitivism about attentional
structure is weaker than is sometimes acknowledged. The main evidence marshaled in
its support—the possibility of phenomenally contrastive appearance replicas—does not
provide clear support for the view. I’ve argued that the possibility of such cases is not
only consistent with but better explained by a view on which attentional structure is the
upshot of a modulatory process in which the agent experiences herself as an active par-
ticipant. On the latter view, the agent does not, in adopting a motivational perspective,
introduce a novel subjective structure to her experience that would otherwise be wholly
absent. Rather, in attending consciously, the agent guides the construction of a perceptual
appearance by biasing its development toward the enhancement of information that is
relevant to her in light of her intentions and other priorities. This implies that the sub-
jective structure of conscious attention is more interwoven with perceptual appearances
than the primitivist can allow.
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